African Conflict Resolution Act Interagency Progress Report for Fiscal Years 1998/1999

U.S. Agency for International Development
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Information Agency
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Report
The purpose of this report is to describe activities which promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa during fiscal year 1998 by the US Government (USG) through the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, United States Information Agency, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and other bodies. This report was mandated by *The African Conflict Resolution Act* (ACRA) of October 19, 1994, which authorized USG agencies to strengthen African regional, national and local institutions addressing issues of conflict. ACRA called for assistance to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa, highlighting the following areas:

– Improving conflict resolution capabilities of the Organization of African Unity (OAU);
– Improving conflict resolution capabilities of multilateral sub-regional organizations in Africa;
– Improving conflict resolution capabilities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs);
– Demobilization and retraining of African armed forces;
– Training for Africans in conflict resolution and peacekeeping;
– Support for conflict resolution and demobilization in Africa.

The next section of this introduction summarizes the nature of conflict in Africa and its costs and consequences. The main body of the report is followed by a series of appendices.

Africa at a Crossroads
Sub-Saharan Africa is at a crossroads in its political and economic development. On the one hand, a "renaissance" is occurring in some countries. As President Clinton remarked in Ghana's Independence Square in March 1998, "old patterns are fading away, the Cold War is gone, colonialism is gone, remnants of past troubles remain, but…nations and individuals finally are free to seek a newer world where democracy and peace and prosperity are not slogans, but the essence of a new Africa." In southern Africa and elsewhere, economies considered hopeless just a few short years ago are booming.

> *"From Kampala to Capetown, from Dakar to Dar-es-Salaam, Africans are being stirred by new hopes of democracy and peace and prosperity…it is time for Americans to put a new Africa on our maps."*
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> **President Bill Clinton**
> **Ghana, March 1998**

In contrast, other African nations remain mired in poverty and violence, and the re-emergence of conflict in Angola and elsewhere suggests that gains may be all too fragile. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 1998 Africa had 11 major violent conflicts, more than any other continent. Over 8 million of the world's 22

million refugees were African. Ominously, the Interdisciplinary Research Program on the Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (known by its Dutch acronym, PIOOM) has documented that the number of low-intensity conflicts (i.e., between 100 and 1,000 deaths per year) has been rising in Africa from 9 in 1994 to 34 in 1997. These clashes may forecast that further chaos is brewing.

Protracted warfare in Africa has resulted in terrible human suffering and lost economic opportunities. Death and human suffering are the most dramatic and distressing consequences of these conflicts, which have caused tremendous setbacks to Africa's political development and socio-economic progress. In many countries engulfed in conflict, state structures have either collapsed altogether or control only a portion of their respective territories. Moreover, even sporadic incidents of violence frequently result in crackdowns by the state, paralyzing fledgling democracies.

Africa has paid dearly in economic terms for the violent conflicts it has endured. Economic crisis goes hand in hand with political chaos. US activities to engage in trade and investment as well as assist in Africa's development have been frustrated by the drain on resources resulting from violent conflict. For example, in 1998 the US provided $890 million in total assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa. Of this amount $190 (21.3%) went for emergency humanitarian emergencies and disaster relief. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo—an unprecedented regionalized war that has drawn at least six armies onto its soil—is among the most dangerous on the globe. The political, economic, and humanitarian stakes of continued conflict in Africa are high indeed. The US government sees such conflict as the cause of "untold economic and social damage to the countries of Africa which threatens political and economic stability while diverting scarce resources from development needs."

It is clear that for Africa conflict is a central issue stifling economic progress and sustainable development. Given the human misery, economic devastation, and environmental degradation that plagues parts of Africa, the imperative for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution is clear. Finding effective solutions to such crises requires a long-term view and multiple strategies spanning from diplomatic initiatives to local ones. Diverging views exist, however, about the timing, sequencing and ownership of the respective processes.

The United States continues to lead in helping African countries prevent, mitigate, resolve, and recover from conflicts. In addition to bilateral assistance, the US works with multilateral organizations such as the United Nations to achieve these aims. Such assistance takes many forms, including preventive diplomacy, conflict mediation,

peacekeeping, strengthening the capacity of indigenous NGOs, support for human rights, demobilization and retraining, arms control, demining, humanitarian relief, and more. These initiatives have achieved important results preventing and mitigating complex emergencies while simultaneously laying the foundation for long-term peace and prosperity.

CHAPTER I:
IMPROVING THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION CAPABILITIES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) AND OTHER MULTILATERAL SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The African Conflict Resolution Act (ACRA) legislation authorizes assistance to strengthen the conflict resolution capability of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other multilateral organizations in Africa. This chapter reviews the major US efforts in this field.

1.1 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Although the main focus of COMESA is to form a large economic and trading unit, promotion of peace and security in the region are also among its objectives. A USAID grant supported these efforts by funding mechanisms for arbitrating disputes between member countries, developing a plan to build the capacity of the Court of Justice, and an investigation lodged by Ethiopia against blocked access to two Eritrean ports. USAID is also collaborating with COMESA in launching two innovative conflict funds, one for quick response to existing or emerging conflicts and another for pilot activities to address longer-term conflicts.

1.2 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The US supports initiatives to promote conflict mitigation and resolution through ECOWAS and other regional institutions.

The US supported ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese-speaking States (CPLP) in their efforts to negotiate a settlement for the conflict in Guinea-Bissau. DOS urged all parties to abide scrupulously by the terms of brokered cease-fires, condemned renewal of armed clashes in October 1998, and urged ECOWAS and CPLP to redouble their efforts to restore peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau. DOS also commended the commitment to open Bissau Airport to support humanitarian assistance. In addition, the US supported efforts by ECOWAS to negotiate a return to power of Sierra Leone's legitimate leader. It endorsed the October 1997 settlement, which called for cessation of hostilities, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants.

1.3 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD's three priority areas are food security and environmental protection; political and humanitarian affairs, including conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution; and regional economic cooperation.

In Sudan, the US believes that the IGAD process offers the best hope of keeping parties focused on core issues related to religion and the status of the south, which in turn helps to balance and stabilize the region and ultimately create peace and economic prosperity. The US has provided financial and diplomatic support to the IGAD effort and will continue to take steps to make that process as effective as possible. In August 1998 DOS visibly supported the active engagement of Kenyan Foreign Minister Godana, chairman of the IGAD talks in Addis Ababa, in pressing the warring parties to bring an end to this devastating conflict.

Ministerial meetings and shuttle diplomacy efforts have led to substantial progress in negotiations. One achievement was the formation in August 1998 of an IGAD technical committee on humanitarian aid. Negotiations for humanitarian corridors across frontlines are often cited as one way to promote linkages that help reduce conflict.

Support for the IGAD peace process is one clear way that the US pursues conflict resolution in Sudan. USAID's commitment to support institutional strengthening of IGAD is yielding returns, both in terms of IGAD's internal operations as well as its program development. USAID also contributed to IGAD's Peace Fund, which was utilized to reinvigorate the Sudan peace process.

Progress has been excellent towards increasing access to information on food security and conflict in Africa. One program funded by the US has been to work through IGAD (and ministries in non-IGAD countries) to establish Internet connectivity for key policymakers in the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) region. Provision of equipment and training was linked to liberalized telecommunications policies. In 36 GHA government ministries, 110 users are actively using Internet technology to communicate and share information on food security and conflict prevention among themselves and with their international counterparts.

1.4 Organization of African Unity (OAU). The US government under the Clinton Administration has provided $8 million to the OAU to support institutional conflict resolution capability. Specifically, the US funded the construction of the Conflict Management Center in Addis Ababa to monitor and manage potential conflicts, and prepositioned equipment for a 100-troop quick-reaction military observer force to be deployed anywhere in Africa on short notice.

The United States has contributed nearly $8 million over the past five years to the OAU Peace Fund. Since 1993, other contributors have been Australia, Belgium, China, France, Spain, the UK, and Korea. Some of the US's contributions are being applied to the work of the International Panel of Eminent Persons' investigation of genocide in Rwanda and to the OAU's effort to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict.

Funding to the OAU was suspended in FY98 over a diplomatic dispute; however, financial assistance for FY99 was renewed to support the OAU Conflict Management Center, the Panel of Eminent Persons on the Rwanda Genocide, and endeavors to settle the Ethiopia/Eritrea border dispute.

1.5 Southern African Development Community (SADC). Established in 1980, SADC is southern Africa's most important regional organization. SADC's current goals include achieving economic growth; alleviating poverty; promoting regional integration; evolving common political values, systems and institutions; promoting regional security; and using natural resources sustainably.

Southern Africa, with its relatively well-developed infrastructure and diverse natural resource base, has the potential to lead the rest of the continent into a more prosperous 21st century. The achievement of economic growth and democratization will contribute to a larger, more stable and democratic trading partner for the United States and eventually reduce the need for economic assistance to the region. The US recognizes that a more effective SADC could accelerate Southern Africa's economic growth significantly. Its support of SADC will encourage the region to continue with growth and market-oriented reforms, assist and complement bilateral programs to expand economic and political cooperation, and support the integration of South Africa's significant industrial, financial and technical resources into the regional economy in order to stimulate mutually beneficial development. While most support to SADC has been targeted towards trade and the private sector, the US has also urged SADC to act as a broker in regional conflicts, such as the recent fencing dispute between Botswana and Namibia.

The US strongly supported a SADC initiative to negotiate a cease-fire and seek a swift political solution to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC). The undertaking, launched by South Africa at the August 1998 SADC Summit in Pretoria, set forth a framework to end the crisis diplomatically. The US urged all parties involved in the conflict to cooperate fully with the efforts of SADC's Chairman, South African President Nelson Mandela, in order to implement the decisions mandated at the Summit.

A US Special Representative of the Secretary of State to SADC was recently appointed to establish a regular high-level dialogue in the form of the US-SADC Forum. In planning for the inaugural meeting of this forum in early 1999, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) developed concept papers to support the discussion of small arms/light weapons issues, particularly in the southern Africa context.

CHAPTER II:
IMPROVING CONFLICT RESOLUTION CAPABILITIES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The African Conflict Resolution Act authorizes assistance to African non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in order to improve capability in areas of conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution. Civil society and good governance are now widely recognized as playing a critical role in these areas. The key US agency engaged in capacity building activities for African NGOs is USAID, which complements and supports overall US policy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

2.1 The African Dialogue Center for Conflict Management and Development Issues (ADC). Based in Tanzania, ADC is an NGO offering research, advisory services and training on issues germane to conflict and development in Africa. Specifically, it seeks to provide a non-governmental contribution in this area in a manner that complements inter-governmental efforts, particularly the OAU and UN agencies. The ADC is designed to give intensive focus to actions and activities that contribute towards preventing the emergence of conflicts on the continent.

USAID support to ADC in FY98 included activities to promote national reconciliation in Rwanda and Burundi; an assessment mission, comprehensive report, and proposals relating to national reconciliation in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC); and a networking meeting for organizations involved in the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa. This meeting brought 36 organizations together and led to the establishment of a formal networking mechanism as well as an African Directory on Peace and Security.

2.2 African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). In FY98, USAID provided support to this African-based organization in two forms: a strengthening grant and an endowment. During this period, ACCORD undertook missions to Liberia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania. In Liberia, an ACCORD-led assessment resulted in increased contact between South African civil society groups and Liberian civil society groups.

2.3 DOS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). During FY98, PRM disbursed approximately $130 million in assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa. While most

> *DOS Contributions to ICRC in FY98 Provided:*
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> – *Relief and medical assistance to conflict victims and displaced persons*
> – *Assistance to political prisoners and prisoners of war*
> – *Tracing services for families separated by conflict*
> – *Refugee protection and assistance*

of these funds constituted US contributions to the UN High Commission for Refugees programs in Africa, a portion of this sum was distributed to international NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Food Program, as well as other international organizations. This support was targeted to meet the basic needs of refugees and conflict victims across the continent. Many of these organizations in turn relied heavily on African staff and/or partnered with African NGOs to carry out life-saving activities.

2.4 Angola. A major priority for USAID in FY98 was national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions. Numerous activities were carried out under this directive. During FY98, the overall performance was mixed; the collapse of the peace process and the Lusaka Protocol hampered activities. Anecdotal evidence and data suggest marked improvement in the ability of targeted NGOs to advocate on behalf of citizens in spite of renewed conflict.

A civic education drive targeting citizens and public officials has benefited a total of 183 groups and over 4,000 participants. This promotion of understanding and communication between government and civil society proved successful. Seminars and theatrical plays broadcast on television and radio supported reconciliation among diverse groups of Angolans. In addition, needs assessments and strategic planning processes led to the development of better communication and joint participation amongst NGOs, donors and the provincial government in Huila. This work improved the capacity of civil servants to respond to the emergency and security needs of the people.

> *Example in action: USAID in Angola*
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> *Prior to the community revitalization activities, interaction between Binje and MacaMobolo had been limited to violent confrontations. By targeting shared infrastructure needs, the project catalyzed interaction among these warring communities. They cooperated in rehabilitating a grinding mill, roads and bridges. These infrastructure repairs succeeded in re-linking three municipalities. Improved relations and easier access has increased economic activity and constructive political interaction between the communities.*

USAID sponsored representatives from 16 Angolan NGOs to travel to Mozambique in an effort to deepen integration efforts between the countries as well as share Mozambique's lessons learned on reconciliation. This group had contact with 23 Mozambican organizations, several of which have continued to collaborate with their Angolan counterparts.

Capacity-building programs for Angolan NGOs have benefited 35 organizations with training in strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, NGO governance, financial management, fundraising, and business feasibility planning and analysis. An evaluation of the program revealed that financial management training showed a 144% improvement over previous practices. The program's success enabled participating NGOs to raise additional funds from outside sources. The first set of 18 graduates of the program

embarked on a replication plan in 5 provinces reaching an additional 60 NGOs. This is a significant achievement considering that in 1997 there were no functioning local NGOs in Angola at all. Since then, USAID-supported NGOs in Benguela have worked against the conscription of child soldiers, mounting their campaign using skills received in USAID training programs.

Fifteen NGOs that benefited from a human rights program formed 35 new community groups dedicated to protecting human rights. Most of these NGOs are rural women's organizations whose main purpose is to fight for land rights and against labor exploitation.

2.5 Benin.   Although USAID did not specifically address conflict in its program for Benin, it did make improving governance and reinforcing democracy a priority, and aspects of this effort fall under the conflict prevention umbrella. This goal was pursued through four avenues: increased participation of civil society in national decision-making; strengthened mechanisms promoting transparency and governmental accountability; improved environment for decentralized private and local initiatives; and a strengthened, more independent and representative legislature.

2.6 Burundi. A USAID-supported Women's Peace Center and training program involving women leaders provided a rare opportunity for women of Tutsi and Hutu heritage to work together to address Burundi's daunting social and political problems.

2.7 Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC). In January 1998, USAID began to disburse Political Transition Grants (PTGs) to develop partnerships between local government, NGOs, and other civil society groups. Funded activities included human rights and regional reconciliation conferences, as well as shared infrastructure and environmental project activities. Other efforts included programs designed to foster increased citizen participation at the provincial and local levels, as well as rule of law issues such as human rights and transparency. Renewed fighting, however, interrupted these efforts.

The US Embassy worked with USAID to support civil society participation in the DROC's political transition process. The US's overall goal of supporting a peaceful democratic transition in this country has been particularly challenging, as initial diplomatic efforts to engage the government in a participatory transition process produced only limited results. Prohibitions on the US providing direct assistance to the government together with political sensitivities have further limited programmatic options. In response to this challenging environment, USAID and its partners established a resource center in Kinshasa. The center provided critical support to civil society organizations through strategic planning and education workshops and information on the evolving transition process. Its existence has also proven to be a mainstay of US-DROC relations. For example, when the US was forced to evacuate its embassy, the resource center remained open, making use of its flexibility as an NGO funded by the US. This activity was highly praised by the US ambassador, State Department, and the National Security Council.

2.8 Ethiopia. USAID made increased access to and participation in democratic systems a major goal, with a high priority given to strengthening democratic institutions and human rights in Ethiopia. Over the year, USAID concentrated most of its resources in three ongoing activities: enhancement of civil society, decentralization of government, and judicial strengthening. USAID also participated in a multi-donor project coordinated by the United Nations Development Program to strengthen Parliament.

The Ethiopian NGO Sector Enhancement Initiative conducted workshops on conflict mediation for 13 local NGOs, and held an Effective Dispute Resolution workshop as well. Substantial progress was also made in improving the overall environment in which civil society organizations, both domestic and international, operate in Ethiopia. USAID's grantee worked with Ethiopian NGOs on the preparation of an NGO Code of Conduct. Over 200 NGO representatives attended a consultative meeting that endorsed a final draft of the Code. Significantly, that meeting was addressed by the chairman of the parliamentary Legal Affairs Committee who affirmed the government's belief that "civil society organizations are essential to a democratic form of government" and promised that NGOs would be consulted on new NGO legislation currently being drafted. By year end, registration and re-registration of NGOs had become timely and routine whereas previously it had been common for the registration process to take over six months.

2.9 Ghana. An analysis of democratization in Ghana reveals a more favorable environment for civic participation in the public policy process. Due to a post-colonial tradition of centralized power, there is little balance between the power of the executive and ruling party on the one hand, and the rest of the government and society on the other. In response, USAID has focused on amplifying the effectiveness of civil society and elected institutions at the local and national levels – not simply making each other stronger independently, but strengthening the ability of each to interact with the other and helping to develop opportunities for such interaction. The result will be an inclusive policy-making process that blends the interests of civil society, Members of Parliament (irrespective of their party affiliation), local-level officials, and the executive branch.

2.10 Guinea. USAID coordinated international donor programs regarding conflict and instability in the country. At the national level, USAID worked to support good local governance through citizen participation. This was achieved by capacity-building efforts such as civic education and internal democratic governance for civil society organizations. These efforts improved governance through increased participation and fostered stronger partnerships between Guineans and their government, businesses, and civil society groups at the local and national levels.

2.11 Kenya. USAID's democracy and governance portfolio in Kenya, which focuses on conflict resolution, is designed to support a very strong and collaborative relationship with the US Embassy so that the implementation of programs in this area complements the Embassy's diplomatic efforts. Broader events taking place in Kenya are derivatives of the increasing confidence by NGOs and opposition politicians in challenging public institutions and their officeholders for public accountability and transparency. Some of these events are unprecedented in Kenyan politics.

USAID's democracy and governance strategy continues to place primary emphasis on strengthening civil society advocacy for political liberalization and basic constitutional reform. In part due to this assistance, civil society is now stronger and more active than it was only a few years ago and is persuading the government to respond to calls for constitutional and legal reforms. There was also an emphasis on increasing women's participation, both within civil society and in the formal political arena, as well as in conflict resolution arenas.

NGOs demonstrated that the constitutional process was deficient and successfully negotiated the passage of the Kenya Review Act. The passage of the act was important in two ways. First, it demonstrated the effectiveness of civil society providing competent, reliable and insightful critiques of government actions. This is especially important in a situation where opposition politicians do not have the means to subject executive actions or parliamentary bills to the same scrutiny as NGOs. Second, the conclusion of the Review Act marked the beginning of the institutionalization of negotiating between polarized groups in Kenya rather than zero-sum positions. The completion of these negotiations demonstrated how indispensable civil society has become.

> *Example in Action: USAID in Kenya*
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> *In 1998, the quality of information provided by USAID-funded think tanks enabled NGOs to more effectively play their watchdog and enforcement roles and respond to ill-informed policies and illegal or incompetent government actions. A clear example of this effectiveness is their response to the government-sponsored ethnic clashes of early 1998. To guard against further spread of violence, NGOs, together with opposition politicians, correctly anticipated and uncovered government preparations for clashes, and promptly informed the public through the media of the areas of potential violence. This forced the government to take preventive actions and even to initiate a series of peace meetings.*

2.12 Liberia. Although US-Liberia relations were strained, particularly following the violence of September 1998 that led to the evacuation of Embassy and USAID Mission staff, major efforts were nevertheless taken to promote civic education and awareness about nonviolent conflict resolution in this troubled country. A major thrust of USAID's democracy and governance activities in Liberia was to work with civil society in order to improve its capacity to participate in the democratic process. The two major themes in this work were strengthening the capacities of the media to promote transparency and accountability in public and private institutions; and providing Liberian society with independent and reliable viewpoints and information.

USAID worked with the media, supported local NGOs to monitor and promote human rights, and promoted civic education. These efforts served to inform the public, increase

citizens' ability to participate in the democratic process, and promote national reconciliation.

The Department of Justice contributed to the renovation of the National Bar Association library, establishment of a fund to maintain and fuel its generator, refurbishment of the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia office, and restoring and reshelving the Supreme Court records room. Elizabeth Boyennneh, President of the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia, was invited to be an International Visitor in a USIS project, "Grassroots Democracy in the US." She returned home to campaign for the rule of law as the basis for democracy. She initiated the merging of eight human rights NGOs into one umbrella organization, which has since undertaken a major human rights education program all over the country.

2.13 Mali. USAID programs included improving the conflict resolution capabilities of NGOs as well as increasing democratic government at the local level through capacity building for community organizations. USAID held inter-regional meetings as part of support to the government's North Commission to consolidate the peace process. USAID also developed activities to increase Malian citizens' participation in local governance. This latter program supported women's organizations and female candidates' participation in political party processes and in local governance.

2.14 Mozambique. USAID has built partnerships and supported the capacity of an array of NGOs, Mozambican universities, local governments, political parties, the parliament, and the judicial sector.

USIS sponsored Mr. Danilo Nala, a member of the Human Rights League of Mozambique, to participate in the Young African Leaders program on "The Rule of Law and the Administration of Justice." He hoped that alternative dispute resolution as practiced in the United States could be introduced in Mozambique's court system, and Mr. Nala was inspired by the success of the Native American Tribal Council in blending the traditional and the modern in dispute resolution matters.

2.15 Namibia. USAID worked to strengthen the legislative structures and the institutional capacity of Parliament as well as support the establishment of stronger linkages between citizens and their elected representatives as a means of strengthening Namibia's fragile democratic institutions. While there are several areas of concern with respect to the overall political environment in Namibia, the democratic transition remains on course with consolidation in a number of important areas. Recent discussions with a cross section of the key organizations and individuals associated with USAID's program confirmed this assessment. There was consensus that Parliament was beginning to provide greater oversight of the executive branch and expand opportunities for citizen participation in the legislative process. It was also acknowledged that civil society has begun to institutionalize its engagement with the legislative process and on occasion played a key role in the development of public policy.

2.16 Nigeria. Nigeria has been trapped in political instability and military rule for three decades, resulting in a weak and fractured civil society. Renewed efforts to establish democratically elected government at the local, state, and federal levels have borne fruit and present new opportunities to help Nigeria's transition to a sustainable democracy. USAID has sought to strengthen civil society's contribution to good governance, focusing mainly on women and youths. During FY98, small grants were awarded to 34 NGOs in 16 states to implement activities on empowering women, human rights, and democratic participation.

In spite of a repressive and hostile atmosphere during most of 1998, the democracy and governance program registered impressive results that demonstrated steady progress. USAID's NGO grantees reached greater numbers of women, formed more coalitions, and demonstrated greater willingness to take part in program activities. Surveys conducted after the first year of the program confirmed that participation improved women's knowledge of legal rights, democratic practices, and local politics. Moreover, with the support of NGO partners, more women ran for and attained political office, gained appointments to village councils by traditional leaders, won landmark rulings reversing discriminatory and repressive practices, and institutionalized women's issues in the media, in schools, and in the community.

These activities have reached an ever-increasing number of Nigerians. USAID-supported NGOs implemented a total of 868 activities in FY98, including 47 rallies, 89 training sessions, 35 workshops, 27 group discussions, 14 lectures, 154 advocacy visits to traditional and modern leaders, 76 other sensitization activities, and a number of drama performances and other cultural activities. The number of participating women and youth reached through these activities is estimated at over 3.2 million. An evaluation found that membership in affiliated NGOs rose by 32 percent and that the number of active members rose by 48 percent.

Members of participating NGOs became more active within their organizations and expected more accountability from their leaders. An evaluation also noted improvements in NGO transparency as well electing rather than appointing leadership positions.

2.17 Sierra Leone.   Although many USAID activities were suspended due to war, support to civil society continued, with an emphasis on engaging the government to develop consensus on dialogue with rebel groups. USAID's ability to respond to dramatically changing conditions in this country since its entrance in 1996 testify to the flexible nature of its programming options. Since the renewal of fighting, USAID has extended assistance to NGOs at the national and grassroots level to lay the foundation for reconciliation of former combatants and support public debate around the government's decision to engage the rebel forces in a dialogue for peace. In addition, USAID, the British government, and the UNDP co-funded a National Consultative Conference that was held in April 1999. This conference served as the official venue for the government to receive and recognize civil society's recommendations regarding peace negotiations.

2.18 Somalia. In the absence of a central government and in order to help Somalis rebuild the country from the bottom up, USAID has helped build the capacity of local authorities and civil society through technical support to regional/district administrations and indigenous NGOs.

One of the main success stories in 1998 was the formation of Puntland, an autonomous tri-regional authority in the Northeast. USAID helped local governments develop and form a roads administration, a precursor to the larger supra-regional body. A general difficulty faced in working with nascent structures in Somalia is that they are often inherently weak, as their support is often based on clan affiliation rather than ability. Progress on similar efforts varies widely throughout the country.

USAID sought to strengthen local Somali capacity to manage donor assistance and establish decentralized planning and program analysis capabilities throughout the country. Assistance to civil society consistently delivered results, both in work done on the ground (provision of credit, agricultural extension, etc.) as well as building the capacity of local NGOs.

USAID supported local administrative structures in acquiring essential technical and functional knowledge to better govern their communities. This included assistance in such areas as bookkeeping, tax collection, and equitable distribution of revenues.

USAID also worked to empower civil society by increasing the overall financial, administrative, and programming capacity of indigenous NGOs. The importance of the NGO sector in rebuilding Somalia cannot be understated. A strong and competent cadre of NGOs in Somalia is absolutely essential to Somalia's future. USAID has worked hard to establish this corps of NGOs, and progressively increased their capacity to manage themselves administratively and financially as well as implement needed projects in the field. For example, the capacity building programs for the southern NGOs allowed them to respond locally to floods in late 1997 and early 1998, in some cases more effectively than international organizations located elsewhere.

2.19 Sudan. Given the intensity of the war in recent years, significant progress has been difficult to accomplish in the area of conflict reduction and capacity building. Nonetheless, some diplomatic efforts and grants promoted peace. A major new initiative was the Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) program, an important new addition to the USAID portfolio which will be the cornerstone of USAID work towards conflict resolution and capacity building through support for independent Sudanese civil society. Total planned funding for STAR is $7 million over 3 years, of which $3 million was obligated in FY98.

One component of STAR is the provision of grants to build the capacity of Sudanese civil society organizations. Secondly, training will be provided to county administrators and their staffs in public administration and finance, governance, transparency, accountability, and human rights. The third element is leadership development. USAID will provide training to the leaders of the National Democratic Alliance in governance,

transparency, accountability, and human rights, with a view to ensuring the sustainability of the recent trend towards improved governance. An important element in addressing Sudan's long-term problems is the ability of the opposition's leadership to resolve internal differences, understand and undertake democratic governance, and plan for the future.

"Do No Harm" training was provided to USAID implementing partners in the use of analytical frameworks to design relief (and development) programs consciously seeking to avoid exacerbating conflict and identifying and building upon indigenous foundations for peace.

The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provided funding for activities aimed at promoting humanitarian principles, safeguards for humanitarian assistance, respect for basic human rights, and the protection of civilians in southern Sudan. Since the program began in 1995, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) relief arm together with UNICEF reached over 8,000 people through a joint dissemination and awareness-raising campaign to promote humanitarian principles. Over thirty workshops were held in Sudan attended by more than 15,000 members of the general public, local counterparts, civil administrators military leaders, and members of churches, women's and other groups. Additional workshops in Kenya were attended by more than 250 representatives from UN agencies, NGOs, counterpart organizations, and donors.

> *Example in action: The US in Sudan*
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> – *STAR program grants were awarded to support capacity building for Sudanese NGOs, local government, and leadership.*
> – *Through funding to UNICEF, over 8,000 people from all levels of southern Sudanese society were reached by an awareness-raising campaign to promote humanitarian principles (since 1995)*
> – *IGAD peace process supported by US yielded a technical committee on humanitarian aid which signed two agreements to improve security for relief workers and support cross-battle lines delivery of relief supplies.*

In part because of the humanitarian principles work done by UNICEF and the SPLM-Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) Ground Rules agreement, the environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the openness regarding humanitarian issues has been significantly improved in parts of southern Sudan. The value of this work was shown when local SPLM authorities requested more OLS humanitarian principles workshops in late 1998 to deal with increased misunderstandings between relief workers and local authorities due to the unprecedented levels of assistance going into the SPLM areas of south Sudan. However, progress towards another of the program's aims—to encourage the creation of a more representative and democratic civil society within Sudanese humanitarian organizations—has been slower, in part because of competing and conflicting agendas within the SPLM.

2.20 Tanzania. Tanzania remains one of the few stable East African countries. Nevertheless, continued ethnic tensions in the region and the potential expansion of the

conflict may threaten stability. Tanzania is noted for its acceptance of refugees displaced by conflict in neighboring Rwanda, Burundi, and DROC at great political and economic cost.

USAID developed a program to promote partnership between civil society and the government of Tanzania for improved governance at both local and national levels. Specifically, it seeks to legitimize the role of NGOs as development partners with government institutions. This goal was supported through encouraging targeted NGOs to effectively represent public interests to the government on selected issues through capacity building in the areas of internal democratic practice; development management and policy advocacy; encouraging targeted government institutions to be more responsive to public concerns on selected issues; and facilitating an environment which enables NGO-government partnerships.

2.21 Uganda. USAID is committed to improving local capacities to resolve and prevent conflicts. Plans were made for a new grants program focusing on grass-roots activities in Karamoja to establish open lines of communication and interaction between hostile groups, leading to dispute resolution and/or prevention. USAID has determined that this is the most effective approach for volatile regions, whose people are armed and traditionally engage in raiding cattle from other tribes. Peace meetings occur regularly but seem to have little lasting effect. Therefore, USAID is instead supporting active, established programs such as alternative education activities for Karamojong children that include dispute resolution to foster long-term changes in social behavior.

2.22 Zambia. An advocacy network among interest groups was established with USAID assistance. Dialogue began with the National Assembly over citizen input and participation in committee deliberations, and a Democracy and Governance Reference Group was constituted to explore ways to make concepts and practice of democracy and good governance relevant to the basic needs of the poor. Pilot efforts to carry out public opinion surveys were undertaken in order to institutionalize responsiveness to the public.

Assistance was directed to a group led by the Law Association of Zambia that included professional associations and business community participation in consultation with government and the judiciary. It established an alternative dispute resolution program. During the reporting period, the more important accomplishments in this area were training and accreditation of Zambia's first class of commercial arbitrators; formulation of a new draft arbitration act; groundwork begun to establish a Dispute Resolution Center; and outreach to the business and professional community through conferences, radio, and print media.

USAID programs to strengthen civic society organizations began and approaches and methods of civic education were reviewed. A training course for journalists, organized by the British Council with USAID support, attracted a good deal of attention, galvanized interest in establishing a professional association, and resulted in the conducting and reporting of several small but topical opinion polls in the Zambian press.

2.23 Zimbabwe.   Conditions in Zimbabwe over the past few years have been characterized by rapid economic, social and political deterioration. The immediate outlook presents difficult challenges in managing what is likely to be a turbulent political transition. Economic mismanagement by the government, poor economic performance in key export sectors, and declining social services and infrastructure have combined to create open dissatisfaction with the state. There is rapidly increasing poverty, an inflation rate of 50%, interest rates above 50%, government wavering on a coherent land reform policy, unemployment of nearly 60%, limited political competition and official repression against the opposition. Breaches in the integrity of separation of powers between the three branches of government have created a constitutional crisis. These factors and the attendant speed with which they have manifested themselves have created a challenging situation to mitigate an unprecedented economic and political crisis.

USAID has drastically revised its portfolio in an attempt to meet the challenges posed by this crisis. One mechanism, approved in July 1998, addressed the lack of competition in Zimbabwe's political and economic system. The intent was to enable citizens to contribute to a dialogue with government and allow competing views and ideas to be heard in decision making. Following the formulation of this program, an agreement was negotiated with the government and funds were obligated in September 1998. The agreement outlines USAID support to NGOs and strengthening parliamentary reforms. A partners group of representatives from NGOs was formed, which nominated a "core" group of partners to represent them in the day-to-day implementation of the program. The core group meets with USAID at least once a month to serve as advisors to the program, and has been instrumental in guiding USAID through the sensitive political period.

CHAPTER III:
DEMOBILIZATION AND RETRAINING
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

In order to facilitate reduction in the size of the armed forces of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the African Conflict Resolution Act authorizes the provision of assistance in the areas of demobilization and retraining of military personnel. Excessive military spending in Africa represents a serious drain of scarce resources; even more troubling is the proliferation of highly armed paramilitary and armed opposition and criminal organizations. Demobilization and retraining of former combatants facilitates transitions to national reconciliation and conflict resolution. This chapter outlines US activities in this area.

3.1 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ACDA's programs in Africa were expanded in FY98, particularly those related to the control of arms exports and the promotion of regional arms control arrangements. ACDA has also played a major role in the development and implementation of US policy and efforts to counter the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, especially in Africa.

ACDA made substantial contributions to the development of a US inter-agency southern Africa regional arms transfer policy framework that was implemented in August 1998. As part of this policy, the US places high priority on ensuring that military acquisitions by South Africa are affordable, suitable for legitimate defense, and do not adversely affect human rights conditions. The policy also calls for active US promotion of multilateral restraint and regional arms control efforts, such as the development of regular security dialogues among countries in the region, military transparency, confidence and security-building measures, and other collective security initiatives.

ACDA participated in follow-up work at the UN for the Secretary-General's April 1998 Report to the Security Council on *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, and contributed to the development of US views and responses. This work included contributions to the UN Security Council resolution on illegal arms trafficking in and within Africa. The report contains several specific recommendations for stopping the proliferation of arms, including the implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in the military and security fields; harmonization of policies against illicit arms trafficking; universal African participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms; establishment of supplementary subregional registers; the reduction of African states' purchases of arms and munitions to below 1.5% of GDP; and a 10-year commitment to a zero-growth policy for defense budgets.

During 1998, ACDA's arms control assessments continued to ensure that US arms and dual-use exports to Africa were fully consistent with US policy and regional security, and that proposed transfers deemed to have adverse arms control implications were denied. Finally, ACDA continued to compile and publish the internationally acclaimed annual

World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers report. This publication contains extensive country-level and aggregate data on worldwide military expenditures, armed forces, arms imports and exports, and other relevant indicators.

3.2 Angola.   USAID sponsored mine-awareness activities, training in mine removal, and demobilization efforts such as civic training and education for ex-combatants, including former child soldiers. Meanwhile, a program to reintegrate child soldiers was concluded in 1998. This program demobilized 1,599 child soldiers, reuniting 1,062 with their families and placing 138 in foster homes.

3.3 Liberia.   USAID funded infrastructure reconstruction teams, which provided temporary jobs to 10,000 ex-combatants and assisted their transition to civilian life. In addition, more than 5,800 former combatants and child soldiers received vocational training. Under the Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Recovery Program activity, USAID funded a family and community sensitization program. Activities focused on the special needs of ex-combatants and their acceptance into society through visitations to homes, schools, churches, markets, hospitals, and rehabilitation centers operated by non-governmental organizations. During 1998, almost 6,000 persons benefited from the sensitization program. During the reporting period, 776 ex-combatants and civilians (35% of whom were women) were trained in tailoring, shoe-making, masonry, carpentry, plumbing, furniture making, and agriculture.

In 1998, the Booker Washington Institute (BWI) received an award from the government of Liberia for training ex-combatants. With some assistance from USAID, BWI was restored and began to provide vocational training for demobilized fighters. The Liberians view the reopening of BWI as an important symbol of reconstruction because many prominent Liberians attended the Institute. Closed in 1990 due to the civil war, it had been the first technical/vocation secondary school in Liberia and the leading center for occupational training in West Africa. Through careful planning, a highly cost-effective restoration program enabled BWI to reopen the agriculture, electricity, automotive, business education, building trade, and home economics departments within five months. A new Department of Computer Science was also opened, using 50 computers donated by individuals and US businesses. To date, 1,600 ex-combatants have been trained.

USAID also funded the rehabilitation and construction of schools, hospitals, and health posts in rural Liberia. Many of these activities have been implemented with local community residents and ex-combatants trained under USAID-funded vocational training programs. The program identified communities with large numbers of returning refugees and internally displaced persons, and then used the schools for regular academic education and adult literacy programs.

3.4 Mali.   The US supported efforts to implement a small arms moratorium and relocation program for displaced persons.

USAID contributed $2 million to the Repatriation and Settlement of Ex-Combatants Program to disarm the rebel soldiers and finance their request for income-generating

activities. The program has financed 868 projects for 9,511 former rebel soldiers and has been instrumental in strengthening the peace process.

3.5 *Mozambique*. The US helped fund a South African de-mining program in Mozambique.

3.6 *Rwanda*. The National Demining Office (NDO) has cleared approximately 50 percent of the land identified as compromised by mines (an increase of over 25 percent from the last reporting period). With recent security improvements, the NDO has also begun clearing mines in the northwest of the country. Meanwhile, the DOD/USAID-supported mine awareness campaign continues to be very successful, resulting in saved lives, especially in rural areas.

At the Entebbe summit in March 1998, President Clinton and six heads of state and government from the central African region pledged to undertake a concerted effort to prevent a resurgence of genocide in Rwanda. They endorsed the reactivation of the UN Arms Flow Commission as a means to identify and stop illegal arms trafficking to the former Rwandan army and militia forces. In April the UN Security Council approved a US-sponsored resolution which reestablished the International Commission of Inquiry into Arms Flows (Rwanda). The purpose of the commission was to continue investigation into reports of the sale, supply or shipment of arms and related material to former Rwandan government forces and militias in Central Africa in violation of Security Council resolutions. It mandated the Commission to identify parties that are involved in arms trafficking to Rwandan militias and insurgents, to make recommendations relating to the illegal flow of arms in the region, and called for the submission of a report to the Secretary-General and the Security Council. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency contributed financial support to the re-establishment of the Commission and participated in the interagency review of its report and follow-up actions.

3.7 *South Africa*. DOD worked with the South African government on guidelines for closing military installations. The guidelines will address such issues as environmental and economic matters that arise when bases are closed. In addition, demilitarizing conventional ammunition has been identified as another area of cooperation between the two militaries.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) participated in the US-South Africa Political-Military dialogue in February 1998, which included productive discussions on a broad range of issues including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Anti-personnel Landmines, Regional Conflict Management, and Arms transfer Policy and Export Controls with a particular emphasis on Small Arms issues. From these talks, the US gained insight and a better understanding of South African views on small arms problems in southern Africa.

3.8 *Uganda*. September 1998 marked the completion of a two-year USAID effort to assist in the reintegration of Uganda People's Defense Force veterans through training in business skills.

CHAPTER IV:
TRAINING IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE-KEEPING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The African Conflict Resolution Act authorizes efforts in education and training in conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa. These programs encompass a wide range of efforts in topics ranging from military operations to alternative dispute resolution. Among the high priority programs in this area are the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and International Military Education and Training (IMET). This chapter outlines major international programs and then reviews country-specific activities in these two fields.

4.1 African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). A bilateral training initiative intended to work with African states, ACRI seeks to create highly effective, rapidly-deployable peacekeeping units that can operate jointly in the event of a humanitarian crisis or peacekeeping operation. It is coordinated with and complements the training efforts of several other African and non-African nations and organizations, including the UK, France, the Organization for African Unity, and the United Nations. The US vision for ACRI is a greatly enhanced African capacity to perform peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in a timely, professionally competent manner and ultimately to strengthen their capacities for preserving peace. African nations must request US assistance, and the resulting training activities are coordinated with the Organization for African Unity and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

The ACRI Interagency Working Group has identified equipment and training requirements for working with selected democratic African partners over a 3-5 year period, leading to self-sustainment on the part of African peacekeeping contingents. ACRI's emphasis on training is based on a common peacekeeping doctrine and the supply of communications equipment, which will enable the units to work together more effectively.

During FY98, ACRI expended a $22 million budget and conducted battalion training in Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, and Ghana. During the course of this training, the US Army provided instruction in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. It exposed host militaries to the full range of peacekeeping tasks, including convoy escort, logistics, protection of refugees, negotiations, and

> *Example in action: ACRI*
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> *ACRI has already contributed to conflict resolution in Africa, where several partner countries have made their sovereign decisions to deploy peacekeepers trained under this program in international operations. Mali and Ghana sent forces to Sierra Leone as part of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force; Benin sent a contingent to Guinea-Bissau; and Senegalese peacekeepers are currently engaged under the UN mission in the Central African Republic.*

command and control. In addition, issues of human rights, humanitarian law, negotiation and mediation, and other humanitarian concerns relevant to peacekeeping were interwoven into the training. ACRI increased both the level and character of involvement of non-governmental, private voluntary and international organizations in ACRI training in order to increase African peacekeepers' capacity to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies.

President Clinton reviewed a Senegalese/American peacekeeping training exercise and affirmed the US's determination to fully implement ACRI during his historic visit to Africa.

4.2 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Seminar. The United States Information Service (USIS) sponsored an ADR seminar in Accra, Ghana in July 1998 that was attended by over 40 individuals from Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal, Tanzania, and South Africa. The seminar was led by Dr. Ernest Uwazie of the Center for African Peace and Conflict Resolution of California State University in coordination with the Legon Center for International Affairs of the University of Ghana. The ten Nigerian participants subsequently formed an umbrella ADR organization that is scheduled to hold a national conference in Nigeria on this subject.

4.3 Emergency Drawdown Authorities (EDA). Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the President, on a grant basis, to draw down defense articles from DOD inventories and to provide defense services, military education, and training to foreign governments and international organizations in response to military emergencies. It can also be used to provide assistance for international narcotics control, international disaster relief, or refugee assistance. During FY98, $2 million was spent on commercial airlifts to support the ECOWAS Military Observation Group (ECOMOG).

4.4 Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) Initiative -- Worldwide. In September 1996, the National Security Council endorsed EIPC, which seeks to focus US resources on improving the international peacekeeping capabilities of selected countries. Thirty-five "focus countries" were initially identified by the inter-agency based on their potential to contribute materially to international peacekeeping operations. The EIPC program received $7 million of FY98 Foreign Military Financing funds. DOS, in coordination with DOD, allocated the funds to the selected countries' accounts. Nine countries, including South Africa, were selected as recipients for FY98, the first year of program funding, and ten were selected for FY99, again including South Africa.

4.5 International Military and Education Training (IMET) -- Worldwide. IMET provides one of the most economical and effective uses of DOD funds in the long term by supporting self-sufficient, professional military forces. IMET is a low-cost, highly efficient component of US security assistance that provides training on a grant basis to military personnel from allied and friendly nations. IMET remains one of DOD's highest priority military assistance programs.

With a $50 million budget, the program provided professional military education and training to some 8,000 foreign students in FY98, including over one thousand Africans. Over half a million foreign personnel have been trained through IMET sponsorship over the past three decades. By attending IMET-sponsored courses and programs in the United States, future leaders of foreign defense and related establishments are exposed to US values, regard for human rights, democratic institutions, and the role of a professional military under civilian control. To meet the challenges posed by recent transitions to democracy in countries throughout the world, IMET has been expanded to include programs focusing on human rights, defense resource management, military justice, and civil-military relations.

Other in-country programs also contribute to US national objectives in Africa. The US Navy Justice School conducts programs on military law, respect for human rights and the role of the military in a democracy. Expanded IMET programs also provide this type of exposure. For example, training has been designed to create a learning environment to facilitate the host nation's playing a positive role in the democratization process.

International Military Education Training
Number of Students Trained, Africa FY 1998

Country	Number	Country	Number
Angola	0	Lesotho	9
Benin	32	Madagascar	29
Botswana	35	Malawi	24
Burundi	0	Mali	71
Cameroon	14	Mauritius	5
Cape Verde	6	Mozambique	63
Central African Republic	5	Namibia	10
Chad	5	Niger	0
Comoros	5	Rwanda	54
Congo (Kinshasha)	0	Sao Tome & Principe	2
Congo	0	Senegal	108
Cote D'Ivoire	56	Seychelles	9
Djibouti	4	Sierra Leone	0
Eritrea	18	South Africa	204
Ethiopia	21	Swaziland	7
Gambia	0	Tanzania	45
Ghana	57	Togo	0
Guinea	3	Uganda	40
Guinea-Bissau	3	Zambia	69
Kenya	71	Zimbabwe	51

4.6 Angola. USAID provided training in political pluralism and tolerance to 11 political parties and 1,500 people, including women and children. In addition, 42 journalists were trained in professional skills, supporting the development of accurate news and information and enhancing conflict resolution potential.

4.7 Madagascar. Two officials were sent to the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies for a five-week course on Legal Aspects of Peace-Keeping. In addition, the Embassy hosted a one-month infantry training exercise with the US army. Some aspects of the training were applicable to peacekeeping operations.

USIS sponsored a political and security roundtable discussion on peacekeeping that was attended by many senior government officials. The discussion centered on US peace-keeping and peace-making efforts around the world: the lessons learned from Somalia, the African Crisis Response Initiative, Bosnia, and the role of the military in a democracy. It was widely covered in the press.

4.8 Mali. DOD was involved in three programs to support professionalization of the armed forces in relation to conflict resolution and peace-keeping: International Military and Education Training (IMET) focused on the professional skills of the military. Extended International Military Education and Training included training in working at the community level and with local residents. The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) also provided training on peacekeeping operations and collaboration with local NGOs and communities in the maintenance of peace. Mali was the first country to sign up for such training. In addition, Joint Combined Exercise Training was conducted with the US military.

4.9 Nigeria. USIS resumed contact with the Nigerian War College's fledgling Conflict Resolution Center and provided materials on conflict resolution. The director of the Center, Major General Charles Ndioum, expressed the hope that USIS and the Center would continue to work together. The materials are being used as teaching materials for Nigerian army officers. The provision of up-to-date materials in conflict resolution is a step towards expanding the US's limited programs with the government of Nigeria.

4.10 South Africa. Since Nelson Mandela became South Africa's president in 1994, US military ties with South Africa have increased steadily. The two nations formed a defense committee in 1997 as part of the Binational Commission led by Vice President Gore and Thabo Mbeki, then South Africa's Deputy President. In recognition of its potential for participation in international peacekeeping, the US granted South Africa $350,000 in FY98 from the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Initiative to fund improved peacekeeping training. US activities to train South Africans in peacekeeping consisted of creating a simulation center for training peacekeepers and supporting the Blue Crane peacekeeping exercise, which was held in May 1999. In addition, US military specialists have conducted training on equal opportunity and the legal aspects of conducting peacekeeping operations.

Recent events in Lesotho, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) have focused considerable attention on the role of the South African military in the region. The South African government has come to realize that as the strongest military power in southern Africa, it bears a special responsibility in regional peacekeeping and has become more involved in diplomatic and military efforts to resolve African crises. Although the

South African government has stated its intention to limit security-oriented efforts to southern Africa, it has agreed to help form a Southern Africa Development Community peacekeeping brigade. South Africa has also been present at meetings of the African peacekeeping support group, an informal UN forum.

USAID-funded programs contributed to a more peaceful political climate nationwide by training almost 7,000 people in conflict resolution techniques. Although in 1998 politically related deaths were slightly less than in 1997, observers correctly foresaw an increase in violence in the violence-prone province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). Because of the respect and objectivity it enjoys among competing factions, a longstanding NGO partner was able to respond quickly to violent events by organizing a workshop for competing parties to discuss ways to mitigate the escalating crisis. This provided an opportunity for leaders from different parties to meet face to face for the first time to talk about ways to address these problems. USAID also awarded a grant to a consortium of NGOs to help monitor and mediate election-related violence.

4.11 Tanzania. USAID provided training and support in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for members of the judiciary. There has been a greater acceptance of ADR by Tanzanians, and neighboring countries are following Tanzania's progress and have expressed interest in this approach. The Chief Justice has been one of the most outspoken government officials espousing legal and political reform in the country and support for ADR. USAID will continue to consolidate work in ADR and explore how to meet the growing interest on the part of NGOs and the legal profession to explore different alternative dispute resolution approaches in Tanzania.

4.12 Uganda. Numerous US-supported training programs for conflict resolution and peacekeeping were held in Uganda. A captain from the Ugandan military was sent to a course on Legal Considerations for the Military and Peace-Keeping Operations at the Naval Justice School's Defense Institute of International Legal Studies. The 321st Civil Affairs Brigade held two four-day seminars on the Role of the Military in a Democracy in Kampala from San Antonio, TX. Finally, a Member of Parliament and a Foreign Service officer were trained in Conflict Resolution and Preventive Diplomacy through USIS.

CHAPTER V:
OTHER SUPPORT FOR PREVENTING, MITIGATING AND RESOLVING CONFLICT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The United States has pursued many other avenues besides those outlined in the legislation in order to pursue the objective of supporting conflict resolution capabilities in Sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter summarizes many of these efforts, including high-profile diplomatic initiatives as well as programs in humanitarian assistance, civic education, access to quality news and information, disaster prevention, and democratization.

5.1 Africa Courts. The United States Information Service (USIS) sponsored a one-year, five-part series broadcast on satellite television in Africa entitled, "Courts in Transition: African Legal Systems Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century." This series, popularly known as "Africa Courts," explored major issues facing judiciaries across the continent. It aimed to heighten awareness about strengthening judicial systems and provided a forum to promote conflict resolution and rule of law standards. The series aired between September 1997 and December 1998. Topics addressed were:
–   Civil Delay Reduction
–   Separation of Powers
–   Rule of Law and Protection of Human Rights
–   Judicial Activism
–   Efficient Running of a Trial

5.2 Africa Journal. The United States Information Service (USIS) television program "Africa Journal" includes topics that support various conflict resolution efforts across the continent. Available on satellite and broadcast by African stations in English and French, this program provides a forum and mass audience for policymakers to discuss key issues. Topics in FY98 included:
–   Ethnic Relations/Conflict Resolution
–   The Media as Conflict Resolvers

Example in action: USIS's "Africa Journal"

An assessment by USIS Nairobi of the May 21 Africa Journal on "Conflict Resolution and Prevention" noted that its most important contribution was that it provided an opportunity to bring together representatives of conflicting political viewpoints in an amicable setting. Questioners included a newspaper journalist, a museum ethnologist, a pro-government representative, and an official from a pro-opposition media advocacy group. The Washington participant, Ambassador Herman Cohen, was well known in Nairobi and an important asset. After the interactive dialogue, an informal discussion continued on regional affairs and political and economic liberalization. One participant commented, "You know, this is the only place where we get to talk to each other."

- Power, Politics and Natural Resources in the
  Great Lakes-Congo Area
- Conflict Prevention and Resolution
- Ethnic Reconciliation
- Transfer of Power: When Politicians Leave Office
- Sustaining Democracy: The Culture of Peace
- US Air Strikes and Human Rights

5.3 DOS Funding to Support Refugee Children and Children in Armed Conflict.
Children represent over 50% of the world's refugees, displaced persons, and conflict victims. Children are among the most vulnerable of any refugee population—they are victims of violence, disease, malnutrition, and all too often they are separated from their families. The US has long been a leader in promoting attention to refugee children, and strongly encourages the UN and its other international partners to mainstream the special protection and assistance needs of refugee children throughout their programs. In FY98, the DOS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) contributed over $7 million toward programs around the world for children affected by war. These programs support the shared Administration and Congressional commitment to refugee children in Africa and elsewhere.

5.4 Famine Early Warning System (FEWS). USAID's Famine Early Warning System is an information system designed to help decision-makers prevent famine in Sub-Saharan Africa. FEWS specialists in the US and Africa assess data for early indications of potential famine areas. Other factors affecting access and availability of local food are also carefully evaluated in order to identify vulnerable populations that might require food assistance. These assessments are continuously updated and disseminated to provide decision-makers with the most timely and accurate information available.

This program improves the conflict prevention capacities of African governments and organizations by providing critical information, which can prevent or mitigate food crises which in themselves can cause or exacerbate violence. By working with various African organizations such as the Drought Monitoring Center (DMC), FEWS successfully developed local capacity to produce and use climate forecasts. For example, DMC forecasts accurately predicted the excessive El Niño rains that inundated parts of Africa, as well as the drought conditions that scorched numerous areas in late 1998. This critical information has permitted host country and donor government decision-makers to plan for and better address potential famine conditions.

5.5 Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict Mediation. In May 1998, DOS and the government of Rwanda engaged in intensive efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The objective of the effort was to promote a peaceful and durable settlement, and urge both parties to exercise restraint. Based on their consultations, it was clear to the US and Rwanda that there were many areas of commonality between the two parties and there existed practical, principled opportunities for peaceful resolution of this conflict. The facilitators presented recommendations and a detailed implementation plan. The US regrets that these recommendations have yet to be

accepted and that the dispute has escalated. The US repeatedly called on both sides to resolve the conflict without further violence, and remains committed to helping both sides achieve a peaceful settlement through pursuit of diplomatic and other efforts.

5.6 International Rule of Law Conference. Sponsored by USIS, USAID, and the Tanzanian judiciary, the conference was held in Dar es Salaam in February 1998 and included the participation of American and African jurists, including the president of the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda. Participating countries included Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Zambia, Seychelles, Namibia, and Malawi. The conference was captured by prime time broadcasting and garnered massive media coverage, which contributed to the building of democratic institutions and the administration of justice by fostering democratic expectations and demand for accountability by citizens in those countries.

5.7 Leland Initiative. The Leland Initiative is a five-year, $15 million US Government inter-agency effort designed to extend full Internet connectivity to approximately twenty African countries in order to promote sustainable development. The Leland Initiative seeks to bring the benefits of the global information revolution to people of Africa through connection to the Internet and other information technologies. This program also seeks to build African capacity in the strategic use of the Internet.

During FY98, the Leland Initiative began or maintained ongoing policy negotiations with seventeen of the twenty-one Leland target countries, codified policy-reform programs through signed memoranda of understanding with five countries, brought three national Internet gateways on-line, trained some three hundred new user institutions on the strategic use of the Internet, and continued to implement a program of pilot demonstration projects. There are now more than 18,000 subscribers in countries where the Leland Initiative has established national Internet gateways. The key issue is now the distribution of these users. Meanwhile, the Leland Initiative "Learning Laboratory" continued to explore the value of the Internet to the development process and disseminated "best practices" to partners throughout Africa and the donor community.

5.8 President Clinton's Trip to Africa. In the spring of 1998, President Clinton made a historic 11-day visit to the continent. The first sitting President ever to undertake a comprehensive trip to Africa, he visited Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana, and Senegal and addressed a broad array of issues,

> *President Clinton's 1998 Initiatives for Africa*
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> – *Radio Democracy for Africa will train African journalists and broadcast programs focused on human rights, democracy, and humanitarian principles.*
> – *The Great Lakes Justice Initiative will strengthen civil and military judicial institutions.*
> – *The African Center for Security Studies will provide a forum for senior military and civilian officials to explore defense policy issues and provide training to strengthen civil-military relations in burgeoning democracies.*

including education, trade, investment, development, and conflict resolution. He announced a number of major new US initiatives to further these aims, and laid out his vision of a new American relationship with Africa. At the Entebbe Summit of Regional Leaders, the President endorsed a historic communiqué committing signatories to protecting human rights, strengthening democracy, and nurturing civil society. He also called on the community of nations to improve its ability to prevent and stop genocide, and committed to further US activities to address the aftermath of the Rwandan bloodbath.

5.9 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's Trip to Africa. Secretary Albright visited Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Angola in December 1997. The themes she focused on included advancing US interests, including conflict resolution and the rule of law. She gave a major speech at the Organization for African Unity, where she unveiled the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, a major US effort to address the cycle of violence and impunity to the peoples of Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and other countries. She also discussed the peace process in Angola with President Dos Santos.

5.10 UN Report of the Secretary General on Promoting Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. In late 1997, the UN Security Council, with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in the chair as Security Council President, convened at the level of Foreign Ministers to "consider the need for a concerted international effort to promote peace and security in Africa." The Security Council requested the United Nations Secretary General to submit a report covering "the sources of conflict in Africa, ways to prevent and address these conflicts, and how to lay the foundation for durable peace and economic growth following their resolution." The report was issued in April 1998. The US was especially encouraged by its emphasis on strengthening mediation efforts. Many of the same themes that President Clinton emphasized during his trip were echoed, including strengthening Africa's capacity for peacekeeping.

5.11 US Special Envoy for the President and Secretary of State for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa. Rev. Jesse Jackson was sworn into this position in October 1997. During three trips to Africa during FY98, Rev. Jackson met with numerous government leaders, opposition figures, and a wide cross-section of civil society including religious leaders and emphasized policies of inclusion, openness, dialogue, and non-violence. He has also been engaged in diplomatic efforts to bring about conflict resolution in Sierra Leone and elsewhere.

5.12 Voice of America (VOA). VOA broadcasts in English, French, Hausa, Amharic, Afan Oromo, Tigrigna, Portuguese, and Swahili. Besides providing balanced, quality news, the service broadcasts feature stories dealing with conflict resolution and a variety of topics related to the process of democratization. International broadcasters provide a formidable counterbalance to Africa's preponderance of state-controlled, government-operated stations, especially when it comes to presenting accurate, comprehensive, and timely news coverage. Moreover, radio assists in bypassing the problem of illiteracy in many countries by providing information to those who cannot read. This program also

promotes an open flow of information which counteracts the physical and political restraints that some governments place on the distribution of printed matter. In Africa, radio's appeal may also stem from the prominence that the oral tradition still has in many local cultures. All of these factors help to ensure that VOA's services play a vital role with daily news broadcasts.

There are many examples of how VOA has served to improve the lives of many Africans and has supported accountability in government and journalism. For example, VOA's Kirundi/Kinyarwanda programs began in July of 1996 to provide accurate and unbiased news and information for listeners in Burundi, Rwanda, and elsewhere in Central Africa, a region where "hate radio" made honest reporting all the more essential. Its 30-minute weekday broadcasts and 60-minute weekend programs also perform an invaluable humanitarian service by assisting in the reunification of families scattered by the fighting and chaotic conditions in target areas. This was made possible through a grant from USAID. Extraordinary responses also followed a series prepared by VOA Kirundi/Kinyarwanda and a refugee trauma team from Harvard's School of Public Health. Several thousand listeners have requested the program be aired again.

> ***Example in action: VOA Central Africa***
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> *VOA Central Africa Service has so far reunited more than 1,000 families in the conflict-torn areas of Burundi and Rwanda through its Family Reunification program. International and non-governmental organizations and members of families caught up in the upheaval had appealed for a means to reach displaced family members. In response, VOA launched the new program on November 30, 1996, just four months after the debut of the Central Africa Service. The service has received more than 9,000 messages from people asking for help in locating family members.*

5.13 Angola. This period marked a collapse of the Lusaka Protocol, a return to conflict, and an increase in internally displaced persons (IDPs). DOS urged the government and opposition UNITA to end the long-running civil conflict in Angola. While it deplored UNITA's repeated failure to comply with its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, it nonetheless was deeply concerned by the government's August 31, 1998 decision to suspend participation by UNITA members in the national assembly and government of unity and national reconciliation. Seventy UNITA members of parliament, 4 government ministers, and 7 vice ministers who had been appointed under the Lusaka Protocol were directly affected, although this decision was later reversed for all but 2 of the ministers. DOS expressed deep concern about this abandonment of a critical aspect of promoting reconciliation between the government of Angola and UNITA.

DOS through its contributions to the International Committee of the Red Cross provided relief and medical assistance to refugees. Meanwhile, despite the disruptions of the conflict and the temporary evacuation of expatriate staff to Luanda from some of USAID's NGO grantees, USAID's overall program to increase resettlement, rehabilitation and self-sufficiency in food production met most of its target goals.

Programs focused on supporting national reconciliation had mixed results; despite the renewal of conflict, however, important measures were achieved in some communities.

In the area of resettlement and reconstruction, performance exceeded expectations in most areas. USAID provided basic support to resettle displaced people in their home or nearby communities. During 1998, USAID supported the resettlement of 139,270 Internally Displaced People (IDPs), as opposed to only 60,000 in the previous year. In addition, several infrastructure projects were rehabilitated: 529 km of rural roads in Benguela, Kuanza Sul and Bie; 33 small bridges; 12 health posts; 8 gravity water supply systems, 50 water ponds and 15 irrigation canals (a total of 302 kms of irrigation canals); 532 latrines, and 27 schools.

In addition to displaced persons themselves, other vulnerable groups were targeted for interventions, such as traumatized children and land mine victims needing prosthetics. Through a center in Moxico, Angolans were trained to make artificial limbs for amputees, and the community-based program of psychosocial assistance to children traumatized by war covered eight provinces. A program for children separated from their families by the conflict was able to register 1,230 children, of whom 763 were reunited with their families or placed with a foster family.

In the area of mine action, USAID partners removed and destroyed 566 anti-personnel land mines; cleared an area of 51,787 m^2; trained 20 mine-awareness instructors in Uige province, who in turn sensitized 180,000 people on the danger of mines; carried out advocacy initiatives to raise awareness of the local population and the government authorities on the Ottawa Treaty; and located 251 land mines and unexploded ordinances in Uige and Gabela-Kwanza Sul province and passed the information onto the de-mining agencies.

The US enabled the flow of objective news and information in Angola via Voice of America (VOA) and other media, encouraging conflict resolution and reconciliation in the country. For example, VOA's "Linha Directa, Linha Aberta" is highly regarded as an accurate and timely news source in Angola. The program focused on issues such as public education on democracy, peace and reconciliation, human rights, and women in the political process.

5.14 Burkina Faso. The United States Information Service (USIS) sponsored Ms. Maria Goretti Sawago, examining judge of the high court of Ouagadougu, to participate in the May 1998 Young African Leaders project, "The Rule of Law and the Independent Judiciary." At thirty-five, Ms. Sawadogo is one of the youngest judges in her country and is an important proponent of women's rights.

5.15 Burundi. The US condemned the violence and killing associated with fighting on the outskirts of Bujumbura, and deplored the indiscriminate killing of civilians by both the Burundian army and the rebel forces. Ambassador Rusty Hughes and other senior officials visited the site of a massacre of villagers. Such grotesque violence made the resolution of Burundi's problems more difficult and complicated efforts to bring an

enduring and equitable peace to Burundi. The US called on all parties to this conflict to respect the lives of non-combatants and cease hostilities immediately. The US believes that lasting peace will come to Burundi only through a political settlement. It supported the missions of the OAU and the UN, which sought to reinvigorate the regional peace process. Presidential Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Howard Wolpe traveled to the region in January 1998 to further emphasize the continuing efforts of the US government to support endeavors to launch peace negotiations.

DOS through its contributions to the International Committee of the Red Cross provided relief and medical assistance to refugees. USAID sponsored a continuing grant program to support technical assistance for political dialogue among national leaders.

5.16 Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC). DOS continued to strongly deplore the escalation of conflict in Congo. It repeatedly pressed all foreign forces to withdraw, and urged countries and armed movements to desist from intervening militarily. DOS supported multiple initiatives of regional leaders to end the Congo conflict, including efforts of the Organization for African Unity, Southern Africa Development Community, President Chiluba of Zambia, President Mandela of South Africa, and the summit in Nairobi of Presidents Moi of Kenya, Mkapa of Tanzania, and Museveni of Uganda. In addition, US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Howard Wolpe and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice consulted extensively in Africa with key regional leaders in an effort to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

DOS articulated deep disappointment that the Congolese government failed to cooperate with a UN human rights investigative team that visited the country while supporting the Secretary General's work to promote respect for human rights and the prevention of further violence and instability. DOS's efforts included direct interventions by Secretary Albright, US Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson, and the US embassy in Kinshasa to urge the Congolese government to respect and facilitate the work of the UN team.

DOS consistently called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, an end to ethnic-based killing, respect for human rights, and the safety of humanitarian workers and other non-combatants. It further urged all sides to halt offensive actions and pursue negotiations to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict: the security concerns of Congo's neighbors, the lack of broad-based participation in the political process, and full rights for all ethnic groups in the Congo. It also expressed unequivocal support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation while remaining conscious of the legitimate security concerns of Congo's neighbors.

DOS was gravely concerned about the number of countries and armed movements that had joined the fighting in the Congo, including the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe as well as reports of the involvement of Sudan, Chad, the ex-Rwandan armed forces, the Rwandan Hutu Interahamwe militia, and possibly other rebel groups. It especially deplored reported Congolese government efforts to enlist the support of the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. The involvement of these ethnically motivated killers would have extremely serious consequences, including

fomenting the resurgence of genocide. Concern was also expressed over reports of human rights abuses in rebel-held areas. DOS engaged in extensive diplomatic efforts to pressure all parties to desist in such activities.

Senior US government officials were in continual contact with regional leaders, and US embassies in the region were actively engaged at all levels of this issue. Through its contributions to the International Committee of the Red Cross, DOS also provided relief and medical assistance to refugees.

5.17 Eritrea. Some of USAID's programs in this country have been designed to increase the capacity and accountability of government at local and national levels. These programs targeted such areas as rule of law, civil society and good governance. Unfortunately, the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia that erupted in May 1998 undermined progress, although some USAID programs did achieve important accomplishments.

Selected Eritrean government institutions, Asmara University, and three national associations benefited from a capacity-building program. Progress was made in developing new university linkages and providing support for strengthening Asmara University. The first group of university graduates in law and journalism sponsored under one program has now taken positions in government ministries. Legal code reform supported by USAID and UNDP continues to bring current codes into alignment with the new Eritrean Constitution. Other planned activities could not be carried out due to the war with Ethiopia.

Despite the constraints imposed by the conflict, however, rule of law programs are continuing, principally under UNDP funding but with important USAID contributions. The Eritrean national constitution, ratified in May 1997, necessitated the recodification of all existing legal codes. The Ministry of Justice continued with the implementation of the Legal Reform Plan (originally financed by USAID), which involved re-codifying the criminal, civil, marine, and commercial codes.

5.18 Ethiopia. Drought and massive floods led to crop failure affecting 1.5 million people in 1997-98; meanwhile, the border conflict with Eritrea displaced 275,000 Ethiopians. Both events distracted the government away from development, as it was preoccupied with crisis management. Nevertheless, USAID was able to stay the course and not abandon any of its development objectives. Among its activities were food security and democratization programs.

USAID remains strongly committed to supporting a food security and agriculture program in Ethiopia, one of the most food-insecure countries in the world. Performance towards increasing the availability of selected domestically produced grains was poor in FY98 due to the lack of consensus with the Ethiopian government on a major bilateral food security/agricultural program. However, the team focused its efforts on working with the government and other donors to finalize Ethiopia's Food Security Program and,

in early FY 1999, USAID reached agreement with the Amhara Regional Government on a set of activities within the Region's Food Security Program to be supported by USAID.

In the area of direct assistance, the US provided over 35,000 metric tons of commodities, valued at $16.0 million, from non-emergency resources. These commodities were distributed to approximately 900,000 Ethiopians in the country's chronically food-insecure regions. Emergency humanitarian assistance valued at $34 million was provided to Ethiopians affected by drought or floods or displaced by the border conflict. However, resource shortages reduced the impact of FY98 emergency programs in Ethiopia. The government had appealed for 573,000 MT of emergency food aid to meet the needs of over 4.2 million people over a period of nine months. However, donor pledges, including USAID's 75,000 MT, met only 58% of the appeal. In addition, 44,000 MT of the US donation was blocked in Eritrea when the port of Assab was closed as a result of the border

> *"USAID/ETHIOPIA's development program showed remarkable resilience in the face of the eruption of a border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998, and the escalation to war in February 1999 which continues to this day. Despite the [government's] pre-occupation with the conflict, USAID was able to achieve significant results in education, health, democracy and gover-nance, and the delivery of relief to the most vulnerable. Even in agriculture, a historically disappointing sector for USAID, there is now hope for a break-through for the design of a food security/agricultural program."*
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> **USAID/Ethiopia Results Review FY98 & Resource Request FY01**

conflict. Together, these factors reduced the number of people reached by emergency assistance by nearly 50%. The issue of "not enough" was constantly mentioned when USAID assessed the impact of emergency assistance. Although the timeliness and targeting of aid was effective, the number of displaced persons grew to 350,000, more than double the 150,000 people for whom the assistance was provided. As the conflict continues, there are fears that the displaced population may require long-term assistance. As long as they are unable to return to their homes and farms, their ability to manage on their own will remain severely limited.

5.19 Guinea. The on-going regional instability in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and the Casamance region of Senegal, and its attendant humanitarian crisis continue to afflict Guinea politically, economically and socially. The UNHCR Commissioner, Ms. Sadako Ogata, noted during a recent visit to Conakry that Guinea has the largest number of refugees in Africa. Guinea continues to host at least 500,000 refugees in the fragile Forest Region; over the past ten years, a cumulative total of 2.5 million persons have sought refuge in this small country. Hosting large numbers of refugees has strained local infrastructure and devastated the environment through deforestation, conversion of forest to cropland, and contamination and overuse of water resources. The competition for natural resources, especially croplands, between indigenous populations and refugees has intensified.

Though Guinea has remained politically stable, the continued turmoil in the surrounding regions poses a serious threat to Guinea's stability. Three important assessments were completed by USAID on Guinean civil society, the National Assembly and potential sources of conflict and instability. These assessments provide an analytical basis for new activity designs. The last study underscored the precariousness of Guinea's current stability, motivating USAID to adopt conflict *prevention* as a major program focus. Unless a solution is found to resolve the regional crises, chaos and bloodshed could spill over into Guinea.

Guineans enjoyed their second opportunity to participate in a multi-party presidential election. Despite some irregularities, the government managed some aspects of the election successfully. While it refused calls to establish an independent electoral commission, it did establish the Superior Electoral Council (SEC), and in doing so provided a forum for conflict resolution and a participatory structure for election administration. This mechanism enabled the government to avert a likely opposition boycott of the presidential elections. A USAID-funded specialist worked with political parties, NGOs, and the government to propose the SEC's terms of references, by-laws and internal rules of order. In the end, the SEC contributed to a more participatory and transparent environment. When the European Union was delayed in delivering promised financing for SEC operations, USAID was able to fill in the gap for start-up of critical activities. Other donors— Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and UNDP—soon followed the US's example by pledging their support.

The elections were peaceful and largely successful. USAID contributed directly to Election Day through its civic education activities. Overall, USAID and the Guinean government attributed the lack of violence on Election Day in part to the radio programs, which were co-produced by the government, civil society groups, and all major political parties. The programs were broadcast in seven languages and reached more than 50% of the population.

5.20 Guinea-Bissau. DOS strongly deplored and condemned the attempted coup by elements of Guinea-Bissau's armed forces against the democratically elected government. It further supported efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Community of Portuguese-Speaking States (CPLP) to broker an agreement between all parties in this country's conflict.

5.21 Kenya. DOS provided over $2 million to programs designed to reach refugee children in Kenya, most of whom had fled from neighboring Sudan and Somalia. These programs included health care, psychosocial services, education, and other needs.

5.22 Liberia. With a $2 million contribution by DOS, the UN Liberian Children's Initiative was launched in 1998 to directly assist an estimated 90,000 Liberian children and adolescents recover from the effects of war and reintegrate into their home country. These goals are accomplished through support for educational facilities, child tracing, income generating, and child rights awareness.

USAID funded Star Radio, which raised the standards of press reporting in Liberia, educated the public, and served as an important test case for freedom of the press. It provided an independent source of news, information, entertainment, and public service activities for a wide Liberian audience. The government attempted to close down the radio station, but under pressure from the international community allowed it to re-open. USAID is facilitating the transition to Liberian management, which should address the government's concern about ownership and control of the station—a major reason given for the removal of its short-wave license. Intensive training in radio production and management has been conducted as part of this effort. Star Radio has hired, trained and deployed stringers in all 13 counties and is positioning itself to achieve self-sustainability within two to three years. In addition, USAID and the Dutch government funded Talking Drum Studio, a Liberian media production facility. Numerous programs related to conflict resolution were produced, including voter information, civic education, and live community drama. These programs were aired on radio stations throughout the country. USAID also provided technical assistance for by-elections held in Lofa County in May 1998.

Department of Justice funds helped renovate the Arthur L. Grimes School of Law and procured a supply of legal resource materials purchased or donated by US law groups. A human rights expert was also sent to monitor treason trials and assess the progress of rule of law in Liberia.

With DOS funding to UNHCR, approximately 250,000 Liberians have been repatriated. Another 200,000 elected to remain in their country of asylum. Some 672,000 internally displaced persons were resettled; however, many people were displaced again following the September 18 fighting. US contributions to UNCHR and other organizations in support of Liberian repatriation and reintegration activities are part of our continuing support to the Liberian peace process and national reconciliation. In addition, the UN Liberian Children's Initiative received $2 million in DOS funding.

> **Liberian Children's Initiative**
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> *DOS contributed $2 million to this new joint program established by UNHCR and UNICEF to address the needs of children and youth in Liberia following seven years of war and instability. Many of these children have never known peace and stability; many were separated from their parents or became child soldiers, prostitutes, forced laborers or street children. All basic infrastructure in Liberia, including educational facilities, was destroyed. The Liberian Children's Initiative seeks to reactivate the educational system through teacher training, the provision of books and other educational material, and through special programs for adolescent girls particularly affected by the war.*

5.23 Madagascar. USAID programs worked to improve governance in Madagascar. New legislation establishing the legal basis for arbitration was adopted by the National Assembly and promulgated into law. This law is expected to contribute to quicker resolution of commercial disputes. Complementing the legal reform work, efforts are underway to improve the functioning of the judiciary. In response to the dire lack of adequate legal information, USAID financed a project to compile all of the nation's

business codes. This prodigious work is in its final stages; the codes are being revised in response to comments by the Malagasy Committee of Judges.

Complementing the legal reform efforts, USAID helped the National Assembly to strengthen its capacity to review and draft legislation and communicate with constituents. With USAID assistance, the National Assembly held its first public committee hearings, including one on the need for an Ethics in Government Law. In addition, USAID democracy and governance programs supported two major municipalities, Mahajanga and Fianarantsoa, in improving the quality of the public policy dialogue between local officials and constituents by convincing municipal authorities of the need to communicate to taxpayers what they will get in return for their taxes. The success of civic participation in public policy debate is beginning to spill over to the national level as the government reaches out to business associations and civil society organizations prior to adopting changes to the tax code and investment regime.

5.24 Mali. DOS-funded voluntary repatriations to Togo were largely completed during 1998.

During the second half of 1998, USAID initiated a six-year program designed to contribute to the strengthening of peace and stability in the three northern regions of Mali. The program is embarking on transition from relief (e.g. food distribution, assistance to returned refugees) to sustainable local development (e.g. income generating activities, cereal production, community-based education and health care). The goals are to enable the people of the North to acquire the capacity and confidence needed to promote stability through broad-based and sustainable local development.

USIS speaker Judge Jane Roth visited Mali in February 1998 to promote the independence of the judiciary. She met with members from the highest levels of government, the Malian Women Jurists Association, the Young Lawyers Group, and law students and professors at the University of Mali. She described the importance and role of an independent judiciary in civil society during a series of lectures, roundtable discussions, and interviews, and explained the American system of justice.

5.25 Niger. DOS-funded voluntary repatriations to Niger were largely completed in 1998.

5.26 Nigeria. In June 1998, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering led a senior-level delegation to Nigeria. The purpose of the visit was to share US concerns about the transition program and discuss steps that could lead to democratic civilian government in Nigeria. It underscored the importance the US attaches to its relationship with Nigeria and to democracy and reform in Africa. Also included in the delegation were Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice, national Security Council Senior Director for African Affairs Joseph Wilson, and Deputy Commander in Chief, European Command, General James Jamerson.

Initiation of work in Nigeria is an excellent example of how USAID can capitalize quickly on new opportunities in a difficult setting. Due to years of dictatorship and poor US-Nigeria relations, the USAID portfolio had been understandably restricted. When a political opening emerged in FY98, USAID sent an assessment team and devised a work plan for FY99. As a linchpin for regional stability in West Africa, USAID placed Nigeria as a high priority country once conditions allowed USAID to operate there.

USAID conducted the first evaluation of preparations for Nigeria's transition from military to civilian government by analyzing the organizational abilities of domestic election observers, the capacity of the independent election commission, and the potential role of international observers. Building on this assessment, the team worked closely with its US NGO partners, DOS, and the international community. A team designed and implemented an electoral assistance program in less than two months, providing nationwide training for domestic observers and support for improved electoral administration and international observation. A nationwide domestic poll watcher program trained and mobilized more than 15,000 monitors. Without this assistance, programmatic support could not have been provided prior to the local elections that served to inform and improve the subsequent state, legislative, and presidential elections.

In the area of human rights, USAID has facilitated the establishment of 3 legal clinics geared towards training paralegals. Six paralegals were trained to protect the legal rights of Nigerian citizens.

The editor of the staunchly pro-democratic daily newspaper "A.M. News" was invited by the United States Information Agency (USIA) to be an International Visitor on a project in "Decision Making in US Foreign Policy."

5.27 Rwanda. During his visit to Uganda, President Clinton declared that the US will "continue to pursue justice through our strong backing for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda." The US is the largest contributor to this tribunal, and has strongly pressed officials to examine its internal organization so as to more efficiently process its gargantuan caseload. The US has led the international community in pursuing justice for victims of the Rwandan genocide, both through the International Tribunal as well as within the Rwandan legal system. In December 1997, DOS and DOJ also worked closely with the Tribunal to transfer an indited individual from Texas to Arusha to stand trial for genocide and other crimes.

A major thrust of USAID activities has been to address the social justice concerns of surviving Rwandans. Immediate post-genocidal needs centered on establishing and maintaining public security, coupled with mechanisms to reduce the huge caseload of detainees accused of participation in the genocide. Although sporadic incidences of violence still occur, particularly in the northwest, public security has steadily improved in most of Rwanda.

The perceived impunity of accused genocide perpetrators remains a major public concern. USAID funded dissemination of information on the progress and process of the

war crimes tribunals, and with the Department of Justice fielded a team of experts to perform an assessment of the very sensitive Rwandan legal and political situation. Based upon this assessment, USAID designed an appropriate rule of law program.

USAID also focused on the need to expedite the genocide caseload that swelled to 127,000 in 1998. To that end, USAID procured 60 motorcycles for *Group Mobile,* judicial investigators who compile case files of genocide detainees. Prior to this the investigators were hindered due to lack of access to or availability of public transportation. The government of Rwanda estimates that due to this assistance, 60 percent of case files are now completed.

USAID provided information, education, and communications support to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Permanent Office of Awareness to encourage detainees to take advantage of the confessions and plea bargaining provisions of the genocide law by informing the public about these provisions. The MOJ now confronts a large backlog of confessions and the need to streamline and accelerate trials.

The security situation in parts of the country has been a major obstacle to achieving peace. In this context, USAID provided assistance to help reconstitute professional civilian police in internationally-recognized standards of human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption, and the promotion of civilian police roles that support democracy.

Probably USAID's most significant achievement in Rwanda to date has been technical assistance to the Ministry of Interior on decentralization, including assistance in the election process for local citizen councils. Unexpectedly rapid institutionalization of the public decision-making structure transpired, contributing greatly to the rebuilding of political and social institutions in Rwanda.

5.28 Senegal. An upsurge in fighting in the Casamance region of southern Senegal was very troubling. The US expressed concerned about the intensified violence that resulted from a clash between rebels and the Senegalese military. The US was further disturbed about the use of landmines in this conflict. The US believes that tensions can only be settled through political negotiations and that a military solution is not possible. The US urged the prompt initiation of peace talks and called on both sides to scrupulously protect the human rights of the inhabitants of the region.

5.29 Sierra Leone. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice led a delegation to a United Nations Special Conference on Sierra Leone in New York on July 30. The conference was chaired by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and focused on reestablishing peace and security in this country. Special emphasis was given to addressing the critical need to support the efforts of the regional peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, to carry out its role and end rebel atrocities against innocent civilians and children. The conference also addressed emergency relief and humanitarian issues as well as post-conflict reconstruction.

5.30 Somalia. The 1998 food crises in Somalia, combined with cholera and measles outbreaks, left only 4-5 months in the middle of the year when regular program planning and implementation was possible. During the food crises, emphasis was put on ensuring that children had access to nutritious food. A total of 320,113 vulnerable people received timely delivery of food aid.

Humanitarian assistance continued to be the focus of US activities in Somalia. In an attempt to preempt a full-blown famine, the US worked with the Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB), which played a role in preventing the situation from worsening. Among other activities, USAID successfully improved crisis mitigation measures through early identification of the most critically vulnerable groups in Somalia. USAID partners trained 104 staff members to conduct vulnerability assessments. These individuals in turn helped identify vulnerable groups. As a result, interventions targeted those with greater needs.

> *Example in Action: The US in Sierra Leone*
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> *When floods of refugees fled to neighboring countries to escape horrific atrocities in Sierra Leone in early 1998, the President authorized with-drawing an additional $19.5 million from the emergency refugee and migration assistance account. Senior US officials, including PRM Assistant Secretary Julia Taft, traveled to Sierra Leone and Guinea in June 1998 to assess the humanitarian situation and focus international attention on the tragedy. In all, the US contributed more than $50 million for humanitarian needs in Sierra Leone this fiscal year.*

5.31 South Africa. USAID's democracy and governance program supports democratic consolidation in South Africa by strengthening the administration of justice, awareness and practice of rights, reducing conflict, facilitating public participation in policymaking, strengthening public management, and supporting government-civil society partnerships for local development.

In FY98, USAID's well-established rights and justice program continued to contribute to the deepening of a human rights culture, national reconciliation, and a more representative justice system. USAID partners trained approximately 400,000 people in democracy and human rights and reached audiences nationwide with rights awareness messages. At least half of those trained were women.

5.32 Sudan. The obstacles to a just and lasting peace remain formidable in this troubled country. Due to drought and famine conditions, humanitarian relief funding jumped 52% in FY98 to approximately $102.4 million, the largest relief outlay to Sudan since 1991. The US is the largest funder of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), an UN-sponsored program which coordinates the delivery of relief assistance to war-affected civilians in both government and opposition-controlled areas. US-supported relief operations alone reached between 1-1.8 million people per month during the period August–December 1998. While some of the population needs food aid each year, many required full food rations in 1998. Estimates of civilians at risk of death from starvation in Bahr el Ghazal

province alone rose from 350,000 in February to 1.2 million in May. While it should be noted that there have been significant achievements in Sudan, the famine spotlights the precarious position of the people and the limits of humanitarian response during wartime.

DOS urged the government and opposition to halt practices that impeded relief operations, which the Sudanese government agreed to at peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya in May 1998. DOS continued to urge the government to keep its pledge, as well as to fulfill its commitment to UN Secretary-General Annan to allow international relief organizations access to the Nuba Mountains. DOS welcomed a cease-fire between the government and SPLM in Bahr el Ghazal province, the area most affected by famine, which enabled OLS to deliver humanitarian relief. DOS also urged other governments to provide funds for OLS.

USAID undertook a number of supportive measures to mitigate the crisis and prevent future famines. NGOs helped revive livelihoods for some 17,000 farmers and their families in by providing a market for surplus crops through cash purchases and "barter" shops that exchange basic items such as blankets, cloth, hand tools, soap and salt for farmers' surplus crops. The surplus production was sold to relief organizations for distribution among refugees and other vulnerable groups. Other programs sought to improve agricultural production and economic self-sufficiency, repair roads, and support other sectors to improve overall food security in Sudan.

5.33 Swaziland. Swazi participants in a USIS co-sponsored International Conference on the Rule of Law and the Independent Judiciary returned to their country inspired to undertake new projects to advance the rule of law.

5.34 Tanzania. USAID undertook a study of conflict "flash-points" in Tanzania; the follow-up to this analysis includes outreach and training in FY99 to address potential trouble spots.

USIS provided case flow management software to the judiciary in an effort to increase judicial speed, effectiveness, and transparency in the legal process.

5.35 Togo. DOS-funded voluntary repatriations to Togo were largely completed in 1998.

A Togolese magistrate participated in the USIS Young African Leaders May 1998 project entitled, "The Rule of Law and the Independent Judiciary." He returned committed to further promoting judicial reform in Togo.

5.36 Uganda. USAID undertook a new activity designed to help reintegrate northern Uganda into the national polity and economy by addressing the diverse needs of refugees, internally displaced persons, abducted children, impoverished households, and strife-torn communities. This program sought to improve the economic and social foundations of targeted areas of northern Uganda such that upon establishment of a lasting stability, affected populations will be able to more effectively participate and benefit from Uganda's national sustainable development programs. Because conditions throughout the

North vary, the program encompasses emergency and transition activities that address a broad range of needs of affected populations and provide a link between relief and development.

USAID increased access to basic emergency relief by tripling the number of eligible people, although efforts fell short of their goals due to problems with security. A World Food Program effort funded primarily by USAID distributed 21,044 MT of food assistance to 257,600 displaced persons in 1998. Access to clean water and sanitation and distribution of seeds and tools met USAID targets in 1998. In addition, a seed bank was developed for non-displaced farmers in conflict areas. All activities were implemented with the relevant district offices and sought to build their capacity to develop and implement emergency activities.

One of the larger components of USAID's program in Uganda focused on the recovery of victims of conflict. As a result of an assessment, $2 million was pledged to support returned abducted children and their families in Northern Uganda. Activities would be aimed at helping children reunite with their families and communities and eventually lead productive lives. This involved vocational training of older youth, education, and working with communities to accept these children.

5.37 Zimbabwe. USIS speaker Wanda Lucibello of Kings County, New York visited Zimbabwe to engage in productive discussions with NGOs, police, magistrates, and prosecutors on the issue of domestic violence, as well the importance of building democratic institutions, rule of law, civic education, white collar crime, and corruption.

APPENDICES

Susan E. Rice
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Remarks at the Agostinho Neto University School of Architecture
Luanda, Angola, October 29, 1998

U.S.-Africa Relations

Thank you, Vice Minister Chikoty, Rector Hoygaard, Ambassador Steinberg, for that kind introduction. It is a pleasure to be with you this afternoon. I welcome students, faculty, diplomatic corps, members of the American community in Angola, and others. *Muito obrigada por este convite.*

It has been almost a year since I last visited Angola. In December 1997, I came with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to underscore our unwavering support for the Angolan peace process. This is my fifth visit to this capital, and I am always struck by the potential of Luanda--once called the Riviera of Africa. I remain awed by Angola's potential to be an economic engine for much of Central and Southern Africa and to achieve its rightful place on the world stage. Angola has always had the means necessary to captivate and help lead this continent--from its tremendous material and agricultural wealth to its most valuable and under-utilized resource: its remarkable people. The United States stands with you, the people of Angola, as you continue your long struggle to achieve lasting peace and to unify and rebuild your great country.

In Angola, as in all of Africa, this is a pivotal time in your history--a decisive moment when the future hangs in the balance. The challenges and opportunities facing Africa's people stand in stark relief. Despite serious setbacks in several regions, there is still considerable reason for optimism about Africa's future. Economies that were growing on average at less than 2% annually at the beginning of this decade are now growing at more than twice that level. Indeed, some countries, such as Mozambique, are recording double-digit growth rates. Moreover, the citizens of over half of all Sub-Saharan African nations are now choosing their governments freely and holding their leaders accountable. The number of democracies in Africa has more than quadrupled in less than a decade.

From the resurgence of war-torn Mozambique to the demise of apartheid in South Africa, from the budding democracies in Benin, Mali, and Namibia, to a fresh start for the great people of Nigeria, there is reason for real hope for the people of Africa. Yet, clearly, Africa's progress has been neither linear nor universal. In recent months, we have witnessed setbacks in several regions. Some countries which were beginning to recover from conflict have picked up arms again; some societies which were rebuilding are tearing down; and some governments which had taken fragile steps toward democracy and reconciliation are drifting back toward tyranny and repression.

At least eight African nations, including your own, are involved in a bitter war in the Congo. This war is potentially one of the most dangerous conflicts in the world today. In

Congo, the specter of genocide is again raising its ugly head. All those involved in the conflict in the Congo have an obligation to prevent genocide and ethnic violence, and the international community has a responsibility to hold all combatants accountable.

The deepening conflict in the Congo, as well as the humanitarian crises in Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan; resumed fighting in Angola and Guinea-Bissau; and the face-off in the Horn of Africa are all serious concerns to the United States.

Recurrent instability in various parts of Africa has led a number of commentators in the United States to conclude rather hastily that the so-called "African Renaissance" must have been a hallucination. Others maintain: We are witnessing the "birth-pains" of a new Africa. Time will tell, but it may be relevant to recall that the European Renaissance lasted over two centuries--and, during at least half that time war, famine, and plague were the norm. Africa's future progress, as in the present and the past, will be uneven and fitful. In this regard, Africa's experience will be no different than that of Europe, Latin America, or Asia.

Yet, whether the challenge is adversity or opportunity, the reality is that the end of the Cold War necessitates a new paradigm for U.S. policymakers working on Africa. We must resist the temptation to dissipate our energies in responding solely to the crisis of the day. Our horizons must be longer term.

Thus, the United States is pursuing two overarching policy goals in Africa. First, we seek to work in concert with our African partners to combat the many transnational threats to our mutual security. The bombings in Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, and Cape Town just 2 months ago were a sobering reminder of the real and continuous threat we all face from international terror. Together, we must guard not only against terrorism but also weapons proliferation, narcotics flows, the growing influence of rogue states, international crime, environmental degradation, and disease. Continued and closer collaboration with the African people and their governments to counter these threats is an important priority for U.S. policymakers. Therefore, we are investing in new strategies in partnership with African countries, the G-8, and others to combat transnational security threats more effectively before they become more pernicious and pervasive.

We have made a start along this path but, in truth, we have a long way to go. Two years ago, the U.S. signed the Africa Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons now and forever in Africa, but too few African countries have ratified the agreement. We have helped clear thousands of acres of landmines, including many in Angola, but thousands more acres remain. We have begun to provide anti-terrorism training to African countries as well as information on the activities of terrorist groups, but much more remains to be done.

Moreover, we have been working with law enforcement authorities from Nigeria to South Africa to interdict illicit drugs before they hit American streets. But together, we must go further to craft, fund, and implement a continent-wide counter-narcotics strategy. We have urged concerted international action to stem the flow of arms, ammunition, and explosives into Africa's conflict zones, but weapons flows continue unabated.

To combat environmental degradation, the United States supports biodiversity and reforestation programs to help save the flora unique to the continent and preserve the rain forests of West and Central Africa. But the U.S. has yet to ratify the 1994 Convention to Combat Desertification.

The Administration has also recognized the risk to U.S. citizens and soil from inadequate aviation safety and security systems in Africa. We are launching an innovative "Safe Skies for Africa" initiative to increase the number of Sub-Saharan nations that meet international aviation standards. The initiative seeks to make air travel safer for Africans and Americans and to strengthen airport security to help interdict would-be criminals and their contraband.

Finally, the United States is sharing our medical expertise through our Centers for Disease Control--CDC--to combat deadly diseases, like malaria and AIDS, that know no borders. For the protection of people everywhere, we cannot allow Africa to remain the world's soft and most accessible underbelly for terrorists and others determined to do evil.

At the same time, we must press ahead to achieve our second principal policy goal in Africa; that is, accelerating Africa's full integration into the global economy. We do so not only because it will benefit Africa's people but also because it will help improve the lives of the American people. Africa is a vast and growing market of 700 million potential consumers. It is in many ways the last frontier for U.S. exporters and investors.

Despite areas of instability, Africa's economic trends remain positive. Two-thirds of African nations--roughly 3 dozen countries--have implemented economic reforms to open markets, stabilize currencies and reduce inflation. African governments have privatized over 2,000 state enterprises in the past few years, raising over $2.3 billion in government revenue to invest in infrastructure, education, and health care.

America's commercial interests on the continent will deepen as U.S. companies continue to discover this nascent market. American businesses exported over $6 billion worth of goods last year to Africa and imported more than $16 billion. Angola is already the United States third-largest trading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa. Over 7% of our imported petroleum comes from Angola. That percentage could reach 10% within the next few years.

Yet, United States' investors are drawn to more than Angola's oil sector. From sugar-refining operations, to flour mills, to mining, to banking and fisheries, Angola is an important and growing partner for U.S. business. Increased stability and good governance can further unleash Angola's vast potential so that all Angolans can benefit from your country's great wealth.

A visionary economic policy toward Africa is in the United States' own long-term interest. Thus, we will continue and intensify our efforts to pass the African Growth and Opportunity Act. This landmark U.S. legislation remains key to establishing a mature trade and investment relationship with Africa as we have with trading partners in other emerging markets.

At the same time, we are implementing the President's Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa. We are providing technical assistance to help liberalize trade and investment regimes, launching an anti-corruption initiative, extinguishing bilateral concessional debt, and organizing the first-ever U.S.-Africa Economic Cooperation Forum. We also are working with Congress to increase our development assistance to Africa. Since 1994 when the Lusaka Protocols were signed, the United States has provided over $400 million in humanitarian and development assistance to Angola, making our cooperation program in Angola one of the largest in Africa during this period.

The United States also is strengthening our ties to the Southern African Development Community to encourage greater regional economic integration. We have established a Special Representative of the Secretary of State to the region. The U.S. Ambassador to Botswana, Bob Krueger, named representative last May, provides a permanent channel for the U.S. and SADC to work together and serves as a focal point for technical assistance programs.

Secretary Albright also announced the establishment of a forum for regularized dialogue between the U.S. and SADC. The U.S.-SADC Forum will meet on an annual basis to give more focus and definition to our engagement. And we hope to establish a Council of American Businesses in Southern Africa to provide American private sector input into SADC's efforts to create a common market. Finally, President Clinton has signed an executive order granting Generalized System of Preference--GSP--cumulation rights to SADC countries that ratify the SADC Trade Protocol.

These various steps are important, because sustained economic growth is key to eradicating Africa's endemic poverty--and the civil unrest which often accompanies it-- and thus to moving Africa toward lasting peace and prosperity.

Democratic governance and respect for human rights are also crucial to the goal of integrating Africa into the global economy. Recent history has taught us that governments which safeguard human rights as well as political and economic freedoms can more effectively establish the conditions for sustainable economic growth. Therefore, the Administration is actively supporting emergent democracies in Africa. We do so in full recognition that elections--although necessary--are not sufficient to sustain democratic change. As a result, we are investing also in the institutional foundations upon which lasting democracy flourishes. We are helping to train legislators, foster independent judiciaries, encourage constitutional reforms, and establish genuine respect for human rights. We are active in newsrooms, universities, churches, community centers, and army barracks to bolster press freedom, build strong civil societies, and teach African militaries the virtues of subordination to civilian leadership.

In Angola, we are implementing dynamic programs to support national reconciliation through strengthening civil society and political institutions. The United States is working with virtually every party in the National Assembly and local leaders to develop party structures, improve the legislature's operation, consider alternative constitutional structures, enhance the role of women in society, and promote conflict resolution and adherence to human rights standards at the grassroots level. Finally, our United States

Information Agency has produced television and radio programs to build bridges between all Angolans.

As important, the United States continues to play an active role throughout Africa--diplomatically and operationally--to help prevent and resolve conflicts. Peace and stability are essential to nurturing a civil society that protects democracy and human rights, and fosters an enabling environment for economic growth. In Angola, the United States has invested more than $265 million in the Lusaka Peace Process through our contribution to the United Nations. We have spent over $20 million to clear landmines, conduct mine awareness programs, and assist the survivors of mine accidents in Angola. Finally, we have devoted our utmost diplomatic energy to try to help end finally what was once the most deadly conflict on the face of the earth--here in Angola.

And even as we labor to end today's conflicts, the United States is helping over the long-term to enhance Africa's own capacity for peacekeeping and conflict resolution. President Clinton's innovative African Crisis Response Initiative is designed specifically to train rapidly deployable, interoperable peacekeeping battalions to respond swiftly and effectively to future crises.

For the reality is, today, too many of Sub-Saharan Africa's 48 countries are involved in regional or civil wars, causing serious humanitarian suffering and destroying the daily lives of millions of innocent civilians. The situation in Angola is especially precarious. Renewed fighting in Lunda Norte, Uige, and elsewhere in Angola are of great concern to the United States and the international community. Resumed conflict has halted voluntary refugee repatriation, disrupted humanitarian assistance operations, displaced several hundred thousand Angolan citizens, and derailed your country's effort to move from relief to recovery and development.

As one of the three Troika observers, the United States has insisted that all sides honor their commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. While we are concerned that past actions of the Angola Government have complicated the completion of the Lusaka Protocol and increased tensions, there can be no doubt that UNITA bears primary responsibility for the break-down of the peace process and the drift toward widespread war.

The fact is: UNITA must stop promising and start acting. It must take substantial, concrete, and irreversible steps to meet its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol--steps that are long overdue. Partial compliance is noncompliance. The United States again calls upon UNITA immediately to allow the extension of state administration to all areas presently under its control, to demilitarize ALL its forces, to allow free circulation of goods and people, and to end senseless attacks against innocent civilians. Anything else is just not acceptable. The people of Angola deserve lasting peace--a peace they have been denied for too long.

In Angola, as elsewhere, there can be no progress where conflict is pervasive. There can be no freedom and respect for human rights where neighbor is pitted against neighbor. There can be no honest trade nor honest day's work where maize fields are made into mine fields and government budgets are diverted from development to destruction. And,

there can be no serious investment in the future where children are torn from school yards and forced to march in armies.

Just two weeks ago, in Washington, I had the honor to meet a young Angolan boy, 11-year old Espirito Dos Santos Bandeira Celestino. He's called "Pito." Pito came to show me his award winning drawing on the theme, "How you see Angola's future?" The contest was sponsored by the United States embassy, the Angolan Ministry of Education, the Christian Children's Fund, and Texaco. Pito's winning poster depicts a house destroyed by war, awaiting reconstruction; replacement bricks appear around the half-built house.

This drawing also is a metaphor for America's commitment to the Angolan people. Brick by brick, shoulder to shoulder, the United States wants to help Angola rebuild and recover from years of conflict and division. We want Angola to fulfill its destiny as a regional economic and political powerhouse.

In Angola, as elsewhere, African leaders and the African people will determine whether they are able to achieve their vast potential or fall prey to the failures of the past. Young Pito's future, and the future of every child in this country, is your responsibility and that of your government. Yet, as Angola's friends, we have an important stake in your progress.

To succeed, Angolans must chose reconciliation over war, freedom over oppression, democracy over demagoguery, and growth over greed. Only through peace can Angola truly prosper and flourish in the 21st century.

The United States wants to usher in a new chapter in U.S.-Africa relations in the next century. We seek a partnership for the 21st century based on mutual interest and mutual respect. We will not be ambivalent as some countries experience setbacks or "growing pains." We cannot temper our engagement or hold back until the whole of Africa is on an even footing. Indeed, an old Asian proverb states, "When fate throws a dagger at you, there are only two ways to catch it, either by the blade or the handle."
We will continue to work with our African partners to achieve their political and development goals. We will walk with you along the road to democratic progress. We will stand with you when you encounter unexpected adversity on your sometimes bumpy path. And we will support your efforts to implement enlightened policies.

The United States' interests in Africa are clear and unwavering. If Africa can achieve its great promise, then we all--Africans and Americans--stand to benefit. If Africa fails, we will all pay the price.

As President Clinton noted in Senegal after gazing through Goree Island's Door of No Return, "The future before us expands as wide as the ocean that joins, not divides, the United States and Africa." Working with you, we can and must achieve the great promise of our future and fashion a brighter next century for all our children. Thank you.

Susan E. Rice
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa
House International Relations Committee
Washington, DC, September 15, 1998
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The Democratic Republic of the Congo in Crisis

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today before this subcommittee on the grave situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Congolese war--an unprecedented regionalized war that has drawn at least six armies onto Congolese soil--is potentially among the most dangerous conflicts on the globe. The ongoing fighting threatens regional stability, hampers economic progress, endangers the lives of millions of people, perpetuates human rights abuses, and impedes the democratic transformation of Africa's third-largest country. Credible reports of inter-ethnic violence, communal massacres, and attacks against non-combatants because of their ethnicity echo the tragedies of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the subsequent alleged massacres inside Zaire in late 1996 and 1997. There are credible reports that rebel forces in the east have killed civilians, including women and children, believed to be sympathetic to the government. There are also reports of mass graves left by departing government soldiers. All these allegations need to be thoroughly investigated.

The political, economic, and humanitarian stakes in the Congo are high. The Administration thus looks forward to working in concert with Members of Congress, and this subcommittee, to continue encouraging regional states and Congolese leaders to achieve a peaceful and lasting resolution to this crisis and to address the key issues that have plagued the region over the years.

As I testified before this subcommittee in March, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the most important countries in Africa. Its political course and economic prospects will have enormous implications for not only the people of the Congo but also for many in the Central and Southern African regions as well. The Congo is home to roughly 50 million people and borders nine other countries. With its vast mineral, agricultural, and water resources, the country has the potential to serve as an economic powerhouse--to improve the lives not only of its own citizens but of many of its poor and troubled neighbors.

Our policy objectives in the Congo have been consistent and clear. We have sought peace, prosperity, democracy, and respect for fundamental human rights. We have worked to counter those who would perpetuate genocide in the region. We have encouraged the establishment of an inclusive political transition that would end the cycle

of violence and impunity; build respect for the rule of law and human rights; and create the conditions for a credible democratic transformation, economic reform, and the stability required for lasting development and reconstruction. As a consequence, we have been committed to a policy of engagement in support of the Congolese people who suffered so much under Mobutu Sese Seko's tyranny. We have sought to do this notwithstanding the difficulties we have had in working with the new government in the Congo.

The current conflict is the newest chapter in Central Africa's tragic history. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, in which over half a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were brutally murdered, set the stage for the recent crisis. Technically, the Rwandan genocide ended when the current Rwandan Government came to power in July 1994. Yet, those who committed the genocide continued to attack inside Rwanda from the security of the refugee camps of the former Zaire. Congolese, Rwandan, and other forces disbanded these camps and overthrew the long-time dictator President Mobutu. The 32-year regime of Mobutu was marked by economic and institutional decay and by corruption and repression on an enormous scale**.** It left the Congo and all of Central Africa weakened and vulnerable.

In May 1997, the new government, headed by Laurent Kabila, seized control by force of a country that was divided, demoralized, and bankrupt. The fall of Mobutu offered new hope for the Congolese people and for all of Central Africa that serious economic and political reform could unleash the country's vast potential, allowing the Democratic Republic of the Congo to take its rightful place as a constructive regional power. Viewed as the catalyst who brought an end to Mobutu, President Kabila initially enjoyed the widespread support and goodwill of the Congolese people and many in the international community. The United States Administration joined the international effort to try to assist the Kabila government to achieve its stated goals of constitutional reform, democratic elections, respect for fundamental human rights, and economic recovery. But, unfortunately, the promise of the post-Mobutu era has yet to be realized.

Indeed, many of the roots of the current crisis stem from the failure of President Kabila's government to implement a credible, open transition and to respect the human rights of all Congo's citizens. The continuing ban on political party activity and the continuing pattern of the arbitrary arrests and detentions of political and civil society leaders stand in stark contrast to the government's professed commitment to democratic values and goals. The new government has improved the personal security for many Congolese and implemented much-needed currency reform. But its consistent interference with the work of the United Nations investigative team on human rights, its political repression, and its reluctance to work with international financial institutions have made it very difficult for the international community to be of meaningful assistance to the Congo.

Today's crisis, which has internal as well as external antecedents, threatens not only to undermine any hope of early reconstruction and reconciliation in the Congo, but also to engulf Central Africa and the Great Lakes region in a bloody and protracted regional war--a war that could leave the Congo divided and the neighboring states openly hostile to

one another for years to come. The conflict also is causing a serious humanitarian emergency. Shortages of food, medicine, electricity, and water in Kinshasa, Kisangani, and elsewhere have been prevalent and are threatening hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians.

In addition, we are gravely concerned by the detention by Congolese security forces of hundreds, if not thousands, of Congolese ethnic Tutsis and others believed to be Tutsis or rebel sympathizers. Many reportedly have been tortured and summarily executed simply because of their presumed ethnicity. Congolese Government radio has broadcast hate messages, sometimes issued by senior government officials, that are reminiscent of those that incited genocide in Rwanda in 1994. It should be noted that some Congolese Government officials have courageously responded to appeals from the United States and others in the international community to intervene to save the lives of innocent non-combatants. However, ethnic tensions, already high, are now greatly exacerbated on both sides of the conflict.

Mr. Chairman, the United States remains deeply concerned about the effect of the fighting on non-combatants of all backgrounds and the potential for a resurgence of war crimes, including genocide. We reiterate our call to all parties and armies to ensure the safety and protection of innocent civilians.

Although there have been several regional efforts to end the conflict, notably two summit meetings in Victoria Falls, two Southern African Development Community (SADC) meetings, and talks on the margins of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Durban, the rebels have been excluded, and regional parties remain at an impasse. The second meeting in Victoria Falls, mediated by Zambian president Frederick Chiluba and involving OAU Secretary General Salim Salim, resulted in an agreement on the desirability of a cease-fire, but the rebels were excluded and fighting continues. Further discussions on implementing the agreement in Addis Ababa on September 10 by regional defense ministers and again at a SADC summit over the weekend in Mauritius resulted in no progress. Despite the gravity of the situation, recent negotiations have floundered on several obstacles. Kabila has refused to enter into good faith negotiations with rebel representatives. Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, the Congo's strongest backers, have apparently not supplied sufficient pressure on Kabila to find a political accommodation with the rebels. Rwanda and Uganda, for their part, have refused to acknowledge the full extent of their role inside the Congo.

The United States has repeatedly urged all parties to the conflict to implement an immediate cease-fire. We share the perspective of regional leaders that a lasting resolution of the conflict will require the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the launching of comprehensive negotiations to address both issues of border security for all parties and issues of inclusive governance for the Congolese.

The United States has been active in efforts to assist the countries of the region to resolve this crisis. In numerous public statements and through energetic diplomatic action we have affirmed our strong and unyielding support for the sovereignty and territorial

integrity of the Congo. We condemn any violation of this fundamental principle of both the United Nations Charter and the Organization of African Unity**.** Mr. Chairman, let me be clear: The United States in no way supported, encouraged or condoned the intervention of Rwandan or Uganda forces in the Congo, as some have suggested. This is a specious and ridiculous accusation that I want to lay to rest once and for all. We have indicated to both Uganda and Rwanda that we fully understand their legitimate security interests in countering insurgent attacks from Congolese soil. We also share regional and international frustration with the Kinshasa government's failures with respect to both democratization and human rights. Nevertheless, we have firmly expressed the United States' conviction that foreign intervention to topple the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not acceptable. It has substantially increased the dangers of wider regional conflict and destabilization and allowed the Kinshasa authorities to divert attention away from critically needed political and economic reform. To emphasize our concern, we withdrew a short-term training team and an assessment team that were in Rwanda at the time.

While we note that the Southern African states--Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe--that have intervened did so at the request of the Congolese Government, we, nonetheless, regard their involvement as destabilizing and very dangerous as well. From our perspective, foreign cross-border military activity is dramatically exacerbating an already volatile situation. For this reason, we have been pressing all concerned for a cessation of hostilities and the quickest possible withdrawal of all foreign military forces.

The United States has been working actively with regional states to urge them to end the fighting in Congo and to keep the lines of communication open among all relevant players. Our immediate goal has been to stop the bloodshed and protect the lives of innocent civilians**.** The United States also has sought to alleviate the humanitarian consequences of the crisis. We are monitoring closely the situation in the Congo and are in regular contact with humanitarian agencies in the region. In particular, we are working with the World Food Program, which plans to provide food aid for Kinshasa. A substantial amount of this food is being donated by USAID's Food for Peace Program. We also have urged all sides to ensure the safety of noncombatants and to take actions to stop ethnic violence. We have strongly pressed the Congolese Government to stop its inflammatory statements inciting ethnic hatred. We have called on all sides to cease actions aimed at depriving innocent civilian populations of essential goods and services, and we are working with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to ensure the safety of at-risk groups being detained in the Congo.

Our diplomatic efforts have been constant and multifaceted. President Clinton urged President Kabila to implement essential internal reforms during their meeting at a summit of six African leaders in Entebbe, Uganda in March. Secretary Albright has personally and repeatedly pressed our concerns about the crisis in conversations with President Kabila, President Museveni, United Nations Secretary General Annan, and other African leaders. My staff and I have been in contact with the Rwandan leadership, met with an envoy from President Kabila, and discussed these issues regularly with representatives of the Angolan, Zimbabwean, Namibian, and Ugandan Governments. We sent the

President's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region Howard Wolpe to the Congo, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda, South Africa, and Angola to press regional leaders to halt their involvement and to achieve a negotiated political settlement that deals comprehensively with the internal and external issues at stake in the Congo. Assistant Secretary Princeton Lyman consulted closely with the United Nations Secretary General and others on the margins of the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Durban with the aim of encouraging a swift peaceful resolution.

We have also been active in the UN Security Council to focus attention on the strife in Central Africa. The United States helped lead efforts to adopt the August 31 Security Council Presidential statement calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of all foreign forces as well as highlighting concerns over ethnic violence.

Although the Administration had to suspend operations at our Embassy in Kinshasa on August 15 for security reasons, after consultation with the Senate, we took the rare step of sending President Clinton's nominee, William Swing, to the region as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo on a recess appointment.

Ambassador Swing has established contacts with President Kabila's government, diplomats, and the United Nations and non-governmental organizations--NGOs--on both sides of the Congo River. He and a small team in Brazzaville are working to promote a peaceful end to the conflict and a cessation of human rights abuses. They also are assisting American citizens in the Congo. Ambassador Swing will resume operations in Kinshasa as soon as the security situation permits.

Mr. Chairman, as we approach this crisis we must bear in mind that a sustainable resolution of the region's problems requires addressing both the issues of internal governance and the issues of external security that underlie the current conflict. Internally, there will never be long-term stability in the Congo and neighboring states until there is a more inclusive government and a political process firmly based on democracy and a healthy respect for the human rights of all of Congo's citizens.

Externally, there will never be long-term regional stability until meaningful action is taken to address the threat that Congolese-based insurgents and genocidaires pose to regional states. A way must be found to bar the Democratic Republic of the Congo from being used as a base for insurgent attacks into other countries, including movements that carry out genocide. Given the political and administrative vacuum that exists in the eastern Congo, any solution to the current crisis will depend upon creating new border security arrangements. The Congolese Government has thus far failed to prevent UNITA as well as Rwandan genocidaires and Sudanese-backed Ugandan rebels from operating out of Congolese territory. The Congolese Government has failed to resolve the crucial issue of the Banyamulenge citizenship, to ensure that ethnic Tutsis who have lived in the Congo for generations enjoy national rights and privileges. These failures have undermined regional security and contributed to the current perilous situation. In addition, we are gravely concerned about reports of the Kinshasa government's close

collaboration with pariah regimes that are known supporters of international terrorism, including Libya and Sudan.

A comprehensive political solution is necessary to meet the security needs of both the Congo and its neighbors. Thus, the United States will continue to press issues of concern both with the Government and the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and with its regional neighbors. We will continue to insist upon the need for a broad-based transitional government, free and fair elections, and the protection of human rights for all Congolese citizens. We are prepared to work with civil society leaders to ensure that the Congolese people have a voice in their future through, for example, electoral assistance programs. Progress on this front will require the selection of truly representative constituent and legislative assemblies, the lifting of the ban on political activity, and the adoption of a constitution that provides for representative government and citizenship for all ethnic groups.

We also will continue to urge genuine economic reform and good governance. And we will continue to cooperate with the World Bank, the IMF, other multilateral and bilateral donors, and NGOs to alleviate poverty and improve the lives of the Congo's citizens. Finally, we will continue to work to prevent a resurgence of genocide and to ensure the protection of human rights in the Great Lakes region. We are pursuing the creation of an international coalition against genocide, called for at the Entebbe Summit attended by President Clinton in March. We support the International War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda and are pleased that it recently issued its first sentence. This is an important step in breaking the cycle of violence and impunity in the region. With Congress' support, we intend to implement the President's Great Lakes Justice Initiative to further this goal. Drawing on African support and expertise, we aim to help the public and private sectors throughout the region develop justice systems that are impartial, credible, and effective. And we will continue to stress the imperative that the Governments of the Congo and Rwanda investigate thoroughly and seriously the human rights violations committed during the 1996-97 war, and hold accountable those who have committed these abuses. Mr. Chairman, the United States wishes to assist the Congolese people and their neighbors resolve this conflict swiftly and urgently. Africa cannot meet the demands or seize the opportunities of the 21st century without viable and stable Central and Southern African regions. The important strides that many African nations have made toward economic and political transformation could be thwarted if widespread hostilities continue. The Congo began this decade under repressive dictatorship, yet, last year, it enjoyed a window of opportunity to achieve significant renewal and change. The quick closing of this window is testimony to the continuing economic and political fragility of many African states. It would be tragic if the Congo ends this decade further fragmented and destabilized.

These are all reasons why the Congolese people must resolve and then recover from this conflict and eventually reclaim the promise of an inclusive society, a democratic government, and a sustainable and growing economy. The United States, for our part, must continue to work with the Congo and other fragile African nations and governments, especially during the most volatile and vulnerable stages of their

development. Africa's progress will not be linear, nor is it assured. Yet, our own national security is tied too closely to the continent's economic and political success for the United States to be a passive bystander at such a critical stage in Africa's history.

However, the United States must also emphasize and acknowledge that Africans themselves will plot their own destiny--their own path toward peace and stability. Neither the United States nor any external actor can resolve this conflict for the people of the Congo or for the region. They must do so themselves, and we will continue to try to help in this regard as best we can.

Mr. Chairman, all the African countries and the leaders of the Congo who have contributed to the crisis have reached a perilous crossroads. They themselves must determine whether to continue on the present violent path to the detriment of their people or pause and step away from armed military action and work in concert to find a viable solution. We strongly support recent African diplomatic initiatives to bring all sides to the negotiating table. We also fully support the significant efforts being made both by OAU Secretary General Salim Salim and by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. Their efforts are essential to resolving the current crisis in Central Africa. I look forward to working with Members of this subcommittee, as always, to lend support to regional states as they work to address the challenges before the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, more broadly, before Central and Southern Africa. Thank you.

Susan E. Rice
Statement before the Subcommittees on
Africa and on International Operations and Human Rights of the House
International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, July 29, 1998

Crisis in Sudan and Northern Uganda

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairmen. I wish to thank the members of the House
Subcommittees on Africa and on International Operations and Human Rights for this
opportunity to address two pressing human rights crises of serious concern for the United
States--the humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan and the heinous activities of the "Lord's
Resistance Army" in Uganda and southern Sudan. Although these crises are occurring in
two different countries and differ substantially in scope and character, they share one
thing in common: both result in large part from the callous and repressive policies of the
Government of Sudan.

Sudan
Before turning to the humanitarian situations in southern Sudan and northern Uganda, I
would like to review with you the key elements of our Sudan policy and the events that
have shaped that policy. Traditionally, throughout Sudan's 42 years of independence, the
United States has sought good relations with Africa's largest state. However, when the
National Islamic Front seized power in 1989 by overthrowing the democratically elected
head of state, our relations deteriorated sharply. Today, Sudan is the only state in Sub-
Saharan Africa that poses a direct threat to U.S. national security interests.

During the past 9 years, we have been at odds with the Government of Sudan over four
fundamental issues.

First, we condemn and strenuously oppose the Sudanese Government's active
sponsorship of international terrorism. The government has allowed international
terrorists such as Saudi financier Usama bin Ladin and the Hamas organization safe
haven in Sudan, has established training camps for extremist militants, and was also
involved in the assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

Second, the NIF regime continues to destabilize neighboring states through its assistance
to a range of organizations, including the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, the Eritrean
Islamic JIHAD, and Oromo Liberation Front in Ethiopia, who have consistently targeted
civilians.

Third, the Government of Sudan systematically violates the human rights of its own
citizens. Torture, religious persecution, slavery, and forced imposition of *Sharia* law on
Sudanese throughout the country are pervasive and well documented.

Fourth, the Government of Sudan continues to prosecute a vicious war strategy in the south that is the direct cause of much of the starvation that is now killing so many in southern Sudan. Quite simply, the policies and practices of the NIF government directly put at risk the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent people--at home and abroad.

As a result, our policy is to isolate the Government of Sudan and to pressure it to change fundamentally its behavior. At the same time, we seek to contain the threat that it poses to U.S. interests, to neighboring states, and to the people of Sudan. Toward this end, we are working on two levels: undertaking specific bilateral measures and urging the United Nations and other concerned countries to act in concert to compel the government to change its behavior. On a bilateral basis, the United States designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in August 1993, and imposed comprehensive economic sanctions in November 1997. These sanctions froze all Sudanese assets in the United States, barred the importation of Sudanese products, and prohibited American companies from selling goods and services to Sudan. We believe these sanctions are now effectively denying Sudan access to American financial institutions and markets.

On a multilateral basis, we supported the 1996 United Nations Security Council Resolution that imposed diplomatic sanctions on Sudan. In addition, we introduced resolutions at meetings of the United Nations Human Rights Commission condemning Sudan's flagrant violations of human rights. We have also worked with other countries to restrict arms sales to Sudan and to try to impose an air flight ban on Sudanese airplanes. Through our Frontline States Initiative, the United States has provided nonlethal military assistance to several of the countries bordering Sudan so that they can defend themselves against NIF-sponsored aggression.

We recognize, however, that security and democracy will come to Sudan only when the warring parties opt for a resolution of the 15-year civil war on the basis of a just and durable peace--a peace that is based on respect for fundamental human rights of all Sudanese. Thus, the United States is actively supporting, financially and diplomatically, the ongoing peace process sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development--IGAD.

The United States strongly supports IGAD. We have assisted its revitalization efforts and provided direct assistance to the Sudan peace process. Our reasons are two.

 First, the IGAD peace process represents a genuine effort by the region to address its own problems. We want to support this encouraging trend;

 Second, and unlike any other negotiation effort, IGAD has successfully defined a framework for resolution which tackles the central question of religion and state.

The Government of Sudan would like a proliferation of the peace process in order to delay, confuse, and undermine the IGAD process. We must not allow these efforts to succeed. We remain hopeful that additional progress will be made when the next round of talks resumes in August.

To promote viable democratic systems in post-war Sudan, we also have encouraged the various Sudanese opposition groups to strengthen their cooperation, halt human rights abuses--especially by the SPLA and splinter factions--and to develop democratic institutions in areas under their control. Secretary Albright met last year with the leaders of the National Democratic Alliance--NDA--the umbrella opposition organization, to encourage them to work together effectively to promote the rights and freedoms of Sudanese citizens. USAID is providing $4 million in development assistance to areas administered by these opposition groups in an effort to enhance the establishment of transparent and democratic systems that can, over time, ensure that Sudanese citizens control their own destinies.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairmen, the humanitarian situation throughout southern Sudan remains dire despite massive U.S. assistance. Due to 3 years of drought, a dozen-plus years of internal strife, and the decision by the Government of Sudan to ban relief flights for the most severely affected areas in February and March, an estimated 2.6 million people are facing starvation or malnutrition. Through direct pressure galvanized by the United States, the international community finally managed to persuade the Government of Sudan to grant access to relief flights on April 1. Without the direct intervention of the United States Government, I do not believe the flight ban would have been lifted. The United Nations umbrella agency for NGO operations in Sudan, Operation Lifeline Sudan --OLS--provides the bulk of the relief to the most affected areas.

Largely due to swift U.S. support, OLS should be able to provide the 15,000 metric tons of food per month needed by the most desperate people in the south beginning in August. OLS is using our most recent assistance to lease additional heavy-lift aircraft and will soon have 13 such aircraft, including C-130s, operating out of Lokichoggio, Kenya, and three newly opened regional bases. The current food delivery program will be the largest of its kind in history, surpassing the Berlin Airlift.

Members of Congress have urged that the United States also provide assistance to civilians living in areas that the OLS cannot reach. Let me assure you that we are already doing that. We feel that support for OLS is critical, both because it can deliver to needy civilians but also because the operation was agreed to, through negotiations, by both parties to the conflict. We cannot abandon that precedent, either for Sudan or for the many other hot spots in Africa where conflict has impeded our efforts to assist innocent civilians. That being said, we recognize that OLS faces serious constraints, and so continue to provide assistance to non-governmental organizations working in non-OLS areas.

The United States has been the largest bilateral donor--specifically targeting efforts to alleviate the suffering and end the humanitarian crisis in the south of the country. Since 1989, the United States has provided more than $700 million in humanitarian assistance to Sudan. This year alone, we have already pledged more than $78 million. The $78 million includes 60,000 metric tons of food--plus transportation costs--emergency healthcare, and tools and seeds for farming. More is likely to be provided. Already, the United States accounts for over one-third of the total relief being provided by the

international community. We've also decided to allocate up to 100,000 additional metric tons of wheat being purchased from U.S. farmers for Sudanese relief efforts.

Today, Roy Williams, the Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID, is in Sudan assessing the magnitude of the current problem and the international effort being mounted to bring it under control. After his return, we will pursue the next appropriate steps to expand efforts and capacities.

As we look ahead, we must work in concert--the Congress, the Administration, and the international community--to end the current crisis in the south of Sudan. But we must bear in mind the root cause of this crisis. Too many Sudanese are going hungry largely because of indefensible government policies. Thus, we must continue our broader policy of pressuring the Khartoum regime to change fundamentally its behavior.
Indeed, we must also note that the Sudanese Government's destructive policies are not limited to the south. In the northeast, for example, the GOS has taken reprisals against growing dissent from the nomadic Beja peoples who, notably, are deeply religious Muslims. Young men dependent on temporary labor in Kassala town have been fired from their jobs as punishment for rising Beja opposition. Thousands of the Beja people have been displaced and are now dependent.

We will continue to support actively the IGAD peace process, which is the only viable route to ending the civil war. And we will continue to back the British-led initiative to convince all sides in the southern Sudan conflict to allow open international relief corridors to end the current crisis in south of Sudan and across the entire country.

Uganda
The situation in Uganda is stark evidence that Sudan's disregard for human rights extends well beyond its own borders. The Sudan-sponsored "Lord's Resistance Army" murders, tortures, rapes, kidnaps, and forcibly conscripts the civilian population of northern Uganda. Its favorite targets for kidnapping are children. Kidnapped girls are forced to become sexual slaves to LRA commanders, while the boys are forced to fight. All can be subject to vicious corporal punishment and murder on the whim of a commander. Those who escape or are freed carry with them tragic psychological scars.

Although the LRA and its commander, Joseph Kony, have their origins in Uganda's own history of domestic conflict, it is Sudanese support for the LRA that has given it resources and the sanctuary necessary to terrorize the populations of the Gulu and Kitgum districts in northern Uganda. Sudan provides the LRA with safe-havens deep within its territory and supplies it with military equipment, food, and other materials. After Sudan's support to the LRA increased significantly in 1994, the atrocities suffered by the people in northern Uganda rose exponentially. That suffering continues today.

During the first half of 1998, the number of incidents and the geographic spread of LRA depredations increased. Abductions appear to be down, but children continue to be victimized. In our embassy's assessment, no areas of Gulu or Kitgum Districts can be considered safe. My colleague from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Valerie

Newsom-Guarnieri, here today, can answer questions about the 400,000 people living in Internally Displaced Persons camps in the north. I want to emphasize, however, that the situation in the north is of concern to all of us. Our Ambassador, Nancy Powell, visited one of the camps as recently as early July, and Secretary Albright visited Gulu during her December 1997 trip to Africa. We were all deeply moved by the experience of meeting the child victims of LRA atrocities. It left us even more committed to helping Uganda address this ongoing conflict.

The United States Government is engaged on many levels to promote a resolution to the conflict in northern Uganda and to meet the immediate needs of the population there. The Northern Uganda Initiative, announced by the First Lady in Kampala in March, is now a $10 million, 3-year program designed to provide targeted relief and promote development in the areas most affected by the war in the north. The program will focus on food security, trauma counseling for children, employment generation, and reconstruction of the infrastructure, particularly roads, necessary to regenerate economic activity. Although security is the prerequisite for sustainable growth and development in northern Uganda, it is our belief that progress can be made even before the conflict there is ended. Improved economic prospects, moreover, may generate additional support among the local population for the Government of Uganda's efforts to defeat the LRA insurgency.

In addition to our relief and development work, we are promoting other avenues of conflict prevention and resolution. We are delivering non-lethal, defensive military assistance to the Government of Uganda to help improve the effectiveness of its military response to Sudanese-sponsored aggression, in particular that of the LRA. We provided $3.85 million in equipment in FY 1997, and are considering a similar amount for FY 1998. With Congress' help, we can maintain this if our requested FY 1999 budget is considered favorable. In addition, a $400,000 International Military Education and Training--IMET--program is aimed at improving professionalism in the Ugandan Army to help it better protect the population in the north.

The Ugandan People's Defense Force--UPDF--has improved dramatically in the last 10 years. Still, the UPDF has not been as efficient as it could be in combating the LRA and protecting civilian populations. Our IMET program and efforts by other like-minded donors are designed in part to redress this problem, but ultimately the Government of Uganda needs to enhance its own efforts in this regard. We recognize the very difficult challenges associated with fighting an insurgency that operates in a large and remote area and resorts to such brutal tactics, but this is all the more reason for the government to make sure its own military has every advantage possible.

The UPDF as well as government-sponsored local defense forces must guard against human rights abuses. We believe that the Government of Uganda is working to implement a military campaign that respects the human rights of non-combatants and deals as humanely as possible with the insurgents, many of them forcibly conscripted by the LRA. But, the government must do more and better in this regard. At the same time, it is critical that we understand the sharp difference between LRA and UPDF behavior.

Abusive tactics are an aberration for the UPDF. For the LRA, they are the standard operating procedure.

At the same time, we are concerned that the government's military response may not be enough. To date, it has not succeeded in eliminating the LRA. Thus, we have encouraged the Government of Uganda to pursue in parallel a political track to resolve the conflict. It is, frankly, difficult to imagine a negotiated settlement with a group like the LRA. Nonetheless, in the interest of arresting the serious costs of this conflict, we believe the Government of Uganda should consider seriously this option. To some degree, at least, we understand that communication has been established.

Perhaps more important for long-term stability in the region, we encourage the Government of Uganda to enhance its dialogue with community leaders in northern Uganda. Members of the principal ethnic group in the area, the Acholi, have been the principal victims of the LRA and the rebellions that preceded the LRA. At the same time, the rebellions have been the work primarily of Acholis. For lasting stability to be achieved, Acholi leaders must recognize the government in Kampala as a legitimate partner seeking to protect their interests, and they must work with local and national governments to build the foundation for peace.

Finally, we must return to the question of Sudan. The LRA would be a much less significant problem were it not for Sudanese support. I have outlined this Administration's policy that seeks to isolate and deny sustenance to the Khartoum regime until it changes its behavior on a number of fronts, including its destabilizing activities in neighboring countries. We continue to draw the attention of friends and allies to the crimes of the LRA in an effort to create the multilateral approach necessary to pressure Khartoum most effectively.

The human costs of the LRA insurgency in northern Uganda are immense. Because it requires the government to sustain high military spending, and because it keeps a large part of the country outside of the productive economy, the war in the north is also detracting from what has been one of Africa's strongest economic success stories in recent years. Sudan's regional aggression, in short, is costing Uganda and many others a great deal, and we must continue to work to contain it.

Mr. Chairmen, I believe the humanitarian crises in northern Uganda and southern Sudan threaten the substantial strides Africa has taken over the past decade toward stability, free market economies, and democracy. Today, many Africans can dare hope that their children and their children's children will actually study and work in peace and security, and freely and regularly elect just and accountable leaders. We look forward to working with both the Africa Subcommittee and the International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee to help all Africans enjoy the same opportunities as the continent approaches the 21st century.

Thank you.

Ambassador Johnnie Carson
Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Remarks to the National Endowment for Democracy
Council on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC, June 3, 1998

Democratization, Human Rights, and Good Governance in Africa: French, American, and African Perspectives

Thank you, Paula. Carl Gershman, Salih Booker and my distinguished co-panelists, Jean-Claude Faure, His Excellency Amadou Toumani Toure, and Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, honored guests from the U.S., Africa, and France, I am very pleased to be with you this morning.

Let me begin by apologizing for Assistant Secretary of State Dr. Rice's cancellation here today. As diplomats we are constantly on stand-by to go where we are needed, when we are needed on a moment's notice. Susan traveled to the Horn of Africa on Saturday to encourage a resolution of the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. I know she regrets not being able to address all of you, and thanks to the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Endowment for Democracy, one of this Administration's key partners, for sponsoring this important 2-day conference. The NED, with two of its core grantees, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, has done a tremendous job over many, many years to spark and sustain democracy around the world. Secretary Madeleine Albright, a former Vice Chair of NDI, and all of us at the State Department look forward to a continued collaborative role with you in Africa.

This is an exciting time to be engaged in U.S.-Africa policy. In just a short decade, we have witnessed the dramatic end of apartheid in South Africa, the conclusion of protracted civil strife in many regions and we have seen the number of democracies grow five-fold. Examples of Africa's progress can be found everywhere on the continent. Military regimes and one-party states are no longer praised or exalted. Benin has established a vibrant new democracy. Uganda has overcome years of human rights abuses. Ghana has restructured and liberalized both its economy and political institutions. Tanzania has moved from "Ujama" to a multiparty system and Namibia and Mali have moved from confrontation to consensus building as a way of bridging differences rooted in the past.

While the democratization process has been uneven, and is still very tenuous, more than 20 countries now enjoy a democratic form of government. Indeed, if the 1980s were a time of internal wars, devastating famine, apartheid, and despotism--the 1990s are more a time of opening, renewal, and of slow but steady progress.

Equally as important, there is an inspired determination among the continent's citizens to move from exclusive to inclusive societies, and from dependence to self-reliance.

Africans are demanding that they be involved in decisions that affect their lives. They are increasingly demanding accountable and just leadership. We have also changed. We no longer look at Africa through the prism of east-west politics. The Clinton Administration has jettisoned its Cold War calculus in Africa to forge a new partnership with Africa for the 21st century--a partnership based on mutual interest and mutual respect.

The promotion of democracy and respect for human rights is the bedrock of this partnership and of our African policy, inextricably linked to our efforts to promote economic development, resolve conflicts, and counter global threats. Working with non-governmental organizations represented here and elsewhere, we support democratization initiatives in 42 of Africa's 48 countries. With our African partners, we are not only on-site at the polls during democratic elections, but

- In parliament buildings helping to establish elected legislatures,
- In courtrooms to encourage independent judiciaries, constitutional reforms, and respect for human rights,
- In newsrooms fostering vibrant and independent free press,
- In universities, churches, and community centers to build strong civil societies, and
- On army bases to train professional militaries that are subordinate to civilian rule.

We recognize that free elections are an essential ingredient in a true democracy, but they alone are not sufficient to sustain democracy. We must assist Africa's efforts to develop durable democratic institutions that lead to accountable and transparent democratic governance.

During the President's historic trip to Africa in March, he announced several innovative programs that will support the democratic march in Africa, linking education to strong independent societies, conflict resolution to viable justice systems, and freedom of the press to the promotion of individual rights continent-wide. The President's $120 million Education for Development and Democracy Initiative is intended to improve the quality of African education at all levels and to provide new technology to bring greater access to information into African communities. We believe education, technology, and improved access to information will also strengthen democratic institutions and civil society. The President also announced the establishment of a new broadcasting service, Radio Democracy for Africa. As a division of the Voice of America, it will train African journalists and broadcast programs focused primarily on bolstering democracy and respect for human rights.

And working with the governments of the Great Lakes region, we are crafting and implementing the Administration's new Great Lakes Justice Initiative. Drawing on African support and expertise, this initiative will help the public and private sectors develop justice systems that are impartial, respected and effective. By improving the justice system in the Great Lakes region, we hope to end the cycle of impunity that has ravaged this part of the continent.

We want to work closely with our allies throughout the world to ensure Africa meets its vast potential. The new partnership with Africa is multinational and inclusive. For too long Cold War and east-west divisions clouded our mutual objectives. But to be frank, there have been times when we have differed, when the United States and other developed countries have not seen eye-to-eye on the best approach for promoting democratic values. And now, more than at any other time in history, we must redouble our efforts to coordinate our policies and activities.

For with all its promise, Africa plainly is not free from peril. The potential for renewed genocide in Rwanda, the recent civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and both Congos, the current border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, pariah states that export terror, and military dictatorships--all threaten to reverse the fragile progress Africans have made. Indeed, many countries hang in a delicate balance--on one side stands peace and reconciliation, on the other, anarchy and deterioration.

In Nigeria, for example, we continue to hold General Abacha to his promise to restore the country to civilian rule. We remain deeply concerned about the regime's tight control over the transition and the continued practice of detaining without charge politicians, pro-democracy activists, and journalists. Abiola, Obasango, and others should be released. Nigerians deserve a fair and free process and we call upon the government to fulfill its commitments to its people.

Threats, intimidation, arrests of respected journalists, and the closure of local radio stations in Niger, undermine efforts to bring about national reconciliation. The U.S. has renewed its call to President Bare and his government to resolve the political stalemate and to guarantee the right of all Nigeriens to democracy, good governance, and free expression.

In Central Africa, war, genocide, political mismanagement, economic disarray, and massive refugee flows have destroyed social cohesion, weakened the rule of law, and led to massive human rights abuses. The United States remains committed to the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who suffered so much under Mobutu, even as we view the record of the Kabila government as mixed and often worrisome. The Congolese authorities are moving forward with the establishment of a constituent assembly, part of President Kabila's announced plans for constitutional reform and democratic elections, and we hope it will be broadly representative of Congolese society.

However, the internal exile of prominent opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, the intimidation of the United Nations human rights team, and continued harassment of the press, human rights organizations, and opposition political groups, do not bode well for stability in the region. Next door, in the troubled Republic of Congo, we must push for the peaceful restoration of an inclusive democracy, requiring talks with all the major Congolese political players, including supporters of former President Lissouba and ex-Prime Minister Kolelas.

With our allies, including France, we are convinced we need to support African efforts toward democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. To promote stability and conflict resolution, the U.S. and France have been coordinating efforts to enhance African states' capabilities to respond to crises--both natural disasters and political upheavals. Following the French government's lead, we have made progress in agreeing on terms for MINURCA, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic. During his recent trip to Africa, President Clinton reviewed Senegalese peacekeeping exercises with U.S.- and French-trained African troops in Dakar. We consult with our French and other G-8 partners in many areas, including progress on the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative, and have been pleased to see strong economic reformers such as Uganda, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Cote d'Ivoire benefit from HIPC programs.

But, as two of the oldest and greatest democracies, we need to move. We need to go forward in setting aside our own natural rivalries and to look for more effective ways to jointly support the enduring principles--democracy, human rights, and liberal economic systems--that have made our two countries great.

Cooperating with the international community, we must stay significantly engaged in Africa. We must work with reforming states to achieve their political and development goals. And we must not turn away from these states when they encounter unexpected obstacles. The objectives shared throughout this room appear to us to be the same-- building a new, multinational partnership for the new century with Africa--a true partnership based on our desire to move further down the path toward inclusive societies, respect for human rights, and political reform in the 2000s.

Americans understand that every democracy, including our own, is a work in progress. As the American Civil Liberties Union stated in the 1950s, "liberty is always unfinished business." Indeed, it took our country 100 years to abolish slavery and 150 years to establish universal suffrage. As we recognize diversity in the democratic practices of other countries in the West, in Latin America, Central Europe, and Asia, we respect diversity in Africa as well. We also understand Africans alone will determine their own destiny, and that many are approaching the 21st century retaining dramatic, slowly healing scars from volatile transitions or years of repression.

But we cannot retreat from our conviction that democracy is a right, not a privilege. We must remember that democratic institutions or the pillars of democracy are universal: freedom of speech, an independent judiciary, freedom of association, freedom of religion, and free elections that provide for a change of government at regular intervals.

Today, many Africans can hope that their children will achieve decent standards of living, study and work in peace and security, and freely and regularly elect leaders who will govern responsibly. Today, many Africans can go to the polls and speak and write their own opinions without fear or intimidation. Today, Africans are finding strength in unity and newfound dignity in debate, and are finally striving for the rights and opportunities they have been denied for so long.

I know Assistant Secretary Rice recognizes the tremendous breadth of your international talent and expertise. We both respectively ask for your wise counsel and full support at this critical juncture in Africa's history and look forward to working with all of you in pursuit of a secure and prosperous Africa in the next century. Thank you.

Arms and Conflict in Africa
Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Bureau of Public Affairs
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Arms transfers and trafficking and the conflicts they feed are having a devastating impact on Sub-Saharan Africa. For the first time since 1989, Africa has more armed conflicts than any other continent. Defining a "major armed conflict" as one with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute identified 11 major conflicts in Africa in 1998. It is not surprising, then, that during that year approximately 8.1 million of the roughly 22 million refugees in the world were in Africa. Millions more Africans are internally displaced. The proliferation of light weapons, financed by cash, diamonds, or other commodities, did not cause Africa's wars, but it has prolonged them and made them more lethal.

By the late 1990s, wars in Africa increasingly had taken on a regional character, especially in the greater Horn, the Great Lakes region, and southern Africa. As of mid-1999, large-scale wars were ongoing in Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan. Low-intensity conflicts plague several countries, including Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Senegal, and Uganda. Other countries suffer from internal instabilities which could evolve into greater civil strife.

To the extent that arms transfers and trafficking contribute to these conflicts, they undermine the promise of African democracy and development, contribute to political decay, and facilitate state collapse. As conflicts drag on and escalate, they can cause widespread violations of human rights and exacerbate famine conditions, particularly in areas such as southern Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Wars divert scarce resources away from social services, disrupt trade, discourage tourism, and contribute to the breakdown of family structures. The pervasiveness and persistence of conflict also have grave psychological consequences as children are traumatized or become accustomed to a culture of violence.

Organized crime also has become active in arms trafficking to strengthen its illegal activities. Gun runners and drug peddlers in southern African are beginning to pool their resources to maximize profits. Unconfirmed reports suggest similar trends in other areas of Africa.

There has been a fundamental change in weapons sales in Sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold War. Many nations and manufacturers eager to empty warehouses and arsenals of arms made superfluous by post-Cold War political and technological advancements have seen Africa as an attractive market. The consequent widespread availability of cheap weapons, easy to use and maintain (AK-47s sell for as little as $6 in some African countries), fuels destruction throughout the continent. In some countries, it is easier and cheaper to buy an AK-47 than to attend a movie or provide a decent meal. Although the infusion of weapons is not large compared with arms transfers in the rest of

the world, the impact of arms trafficking on Sub-Saharan Africa's politically fragile countries has been catastrophic.

Light Weapons
During the Cold War, state-to-state arms transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa involved primarily heavy, high-maintenance equipment such as jet fighters, helicopters, transport aircraft, and tanks. Such items accounted for the largest portion of many African military budgets. After the collapse of Communist governments in the former Soviet Union and its East European allies, state-to-state transfers declined from $4,270 million in 1988 to $270 million in 1995.

At the same time, however, gray (commercial) and black (illegal) arms trafficking in light weapons increased. Because no agency keeps comprehensive statistics on such sales, and arms dealers have little interest in revealing the details of these transactions, their annual value is unknown. An educated guess is hundreds of millions of dollars. Arms trafficking involves primarily low-maintenance, durable light weapons (e.g., AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, and land mines). However, heavy weapons remain popular with some African countries, including Angola, Botswana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Local Wars and Regional Conflicts
The growth of arms trafficking has coincided with a change in the nature of warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa. Warfare has become more complicated as guerrilla groups have proliferated and divided into warring factions. The region has also seen the emergence of warlords (e.g., in Somalia) and cult movements (e.g., the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda).

Warfare by proxy has helped spread conflicts regionally. For example, the armed forces of eight countries and several militia groups are entangled in the conflict in the Congo-Kinshasa. Kinshasa, for its part, provides military support to rebel groups in Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. In response to the evolving regional conflict, Uganda and Rwanda have provided military support to rebel groups in the Congo-Kinshasa. In another example, Sudan provides assistance to the Lord's Resistance Army and other Ugandan insurgent groups in large measure, it claims, because Uganda supports the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Such cycles of violence complicate conflict-resolution efforts and increase the damage suffered by local populations. The use of mercenaries and private security firms has increased, and targeting of civilian populations or individual ethnic groups is more widespread. To prevent chaos, regional peacekeeping forces have sometimes become involved in conflicts as combatants (e.g., ECOMOG in Liberia).

Regional/National Consequences
Contemporary arms transfers and trafficking make today's conflicts more lethal and contribute to devastating humanitarian and refugee crises that spill over state borders from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. Ongoing conflicts in Angola and Congo-Kinshasa have forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to seek refugee status in

neighboring countries. As many as 1 million other Angolans may have been internally displaced by the renewed civil war. The same is true of hundreds of thousands of Congolese civilians.

The region's conflicts have claimed an estimated 7-8 million lives, a large number of which have occurred during the past decade. According to the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), more than 2 million of the fatalities have been children. Some 4-5 million children have been disabled, another 12 million left homeless, and more than 1 million orphaned or separated from their families. Tens of thousands have become "child soldiers."

Almost 2 million people have died in Sudan's 16-year civil war. Angola's 25-year war has killed an estimated 500,000 persons. During the past 6 years, genocide and insurgency have claimed a million lives in Rwanda and several hundred thousand in Burundi. Liberia's civil war (1989-97) took 150,000 lives. The Eritrean/Ethiopian border war, in less than a year and only a few brief battles, may already have cost the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers on both sides. The Eritrean/Ethiopian conflict has spread to Somalia, where local warlords often exchange allegiance for weapons and other supplies. Somalia shows no sign of emerging from the anarchy that has engulfed it for the past 8 years.

Arms Transfers and Trafficking: What It Costs/How It Works
African nations spend considerable sums on arms to prosecute border wars, counterinsurgency campaigns, and wars of secession. Angola probably has spent at least $4 billion during the past 6 years trying to defeat the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA). Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Congo-Kinshasa probably have spent hundreds of millions of dollars to acquire a variety of weapons including small arms, tanks, artillery, and sophisticated jet fighters. Rwanda and Burundi, limited by the revenues available to their agricultural economies, nevertheless spent tens of millions of dollars.

The arms market provides many opportunities to those with assets other than hard currency to fund weapons purchases through parallel financing. Cash-poor governments and rebel groups often sell or barter diamonds, other gemstones, and minerals to obtain arms. The SPLA and UNITA have exchanged timber, cattle, and animal trophies for weapons and other military supplies. UNITA is estimated to have earned several hundred million dollars during the past 5 years from the sale of diamonds mined and smuggled out of numerous sites in northeastern Angola. Since the early 1990s, the Government of Angola has issued tenders for military equipment on short-term loans, mortgaged against future oil production. Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan have mortgaged crops (e.g., sesame, gum arabic, cotton, coffee, tea, etc.) to pay for guns.

Hutu insurgents in Central Africa buy weapons with remittances from Hutu expatriates and the proceeds from the sale of stolen relief supplies and vehicles. Some Hutus reportedly obtain money for arms by trafficking in wildlife. Somali warlords sell stolen relief supplies or "tax" relief shipments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to

get cash to buy weapons. Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Sierra Leone mine diamonds. Liberian President Charles Taylor, when he was a rebel fighter in the early 1990s, sold iron ore and timber. More recently, Taylor has become an important player in the sale of West African diamonds. By supplying money to buy weapons, which he provides to the RUF, such activity enables him to influence the war in Sierra Leone.

Arms Merchants
The people who operate the arms trafficking network in Africa come from a variety of backgrounds. Many are former military or intelligence officers. For example, an ex- KGB official operates a fleet of transport aircraft which flies arms throughout Africa. He also recruits East European mercenaries for African clients. Others work as arms and drug dealers. Senior ex-government officials, including some associated with South Africa's former apartheid regime, have been accused of arranging arms deals for UNITA. Another South African has been linked to arms shipments to Hutu extremists. All are motivated by profits and are masters at leaving false paper trails, making prosecution extremely difficult.

Arms Trade Labyrinth
Monitoring state-to-state weapons transfers is relatively easy because there normally is only a seller and a buyer. The gray and black arms trafficking businesses are significantly more complex operations involving African and non-African, corporate, and individual suppliers and an array of transshipment points, brokers, and financiers throughout the world. African states or insurgents interested in obtaining weapons can choose from numerous manufacturers whose headquarters span the globe. A single weapons purchase can involve several nations, corporations, or brokers.

Arms suppliers in Western and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North America, Latin America, and Asia have sold arms to African clients. Sellers include the obvious large producers, such as Russia and China, and less-publicized sources, such as Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, North Korea, Romania, and Slovakia. Clients also may obtain weapons from individual arms traffickers or from African suppliers such as Uganda, South Africa, Sudan, or Zimbabwe, all of which have indigenous weapons-production facilities.
Weapons are flown and shipped into and through Africa by a variety of routes, sometimes directly, often through one or more transshipment points. These nodes make up an elaborate network of options for gray and black arms dealers who skirt customs inspectors and law enforcement agencies.

According to regional journalists, some of the more frequently used African airfields for flights to eastern Congo-Kinshasa include Entebbe, Goma, Kigali, Luanda, and flights also have come from Juba in southern Sudan. After Kampala's military intervention in Congo-Kinshasa in 1998, the increase in arms flows was so significant, according to an African news report, that at least five East African-based commercial air carriers (Air Alexander International, Busy Bee, Sky Air, Planetair, and United Airlines--no relationship to the U.S.-based United Airlines), and Sudanese, Ugandan, and possibly other regional military aircraft transported weapons and other military supplies into eastern Congo-Kinshasa.

African seaports used by arms traffickers include Aseb, Beira, Conakry, Dar-es-Salaam, Djibouti, Durban, Luanda, Merca, Mombasa, Monrovia, and Nacala. After arrival, arms are forwarded to their destination by road, rail, air, or ferry, often to what press accounts describe as interior distribution centers, such as Port Bell, Ouagadougou, and Juba.

Constraints on Limiting the Flow
Several factors limit the international community's ability to control arms flows into Africa. With the exception of countries/groups under a UN arms embargo--Liberia and Somalia and rebel groups like the RUF (Sierra Leone) and UNITA (Angola) and Hutu and ex-FAR extremists (Central Africa)--it is not illegal to sell arms to Africa. Even those nations and organizations subject to a UN arms embargo easily acquire weapons because of the paucity of effective international monitoring and policing mechanisms. As a result of these loopholes, no one has been prosecuted during the past decade for violating UN arms embargoes in Africa.

Another problem concerns the chronic abuse of end user certificates, which supposedly identify the ultimate destination of an arms shipment. Recently, for example, Ukraine sent weapons to Burkina Faso, listed on accompanying documents as the end user. Ouagadougou transshipped these arms to RUF insurgents in Sierra Leone.

Growing concern about the arms trafficking problem has spawned numerous initiatives by nations in Africa and elsewhere to restrict the flow of weapons. For example, the UN Security Council on September 16, 1998, passed a resolution urging member governments to punish those who sold weapons to countries under a UN arms embargo, especially those in Africa.

The lack of adequate policing and enforcement mechanisms undermines UN efforts to control gray and black arms trafficking to Africa. In 1993, for example, the UN Security Council implemented an arms embargo against UNITA (made more robust in 1997 and 1998). However, UNITA easily evaded the embargo by buying millions of dollars worth of military equipment. This buildup allowed UNITA to abandon the peace process and press for a military victory over the Angolan Government.

On a regional level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on November 1, 1998, announced an ambitious three-year moratorium on the importation, export, and manufacture of light weapons involving member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo). According to some estimates, there are at least 8 million weapons in West Africa, with more than half in the hands of insurgents and criminals.

The success of the ECOWAS and UN initiatives and other similar arms control accords will depend on the implementation of strong monitoring and policing mechanisms. As of mid-1999, arms trafficking continued unabated throughout much of West Africa because ECOWAS lacked the resources to establish such systems.

Prospects

Arms transfers and trafficking will continue to add volatility to politically unstable areas of Sub-Saharan Africa for the foreseeable future. Given the multidimensional and highly complicated nature of the arms transfer/trafficking network, there can be no "quick-fix" solution to this problem. Establishing strong monitoring and policing mechanisms to support ongoing efforts to restrict arms flows to and within Africa will require a demonstration of sustained political will on the part of African leaders and a commitment from the international community to begin sharing information about arms sales and exercising a far higher degree of restraint in approving the transfer of weapons to the region.

Many of Africa's protracted wars continue because the combatants believe military force can resolve political and economic problems. A concerted effort to constrain the availability and flow of weapons to these conflicts might significantly alter the plans of those who continue to choose war over peace.

Excerpt from

Report to Congress on U.S. Military Involvement in Major Smaller-Scale Contingencies since the Persian Gulf War.

William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense
March 1999

In general, the United States, along with others in the international community, will seek to prevent and contain localized conflicts and crises before they require a military response. If, however, such efforts do not succeed, swift intervention by military forces may be the best way to contain, resolve, or mitigate the consequences of a conflict that could otherwise become far more costly and deadly. These operations – known as Smaller-Scale Contingencies or SSCs - encompass the full range of joint military operations beyond peacetime engagement activities but short of major theater warfare. SSCs include crisis response/show-of-force operations, limited strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations, no-fly zone enforcement, maritime sanctions enforcement, migrant operations, peace operations, humanitarian assistance operations, and emergency operations overseas in support of other U.S. government agencies. SSCs also include other operations such as force protection, counterdrug, and counterterrorism operations that are not reviewed in this report as they have not involved the deployment at any one time of 500 or more military personnel.

Selective participation in SSC operations can serve a variety of U.S. interests. For example, U.S. forces are sometimes called upon to conduct noncombatant evacuations, protecting U.S. citizens caught in harm's way. The United States might also choose to deploy forces to an intervention or peacekeeping operation in order to support democracy where it is threatened or restore stability in a critical region. In addition, when rogue states defy the community of nations and threaten common interests, the United States may use its military capabilities – for instance, through maritime sanctions enforcement or limited strikes – to help enforce the international community's will and deter further coercion. And when natural disaster strikes at home or abroad, U.S. values and interests might call for the use of military forces to jump-start relief efforts, enabling other elements of the U.S. government or international community to initiate longer-term relief efforts.

Since there are always many demands for U.S. military action, U.S. decision-makers must clearly delineate the national interests guiding the decision to be involved in potential and actual crises or conflicts. As the National Security Strategy notes, U.S. national interests fall into three categories. The first includes **vital interests** – those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of the nation. Among these are the physical security of U.S. territory and that of U.S. allies, the safety of U.S. citizens, U.S. economic well being, and the protection of the nation's critical

infrastructures. The United States will do what it must to defend these interests, including – when necessary – using its military might unilaterally and decisively.

The second category includes situations in which **important national interests** are at stake. These interests do not affect U.S. national survival, but they do affect the nation's well-being and the character of the international security environment. In such cases, the United States will use its resources to protect and advance these important national interests insofar as the costs and risks are commensurate with the interests at stake. U.S. efforts to halt the flow of refugees from Haiti and restore democracy in that country and its participation in NATO operations in Bosnia & Herzegovina are relevant examples.

The third category is **humanitarian and other interests**. In some circumstances, the United States may act because its values demand it. Examples include responding to natural or manmade disasters or violations of human rights, and supporting democratization and civil control of the military. Often in such cases, the power of U.S. example bolsters support for U.S. leadership in the world. Whenever possible, the United States seeks to avert humanitarian disasters and conflict through diplomacy and cooperation with a wide range of partners, including other governments, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations. This may not only save lives, but also prevent the drain on resources and risks to U.S. military personnel caused by military intervention in crises. Such efforts by the United States and the international community should be limited in duration, have a clearly defined end state and be designed to give the affected country the opportunity to restore its own basic services. This policy recognizes that the U.S. military normally is not the best tool for addressing long-term humanitarian concerns and that, ultimately, responsibility for the fate of a nation rests with its own people.

As this report details, since the end of the Persian Gulf War in February 1991, U.S. military forces have conducted or participated in approximately 50 named, overseas SSCs involving the deployment of 500 or more military personnel at any one time.[1] This includes three crisis response/show of force operations, three limited strike operations, ten noncombatant evacuation operations, four no-fly zone enforcement operations, three maritime sanctions enforcement operations, six migrant operations, ten peace operations, ten humanitarian assistance operations, and one operation to provide emergency overseas assistance to other U.S. government agencies.

The frequency of SSCs has been significantly higher since the end of the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War periods. Based on recent experience and intelligence

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[1] A few unnamed SSC operations in the post-Gulf War period have involved the deployment of more than 500 personnel. These would include the deployment of two U.S. Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups to the vicinity of Taiwan in March 1996 in response to aggressive posturing of Chinese forces and provocative live-fire missile tests into Taiwanese waters. Another such unnamed operation is the Maritime Intercept Operation (MIO), involving forces from the United States, United Kingdom, Kuwait, Canada, New Zealand, Holland, and Australia. Conducted in the Northern Arabian Gulf since 1992, MIO supports UN resolutions against Iraqi smuggling of oil and other goods. The United States routinely deploys between three and five ships in support of MIO.

projections, the demand for SSC operations is expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years. U.S. participation in SSC operations must be selective, depending largely on the interests at stake and the risk of major aggression elsewhere. However, these operations will still likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S. forces through 2015 and may require significant commitments of forces, both active and reserve. Importantly, while the frequency of SSCs has increased and is expected to remain high, the size of the military services has fallen from post-Cold War levels of 2 million to less than 1.4 million active-duty personnel and from 1.9 million reserve personnel to less than 900,000. U.S. force structure has also been reduced during the 1990s from 18 to 10 active Army divisions, 36 to 19 Air Force fighter wings, and 547 to 314 ships. The combination of these two factors – increased frequency of SSCs and reductions in personnel and force structure – has contributed to increasingly high operational and personnel tempo rates, that, in turn, have played a role in readiness problems that have begun to emerge over the past year.

MAJOR OVERSEAS
SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
(involving the deployment of 500 or more U.S. Armed Forces personnel)
March 1991 – February 1999

CRISIS RESPONSE/SHOW OF FORCE

Location	Operation	Dates
Kuwait	Vigilant Warrior	Oct - Dec 94
	Vigilant Sentinel	Aug - Dec 95
Iraq	Desert Thunder	Oct 97 - Nov 98

LIMITED STRIKE

Bosnia	Deliberate Force	Aug – Sep 95
Iraq	Desert Strike	Sep 96
	Desert Fox	Dec 98

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

Liberia	JTF Liberia	Oct 92
Rwanda	Distant Runner	Apr 94
Liberia	Assured Response	Apr – Aug 96
Central African Republic	Quick Response	May 96
Zaire	Guardian Retrieval	May – Jun 97
Albania	Silver Wake	Mar – Jul 97
Sierra Leone	Noble Obelisk	May – Jun 97
Cambodia/Thailand	Bevel Edge	Jul 97
Indonesia	Bevel Incline	May 98

NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT

Iraq	Northern Watch	Aug 92 – present
Persian Gulf	Southern Watch	Aug 92 – present
Bosnia	Deny Flight	Apr 93 – Dec 95
	Deliberate Guard	Dec 96 – Apr 98

MARITIME SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT

Adriatic Sea	Maritime Monitor	Jun – Dec 92
	Maritime Guard	Dec 92 – Jun 93
	Sharp Guard	Jun 93 – Sep 96
	Decisive Enhancement	Dec 95 – Dec 96

MIGRANT OPERATIONS

Cuba (Guantanamo)	Safe Harbor	Nov 91 – Jun 93
Cuba (Haitian/Cuban)	Sea Signal	May 94 – Feb 96
Caibbean (Haitian)	Able Vigil	Aug – Sep 94
Panama (Cuban)	Safe Haven	Sep – Feb 95
Cuba (Cuban)	Safe Passage	Jan – Feb 95
Guam (Kurds)	Pacific Haven	Sep 96 – Apr 97

PEACE OPERATIONS

Sinai	Multinational Force & Observers	Apr 82 – present
Macedonia	Able Sentry (UNPREDEP)	Jun 93 – present
Somalia	Continue Hope (UNOSOM II)	May 93 – Mar 94
	United Shield	Dec 94 – Mar 95
Haiti	Uphold Democracy (MNF/ USSPTGP)	Sep 94 – present
	Restore Democracy (UNMIH)	Mar 95 – Apr 96
Bosnia	Joint Endeavor (IFOR)	Dec 95 – Dec 96
	Joint Guard[2] (SFOR)	Dec 96 – Jun 98
	Joint Forge[3] (SFOR/FOF)	Jun 98 – present
Kosovo	Eagle Eye	Oct 98 – Mar 99

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS (overseas)

Iraq	Provide Comfort	Apr 91 – Dec 96
Bangladesh	Sea Angel	May – Jun 91
Former Soviet Union	Provide Hope	Feb 92 – Apr 92
Bosnia	Provide Promise	Jul 92 – Feb 96
Somalia	Provide Relief	Aug 92 – Dec 92
	Restore Hope	Dec 92 – May 93
Zaire	Support Hope	Jul – Oct 94
Rwanda/Zaire	Guardian Assistance	Nov – Dec 96
Central America	Strong Support	Oct 98 – Mar 99

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS OVERSEAS IN SUPPORT OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Tanzania/Kenya	
Resolute Response	Aug 98 – present

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[2] When the NATO Implementation Force transitioned to become the Stabilization Force, Operation Joint Endeavor was replaced by Operation Joint Guard.

[3] In June 1998, the SFOR was reduced in size and became the SFOR Follow-on-Force (FOF). Operation Joint Guard was replaced at that time by Operation Joint Forge.

CRISIS RESPONSE/SHOW OF FORCE

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

JTF LIBERIA (Liberia, October 1992)

Interests: Vital national interest in protecting U.S. nationals. JTF LIBERIA involved the protection and evacuation of American citizens and designated third country nationals (TCNs) in support of a State Department evacuation directive that reduced the number of at-risk American citizens.

Objectives: To protect and safely evacuate American citizens and designated TCNs in response to factional fighting and general violence in Monrovia, Liberia.

End Date: Operation terminated in October 1992 with the safe and orderly evacuation of American citizens and designated TCNs. All U.S. forces then departed the area.

DISTANT RUNNER (Rwanda, 6-13 April 1994)

Interests: Vital national interest in protecting and evacuating U.S. nationals in support of a State Department directive to suspend all Embassy operations and evacuate U.S. nationals from Kigali.   The U.S. evacuation was staged from neighboring Burundi for force protection and access reasons.

Objectives: To evacuate safely U.S. nationals resident in Rwanda at the onset of 1994 Rwanda genocide that threatened to put at direct risk U.S. nationals and to transport evacuees to a designated safe haven in Kenya.

End Date: Operation terminated in April 1994 with the safe and orderly evacuation of all American citizens. All U.S. forces then departed the region.

ASSURED RESPONSE (Liberia, 9 April – 15 August 1996)

Interests: Vital national interest in protecting and evacuating U.S. nationals and designated TCNs from Monrovia, Liberia, in support of a State Department ordered departure directive.

Objectives: To protect and safely evacuate U.S. nationals and designated TCNs from a resumption of factional violence and heavy fighting in Monrovia and other areas of Liberia.   Following the initial evacuation, an Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit remained on station off the coast of Liberia to provide additional security for the American Embassy and other U.S. nationals who chose not to evacuate.

End of operation: The operation terminated with the safe and orderly evacuation of designated U.S. nationals and TCNs. U.S forces remained on station off the coast of Liberia through the middle of August 1996 and then departed the area.

QUICK RESPONSE (Central African Republic, 21-31 May 1996)

Interests: Vital national interest in protecting and evacuating U.S. nationals in support of a State Department ordered departure directive.

Objectives: To protect and safely evacuate U.S. nationals and designated TCNs resident in Central African Republic and to provide increased security at American Embassy during a violent military mutiny and labor strife in the capital city of Bangui.

End Date: The operation terminated on 31 May 1996 with the safe and orderly departure of designated U.S. nationals and TCNs. Evacuation forces departed the country in June 1996, but left behind a small U.S. military security detachment at the American Embassy. The security detachment departed the country in July 1996.

GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL (Zaire, March – May 1997)

Interests: Vital national interest in protecting and evacuating U.S. nationals in Kinshasa in support of a State Department ordered departure directive.

Objectives: To pre-position forces in the region and to prepare for the protection/evacuation of U.S. nationals and designated third country nationals from Kinshasa during the Zaire civil war, as rebel forces approached the capital and threatened to put at risk U.S. nationals.

End Date: The Zaire government fell to rebel forces in mid-May 1997 without the necessity of an evacuation operation from Kinshasa. The operation then terminated. The U.S. Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit departed the region in May 1997.

NOBLE OBELISK (Sierra Leone, 30 May – 6 June 1997)

Interests: Vital national interest in protecting and evacuating U.S. nationals and designated TCNs in support of a State Department ordered departure directive.

Objectives: To protect and safely evacuate U.S. nationals and designated TCNs who were put at extreme risk from violence and factional fighting in the capital city of Freetown, following a successful military coup against the democratically-elected Sierra Leone government.

End Date: The operation ended with the safe and orderly evacuation of all U.S. nationals and TCNs. The U.S. Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit departed the area in June 1997.

PEACE OPERATIONS

CONTINUE HOPE (Somalia, UNOSOM II, 5 May 1993 – 31 March 1994)

Interests: Humanitarian interests in providing aid to Somalis and preventing humanitarian disaster. Following the March 1993 signing of the Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia, and coinciding with the transition from the United Nations' Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the United Nations Operation in Somalia known as UNOSOM II, Operation CONTINUE HOPE was initiated to participate in and to support UNOSOM II.

Objectives: To conduct military operations to consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure environment for the advancement of humanitarian aid, economic assistance, and political reconciliation in Somalia.

End Date: This operation concluded in March 1994.

UNITED SHIELD (Somalia, UNOSOM II, December 1994-March 1995)

Interests: Important national interest in providing appropriate and necessary assistance in support of international peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts. Specifically, in response to UNSCR 954 (1994) that requested member states to assist in the withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces from Somalia, U.S. forces served for a limited period of time as part of a final rear guard unit for the withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces.

Objectives: To provide force protection and security support for the withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces from Somalia.

End Date: This operation concluded in March 1995 when the objective was achieved.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

PROVIDE RELIEF (Somalia/Kenya, 15 August – 2 December 1992)

Objective: Airlift of humanitarian aid to Somalia and to Somali refugees in Kenya during a famine caused by civil conflict.

End Date/Conditions: Airlift phase ended in December 1992, when U.S. and other U.N. troops landed in Somalia.

RESTORE HOPE (Somalia, UNITAF, 3 December 1992 – 4 May 1993)

Objective: As a follow-on to Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, deployment to Somalia of U.S. and multinational UN force (UNITAF) to secure major airports, seaports, key installations and food distribution points, and to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, with security for convoys and relief organizations and those supplying humanitarian relief.

End Date/Conditions: The operation ended in May 1993 when UNITAF transferred responsibility to UNOSOM II.

SUPPORT HOPE (Zaire, 17 July – 6 October 1994)

Objective: Establishment of refugee camps and provision of humanitarian relief to Rwandan refugees in Eastern Zaire following the genocide in Rwanda.

End Date/Conditions: U.S. military forces redeployed in October 1994 once high mortality rates among refugees had been reduced and the military functions were transitioned to international organizations and NGOs.

GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE (Rwanda/Zaire, November – December 1996)

Objective: U.S. European Command deployed forces to East Africa for reconnaissance and logistical planning, in preparation for a possible humanitarian relief operation to assist Rwandan refugees affected by the civil war in Zaire.

End Date/Conditions: U.S. forces redeployed in December 1996 when it was decided not to carry out a large-scale relief operation.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS OVERSEAS IN SUPPORT OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

RESOLUTE RESPONSE (Tanzania/Kenya, August 1998 – Present)

Interests: The safety of U.S. citizens and the protection of U.S. facilities constitute a vital national interest. Following the August 1998 terrorist attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Secretary of Defense directed the deployment of forces under Operation RESOLUTE RESPONSE following a State Department request for immediate medical, security, and disaster response assistance from DOD.

Objectives: To provide emergency medical, security, and disaster response support to the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and to victims of the terrorist attack. DOD support included critical care and surgical teams, medevac crews, anti-terrorism security teams, canine explosive detection teams, mortuary affairs detachments, Seabees, and airlift (for the FBI) and logistical support.

End Date/Conditions: Once the immediate emergency situation subsided, most DOD forces redeployed from Kenya and Tanzania. However, at the request of the State Department, the Secretary of Defense extended the deployment of a security platoon (approximately 50 personnel), along with one contracting officer and two canine explosive detection teams, to provide external security for the temporary U.S. Embassy in Nairobi until 30 November 1999 or until a suitable contract security force is in place, whichever occurs first.

United States Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations

($ in thousands)

	FY98 Actual	FY99 Estimate	FY00 Request
Africa Regional	7,130	4,000	13,000
Africa Crisis Response Initiative	10,000	15,000	15,000
Haiti	14,110	4,400	6,000
Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group	810	1,000	1,000
Multinational Force and Observers	15,500	15,500	16,000
Org. of American States (Haiti)	-	1,600	-
OSCE (Bosnia/Croatia)	25,000	25,000	36,000
OSCE (Kosovo)	-	10,000	43,000
Subtotal	**72,550**	**76,500**	**130,000**
Lockerbie transfer	4,950	-	-
TOTAL	**77,500**	**76,500**	**130,000**

DISASTER DECLARATION LIST
FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, FY 1998
OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE

Country	Disaster
1. Angola	Complex Emergency
2. Benin	Floods
3. Burundi	Complex Emergency
4. Chad	Floods
5. Comoros	Cholera Epidemic
6. Congo-Brazzaville	Complex Emergency
7. Dem. Rep. of Congo	Complex Emergency
8. Dem. Rep. of Congo	Floods
9. Dem. Rep. of Congo	Floods
10. Djibouti	Floods
11. Eritrea	Returnees
12. Ethiopia	Floods
13. Ethiopia	Displaced Persons
14. Gambia	Fire
15. Guinea-Bissau	Displaced Persons
16. Kenya	Drought
17. Kenya	Floods
18. Kenya	Cholera Epidemic
19. Kenya	Cholera Epidemic
20. Kenya	Explosion
21. Liberia	Complex Emergency
22. Mozambique	Cholera Epidemic
23. Niger	Floods
24. Rwanda	Complex Emergency
25. Sierra Leone	Complex Emergency
26. Somalia	Complex Emergency
27. Sudan	Complex Emergency
28. Sudan	Floods
29. Tanzania	Floods
30. Tanzania	Explosion
31. Uganda	Complex Emergency

Countries are listed separately for each emergency.

FY98 Emergency Operations: Targeted Populations by Country and Cooperating Sponsor

Region/ Country	Cooperating Sponsor	Special Groups Targeted[1]	Total Number of Targeted beneficiaries	Targeted Population: Reached	Targeted Population: Not Reached	Targeted Population: No Info
AFRICA						
Angola	**TOTAL**		746,275	635,574	110,701	-
	CARE	F (IDPs, Rt)	106,275	103,294	-	-
	CRS	F (IDPs, Rt)	160,000	160,000	-	-
	SCF	F (IDPs)	165,000	165,000	-	-
	WFP	F (IDPs)	315,000	207,280	-	-
Chad	WFP	I, C	250,310	250,310	-	-
Ethiopia	DPPC	F	1,338,735	-	-	1,338,735
Kenya	WFP	A2, F, I	895,718	895,718	-	-
Liberia	CRS	C, F (IDP,Ref, Rt.)	379,000	300,000	79,000	-
Madagascar	CRS	C, C1, H	18,040	16,000	2,040	-
Mauritania	**TOTAL**		217,745	217,745	-	-
	Doulos	A, B, C, I	17,745	17,745	-	-
	WFP	I, C	200,000	200,000	-	-
Niger	CRS	B1, E, I	63,000	63,000	-	-
Rwanda Regional2	**TOTAL**		1,767,000	1,767,000	-	-
	CRS	A, A4, A5, C, D, G	4,000	4,000	-	-
	WFP	I, C, F (IDPs, Ref, Rt)	1,763,000	1,763,000	-	-
Sierra Leone	**TOTAL**		557000	361000	196,000	-
	CARE	B1, C1, F (IDPs)	200,000	65,000	135,000	-
	CRS	F (IDPs, Rt)	292,000	231,000	61,000	-
	WVRD	F (Ret)	65,000	65,000	-	-
Somalia	WFP	F, I	196,770	196,770	-	-
Sudan	**TOTAL**		1,433,200	273,600	49,600	1,110,000
	ADRA	A1, B1, C, D, F (IDP, Rt)	500,000	105,600	56,000	49,600
	CRS	A, B1, C, F (IDPs, Rt)	110,600	110,600	-	-
	NPA	F (IDPs, Rt)	107,000	107,000	-	0
	WFP	B, C, I, F (IDPs)	1,110,000	-	-	1,110,000
Uganda	WFP	A4, B1, C, F (IDPs)	110,000	110,000	-	-

[1] Special Groups Targeted-- Categories

    A. Children (general)
       A1 Preschool
       A2 School

A3 Orphans
A4 Unaccompanied
A5 Prisoned
B. Women
B1 Pregnant/lactating
B2 Widows, household heads
C. Malnourished (general)
D. Sick (in hospitals and clinics)
E. Elderly
F. Food Insecure
G. Handicapped
H. Typhoon/cyclone victims
I. Drought/famine victims

[2] Includes Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda

Source: http://www.info.usaid.gov/hum_response/farpt1998/annexes/appendix7.htm

U.S. INTERNATIONAL FOOD ASSISTANCE REPORT 1998

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

United States international food assistance channels the abundance of American agricultural productivity to help those in need around the world. There are several mechanisms for international food assistance, the primary one being the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, also known as Public Law 480 (P.L. 480). In re-authorizing P.L. 480 legislation through the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR), commonly referred to as the 1996 Farm Bill, Congress reaffirmed the principal intent of US international food assistance programs to:

- Combat world hunger and malnutrition and their causes;
- Promote broad-based, equitable and sustainable development, including agricultural development;
- Expand international trade;
- Develop and expand export markets for U.S. agricultural commodities; and
- Foster and encourage the development of private enterprise and democratic participation in developing countries.

In Fiscal Year (FY) 1998, the United States provided 3.5 million metric tons, valued at $1.22 billion, to 67 developing and re-industrializing countries, reaching millions of people. While international food assistance alleviates human suffering in emergency situations and promotes sustainable development necessary for food security in the long term, it also has a positive impact on the U.S. economy. The U.S. economy benefits directly because commodities used in food assistance programs are produced by American farmers, and processed and packaged by American enterprises. The commodities are then transported by U.S. rail or motor transport to U.S. ports to be shipped generally on U.S. flag vessels to recipient countries. Indirectly, millions of Americans benefit when international food assistance promotes the development that helps aid recipients become commercial importers of American commodities.

FY 1998 saw an increase in need for international food assistance. Floods and droughts attributable to weather fluctuations related to the El Niño and La Niña weather phenomena reduced domestic supplies in Asia, Latin America and Southern Africa. The international financial crisis, most severe in Asia, also affected developing nations in Africa and Latin America. Devaluation of local currencies left some countries unable to purchase food imports necessary for adequate consumption. In countries such as Indonesia, the financial crisis compounded the impact of a food emergency initially related to weather patterns. Finally, food emergencies from conflict or post-conflict repercussions continued to demand a large portion of food assistance resources.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) directly manages the bulk of U.S. P.L. 480 international food assistance. Title II Food for Peace (FFP) activities, valued at almost $889 million, moved a total of 1.92 million metric tons and assisted more than 43 million beneficiaries in 54 countries in 1998. Title II funding included support to the Farmer-to-Farmer (FTF) program - technical assistance by U.S. volunteers to developing countries and emerging democracies in agriculture and agribusiness. USAID also manages P.L. 480 Title III programs - bilateral grant food assistance tied to policy reforms. In FY 1998, four of the most seriously food insecure countries in the world—Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Haiti—received a total of $29.9 million. These countries were also selected, in part, because of their capacity to use the assistance effectively and their commitment to long term policies to promote food security. USDA-administered Title I and Food for Progress programs together provided over $289 million in resources (1.5 million metric tons) in FY 1998. Moreover, on July 18th, a Presidential Initiative to provide 2.5 million MT of wheat and wheat products to meet urgent humanitarian need under Section 416 (b) authorities of the Agricultural Act of 1949 was announced. This instrument would prove exceedingly important in permitting the United States Government to respond to a number of unfavorable food supply situations in the latter half of 1998 caused by adverse weather and economic difficulties in Asia, and hurricane devastation in Central America and the Caribbean.

During FY 1998, USAID and USDA, the administering agencies for U.S. international food assistance, both made significant improvements in program management. USAID-administered Title II emergency and non-emergency operations have begun to report on the development-oriented food security objectives and performance indicators established in 1996. Improvements in monitoring show the impact of targeting assistance towards the most food insecure and disadvantaged population groups. The FFP emergency team has taken steps to improve program planning, the approval process, pre-positioning of quantities of selected commodities and food aid delivery mechanisms so as to reduce delays and "food aid pipeline" bottlenecks.

The USDA Food for Progress team was awarded Vice President Gore's Hammer Award for Reinventing Government for significant improvements in review and approval processes. Standardized formats for advance requests and final reimbursements and a Division-wide advance spreadsheet facilitate the approval process, tracking and reporting. Overall administrative costs for the Food for Progress program were reduced by nearly $1 million between 1997 and 1998, and the average time for advance approval was reduced from 41 business days to 7 business days. The agreement-signing process for USDA-administered Title I was also improved during FY 1998 allowing purchases and deliveries to be spread out over the year. This has kept costs down and reduced costly delays in delivery of Title I commodities.

All Title II development (non-emergency) food assistance projects submitted documentation in FY 1998 regarding the potential environmental impact of all FY 1999 proposed activities. These submissions bring Title II development activities into compliance with USAID environmental standards -- as described in Part 216 of Title 22,

Code of Federal Regulations. To facilitate this compliance, a comprehensive manual and field-guide were prepared and six workshops organized with private voluntary organizations and other partners that implement Title II activities.

Additional accomplishments in FY 1998 are noted herewith. A policy and procedures manual was completed on the monetization of commodities to support Title II activities. It was decided that all packaged vegetable oil used in P.L. 480 Title II programs will be fortified with Vitamin A. Vitamin A fortification will help reduce the incidence of childhood blindness and increase resistance to infection in developing countries. USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) completed an examination of the role of U.S. food aid in contributing to sustainable development. CDIE published six impact evaluations--five based on fieldwork in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras and Indonesia, and a sixth desk study on Africa's Sahel region. A synopsis of these studies entitled *U.S. Food Aid and Sustainable Development: Forty Years of Experience* offers insight into the role of U.S. international food assistance in sustainable development and recommendations for the effective use of food assistance to promote long term global food security.

> *"Food insecurity is not going to go away without American leadership...Now is the time to stay the course that has served us so well--constructive engagement to make the world more prosperous and food secure."*
>
> USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood, 1997

P.L. 480 Title II Emergency Programs in FY 1998

Country	Sponsor	Commodity	Recipients[1] ('000)	Tonnage (MT)	Value[2] ($')
Angola	CARE	Beans, Corn, Veg. Oil	80	5,840	$3,023,900
	CRS	Bulgur			$16,600
	SCF*	Beans, Corn, Veg. Oil	222	2,910	$2,475,400
	WFP/PRO*	Beans, Corn, CSB, Lentils, Peas, Veg. Oil		35,550	$21,519,000
	WVI*	Beans, Corn, Veg. Oil	261	11,360	$6,809,600
	FFP/EOS3	Not Applicable (NA)	NA	NA	$205,600
Albania	WFP/IEFR	Beans, Veg. Oil, Wheat Flour	40.0	970	$607,400
Algeria	WFP/PRO	Wheat Flour		1,500	$724,200
Bosnia-H	ADRA*	Wheat, Beans, Veg. Oil	30	3,820	$1,668,000
	ARC	Beans, Veg. Oil, Wheat Flour	75	9,530	$5,241,900
	CRS*	Beans, Veg. Oil, Wheat	30	9,620	$3,201,600
	WFP/IEFR	Beans, Veg. Oil, Wheat Flour	250	8,550	$4,871,400
Bulgaria	ARC	Beans, Veg. Oil, Rice, Wheat Flour	60	3,440	$2,843,700
	CRS	Wheat Flour	20	7,200	$2,841,800
Burundi	WFP/IEFR*	Beans, CSB, Lentils, Peas, Cornmeal (Regular [R] & Soy-fortified[S-F])	345	22,000	$13,792,700
Cameroon	WFP/IEFR*	CSB	210	2,000	$1,299,100
Djibouti	WFP/PRO	Wheat Flour		930	$434,300
Ethiopia	GTG4	Sorghum, Wheat	2	75,000	$24,004,000
	REST	Veg. Oil		430	$1,600,700
	WFP/PRO	Wheat		23,300	$7,686,500
Indonesia	ADRA	CBS, Rice	30	3,520	$2,018,500
	CARE	Rice	125	18,200	$10,967,700
	CRS	CSB, Rice, Wheat Soya Blend (WSB)	125	13,540	$7,638,700
	CRS	Rice	80	6,000	$3,246,000
	CWS	Rice	38	3,580	$2,436,500
	WFP/IEFR*	WSB, Rice	284	38,660	$21,298,500

Country	Sponsor	Commodity	Recipients[1] ('000)	Tonnage (MT)	Value[2] ($')
Kenya	WFP/IEFR[*]	Beans, Corn, Peas, Veg. Oil	930	8,390	$4,195,800
	WFP/PRO	Beans, CSB, Corn, Sorghum, Veg. Oil		24,850	$12,430,400
Korea (DPRK)	CARE[*]				$890,300
	WFP/IEFR[*]	CSB, Corn, Rice, Cornmeal (S-F)	7,460	200,000	$71,983,700
Liberia/ Region	CRS[*]	Bulgur	149	6,030	$5,220,100
	WFP/PRO[*]	Beans, Bulgur, CSB, Peas, Veg. Oil		34,310	$25,336,100
	FFP/EOS3	Not Applicable (NA)	NA	NA	$1,500
Mali	WFP/PRO[*]	Cornmeal		980	$595,800
	FFP/EOS3	Not Applicable (NA)	NA	NA	$322,200
Nepal	WFP/PRO	WSB		1,000	$642,800
Nicaragua	WFP/IEFR[*]	Beans, CSB, Rice, Veg. Oil	323	5,860	$3,489,700
Niger	CRS	Sorghum	15	2,000	$780,600
Pakistan	WFP/PRO	Veg. Oil		1,050	$1,237,500
Rwanda	CRS[*]	Beans, CSB, Cornmeal, Peas, Veg. Oil	23	1,930	$1,822,900
	GTG[4]	Cornmeal, Veg. Oil, Wheat, Wheat Flour		24,280	$7,694,600
	ICRC	Beans, Cornmeal	12	1,700	$1,197,700
	WVI[*]	Beans, Corn, Cornmeal (S-F), Veg. Oil	45	3,990	$3,562,300
	WFP/IEFR[*]	Beans, Lentils, Peas, Cornmeal (R&S-F), Veg. Oil	596	23,000	$15,128,500
	FFP/EOS3	Not Applicable (NA)	NA	NA	$246,700
Serbia	ARC	Beans, Veg. Oil, Wheat Flour	55	6,160	$3,588,500
	CRS	Beans, Rice, Veg. Oil, Wheat Flour	252	9,620	$4,891,900
	MCI	Veg. Oil, Wheat Flour	60	3,420	$1,167,300
	WFP/IEFR	Beans, Veg. Oil, Wheat Flour	50	410	$205,700

Country	Sponsor	Commodity	Recipients[1] ('000)	Tonnage (MT)	Value[2] ($')
Sierra Leone	CARE*	Bulgur, Lentils, Veg. Oil	338	4,170	$4,115,400
	CRS*	Bulgur, CSB, Lentils, Veg. Oil	108	12,830	$8,068,600
	WFP/PRO*	Bulgur, CSB, Cornmeal, Peas, Veg. Oil		26,040	$16,109,900
	WVI*	Bulgur, CSB, Lentils, Veg. Oil	50	5,970	$5,187,000
Somalia	CARE*	Corn, Sorghum	189	8,500	$5,446,600
	WFP/IEFR*	Cornmeal	658	3,620	$3,759,600
Sudan	ADRA	Lentils, SF Sorghum Grits, Veg. Oil	63	2,750	$2,356,900
	CRS*	CSB, Lentils, Sorghum, Veg. Oil	413	13,010	$9,771,900
	NPA*	Lentils, Sorghum, Veg. Oil	183	10,970	$6,084,500
	WFP/IEFR*	CSB, Corn, Lentils, Peas, Sorghum,	4,539	23,110	$34,233,500
	WFP/PRO	Veg. Oil		24,500	$7,770,900
	WVI*	Lentils, Sorghum	128	7,710	$5,566,100
Tajikistan	WFP/IEFR*	Veg. Oil, Wheat Flour	500	8,000	$4,166,200
Tanzania	WFP/IEFR*	CSB, Corn, Peas	355	23,700	$10,945,600
	FFP/EOS[3]	Not Applicable (NA)	NA	NA	$14,100
Uganda	WFP/IEFR*	CSB, Cornmeal, Peas	246	7,060	$4,249,100
	WFP/PRO*	Corn, CSB, Peas, Sorghum, Veg. Oil		43,110	$19,387,000
	WVI*	Wheat		5,270	$2,100,000
Zambia	WFP/IEFR*	Sorghum	692	5,000	$2,317,900
Unallocated, pre-positioned		Beans, CSB, Lentils, Peas, Veg. Oil, Wheat Flour		19,600	$6,740,800
WORLDWIDE SHIPPED TOTAL			**20,737**	**921,350**	**$477,497,500**
WORLDWIDE TOTAL[5]			**20,737**	**921,350**	**$481,924,700**

[1] Recipient Information not available for all activities.

[2] Activity Values include Section 202(e) funds wherever sponsor is noted by an asterisk (*).

[3] Food for Peace Emergency Operational Support/Personal Services Contracts (PSC).

[4] Government to Government agreement.

[5] Adjusted for confirmed fallout and unallocated commodities.

Source: USAID/BHR/FFPIS, 12/03/98

Source: http://www.info.usaid.gov/hum_response/farpt1998/annexes/appendix4.htm

U.S. Foreign Assistance FY 1998
('000)

Grant Assistance			**$ 6,602,515**
	Economic Support Fund	$ 2,419,928	
	Development Assistance	$ 1,860,634	
	SEED/NIS*	$ 1,256,074	
	International Disaster Assistance	$ 190,298	
	Peace Corps	$ 225,581	
	Migration and Refugee Assistance	$ 650,000	
Food Assistance Programs			**$ 1,219,096**
	Title I	$ 205,261	
	Title II	$ 888,800	
	Title III	$ 29,900	
	Food for Progress	$ 84,235	
	Farmer-to-Farmer	$10,900	
TOTAL U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE			**$ 7,821,611**

Source: USAID/FFP 12/03/98; USDA/FAS 12/21/98
U.S. INTERNATIONAL FOOD ASSISTANCE REPORT 1998, USAID

USAID FY98 Congressional Presentation on Africa

Note: This document may not always reflect the actual appropriations determined by Congress. Final budget allocations for USAID's programs are not determined until after passage of an appropriations bill and preparation of the Operating Year Budget (OYB).

FY 1998 Development Fund for Africa		**$700,000,000**
FY 1998 P.L. 480 Title II		**$262,147,000**
FY 1998 P.L. 480 Title III		**$19,900,000**
FY 1998 Economic Support Funds		**$25,000,000**

> *"When we speak about Africa, we must of course recognize its great diversity. But many African nations have this in common: they are at a crossroads ... much of Africa is at a fragile mid-point, the point at which good leadership, sound policies, and steady international support and engagement can make the greatest difference. That's where the opportunity lies."*

--Former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher

Introduction

Opportunities exist today in Africa that haven't existed before: increasingly, Africans define the solutions to their economic and political problems, chart routes to become full-members of the world economy, and strive, across the continent, to realize the potential of their people and their resources. Africa is changing because Africans are changing; and the United States, as USAID, is with them as partners in this change. Thus, despite the challenges facing the region and despite the seemingly inescapable crises confronting many African countries, great gains are being made in Africa, and being made at an increasing pace:

- infant mortality rates are falling, and fell below 100 per 1,000 births for the first time in 1995
- of 47 nations in Africa, the Freedom house in 1990 considered 5 free, 14 partly free, and 27 (59%) not free; by 1996 these numbers changed dramatically to 9 free, 19 partly free, and 19 (40%) not free, and those that moved to free and partly free status did so in peace
- U.S. imports from Africa, primarily oil, remained steady, but U.S. exports to the region increased by 25% between the early and mid-1990s
- fertility has declined dramatically in countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe
- primary school enrollments have increased, and especially among girls in countries such as Malawi and Uganda, and literacy is growing rapidly.

This opportunity is unprecedented, but opportunity alone does not guarantee success. Wise leadership and thoughtful investments transform these opportunities into successes. Several phases of investment may be necessary to achieve that transformation, but the

rewards -- to those whose lives are changed and to those for whom change makes real the dream of peace and growth -- are tremendous and give hope and inspiration to a continent.

The Development Challenge in Africa

In Africa, the overall economic outlook is improving, but daunting problems of debt, strife, environmental stress and inadequate investment remain.

It is in our interest to help the region's leaders overcome these problems and to build an Africa that is more prosperous, democratic and stable.

We know, however, that the primary impetus for development here, as elsewhere, must come from the private sector.

It is encouraging, therefore, that many African governments are facilitating growth through policies that allow private enterprise to take hold, while investing public resources wisely in education, health and measures that expand opportunities for women.

[If confirmed], I will place great emphasis on working with Africa's democratic leaders to broaden and deepen these trends.

-- Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright, January 8, 1997

Despite the opportunities, problems remain. The development challenges facing Africa are legion:

- More African infants die before their first birthdays than anywhere else on earth, and HIV/AIDS infection rates are the highest in the world and continue to climb.
- Fewer children and fewer adults can read and write in Africa than anywhere else.
- Population growth is more rapid in Africa than other places in the world, with land and governments less able to support that rapidly growing population.
- Africa is both land-rich and land-poor -- there are extensive stretches of sparsely populated, marginally productive lands and isolated patches of densely populated, highly productive lands. Thus relatively high investments in physical infrastructure -- from roads to schools and health clinics -- are required to reach people. And all types of investment are required -- a health clinic with no road has neither drugs nor patients.
- Agricultural and climatic diversity complicates the task of adapting a single food-grain such as corn or wheat to satisfy sub-Saharan Africa's nutritional demands; instead extensive investments are required to develop, adapt, and produce a variety of crops to correspond to those soil and climatic variations and to reach food security in the region.
- Climate also predisposes the continent to drought, because soil conditions are fragile, rainfall variable, and irrigation is costly and uncommon.
- Responding to natural disasters such as drought and equitably exploiting natural wealth such as oil is complicated by the continent's tremendous ethnic diversity,

political fragmentation, and nascent democratic institutions. As a result, the continent continues to be ravaged by war and strife.

- Incomes are the lowest on earth, values for traditional exports remain stagnant, and external debt is high and rising -- external debt in Asia is 35% of GNP, in Latin America is 37% of GNP, and in Africa is 78% of GNP. As a result, African nations are highly indebted with few prospects for repayment without significant reforms by both lenders and borrowers.

Africa's Needs Are Greatest

Socio-Economic Indicator			
GNP per Capita	**Africa**	**Latin America**	**Asia**
Life Expectancy (years)	$460	**$3340**	$639
Infant Mortality (/1000)	52	**65**	68
Adult Literacy (%)	92	**51**	41
Primary School Enrollment (%)	57	**69**	87
female	64	**104**	105
male	77	**115**	108
Total Fertility Rate	5.9	**2.8**	2.9
Annual Population Growth Rate	2.7	**1.6**	1.8

Africa Matters -- to our self interest, to our foreign policy, and to our human compassion

Promoting Africa's development is in the U.S. national interest ...

"Today, Africa needs the support of all its many friends ... The United States will do its part, not only because it is right, but because it is in our national interest to help Africa succeed."
      Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, October 12, 1996

Africa shares its produce and people, skills and ideas with the United States everyday in important ways. The U.S. imports 15% of its total oil imports from Africa, with the world's largest oil reserves recently discovered in Angola and likely to further increase U.S. imports from that country. The largest gas fields in the world have just been discovered in Mozambique. Non-ferrous metals are imported from Africa, as are diamonds, cocoa, and coffee. Even small flowers are important: In 1960, a child with leukemia had a one in five chance of surviving; today, that child has a four in five chance of survival, thanks to the Rosy Periwinkle -- a wild flower of Madagascar's rapidly disappearing rainforest. African grain varieties are being used by agronomists today to strengthen U.S. wheat and corn seed, making them more disease and drought resistant. Beyond commodities and crops, Africa also brings us ideas. In her address to a USAID-sponsored "Lessons Without Borders" Conference in Baltimore last September, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton noted:

"here in Baltimore, we are seeing how grassroots strategies pioneered [by USAID] in Nairobi, Kenya, can be used to improve childhood immunization rates and encourage economic development in America. As you may know, Baltimore has increased its childhood immunization rates from 62 to 95% by adopting [these] simple strategies."
... USAID is making investments for the future ...

All USAID programming represents investment for the future -- for the independent and sustainable well-being of African partners. For FY1998, the Administration has announced a major new initiative to focus directly on enhancing the region's food security.

The Administration's Initiative "Promoting Food Security: Africa and Beyond" is a FY1998 budget request, designed to address a growing food and poverty crisis in Africa. Several recent projections all point to a major food gap emerging in Africa unless current trends -- rapid population growth, stagnant food production, and only modest income growth -- change. Some African countries are now beginning to change and are starting to provide the incentives and policy environment needed to get agriculture and food production moving. Elsewhere, civil strife, poor policies, and lack of investment mean continued stagnation and declining per capita production and nutrition. Striking statistics point to sharply increased numbers of malnourished children unless a concerted effort is made by both Africans and donors to turn things around. USAID has a strong track record and has traditionally been a leader in addressing food security issues (much of the hard-won success in several countries is due to USAID's past investments), but in recent years has been rapidly losing the resources needed for lasting results: the evidence of increasing malnutrition is particularly worrisome. USAID also remains committed to improving child survival and health in Africa. This new Initiative is innovative in its combination of health and agricultural resources to promote sustainable improvements in the health of Africa's children.

Agriculture and rural development are inseparable from economic growth in Africa -- in most countries, over 85% of the population earns its livelihood from the agricultural sector. By addressing major bottlenecks in agricultural policy, technology and rural infrastructure in several key African countries, this Initiative will support rural growth which in turn will enhance rural food security and rural health. It will also more tightly link food aid and development assistance resources, and focus on African "ownership" of programs and better sectoral coordination. In addition, the initiative will explicitly address the linkages between better nutrition and agricultural growth in selected countries. The Initiative will begin with a relatively modest pilot phase, focussed on the most promising countries in each region; the pilot will expand as USAID gains experience and begins to demonstrate results.

The cost of not acting now is high, and there is good evidence to demonstrate that investments made today are a win-win situation for both Africa and the U.S. economy. Past investments in international agriculture have brought exceptionally high returns to the United States in the form of increased exports and genetic improvements to U.S. crops.

Beyond investing for the future of Africa, the United States is also investing for the future well-being of Americans. Americans are not an isolationist people nor does America have an isolated national economy. U.S. businesses import from the developing world and export to the developing world -- American jobs depend on international trade. In addition, American, and European and Japanese, experience has repeatedly demonstrated that investments in broad-based growth in the developing world help develop markets for goods and services. American experience around the world demonstrates that the United States benefits directly from the expansion that American foreign aid helps fuel. But it requires American involvement.

This argument has been proven in Latin America and for Asia, but is it relevant to Africa? Yes. Not only is Africa's market growing, the U.S. share of that market is growing rapidly as well. Africa's market has been dubbed the "final frontier of the world's emerging markets ... producing dramatic returns for investors." With nearly $6 billion in exports to Africa, U.S. exports to sub-Saharan Africa continue to grow rapidly and continue to outdistance those to the states of the former Soviet Union. This level of trade supports more than 100,000 American jobs today -- but the implications of export growth are even more impressive.

... the United States is practicing preventive diplomacy ...

> *"[USAID] programs promote free market reform, privatization, job creation, democracy, the environment, the advancement of women and peace -- all of which contribute to American interests and reflect our values ... Measures to prevent famine, deter violence, and help people solve their own problems generally provide a greater dollar-for-dollar payoff than the contribution of relief funds after a crisis has occurred."*

> -- Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright

Practicing preventive diplomacy makes strategic sense, and it also makes economic sense: USAID estimates that nearly $300 was spent per Rwandan refugee during last year's crisis. While costs could have been higher had military intervention proved necessary, they could also have been much lower -- total U.S. development assistance to those countries with full USAID programs in place averages about $1.50 per person. Clearly, it is in the U.S. national interest to help avert these crises from both a humanitarian and a financial perspective.

The roots of these crises lie in poverty: inadequate incomes and nutrition, inadequate access to health and educational facilities, food insecurity exacerbated by fragile lands and drought. Such problems have been heightened by the political use of ethnicity across the continent and the historical failure of colonial, and many independent, governments to use the positive contributions of ethnic diversity in building strong nations and strong economies.

The risks of failure in this area are great, as are the benefits of success. Somalia, Liberia, and Rwanda stand as the most strident reminders of what is at risk. Yet Rwanda also offers hope: the end of 1996 did not see that nation torn apart again, but saw instead an amazing expression of faith in the new government as a million refugees returned home -- frightened at first, but peaceful and willing. The destiny of other nations, such as Angola, Sudan, and Zaire, are not yet clear. What is clear is that waiting for crisis to erupt is the most costly route -- for Africans and for Americans.

... and the United States is demonstrating its national values.

USAID's assistance program to Africa also reflects national values. Americans are a caring and compassionate people, and this nation is premised on the philosophy that people should have the opportunity to make a better life for themselves. USAID's development assistance programs foster economic and political empowerment; the United States offers a helping hand, not a hand-out. Nowhere is the justification for foreign aid clearer and more compelling, in terms of U.S. national values, than in Africa. It is a program that American citizens can understand and support.
Beyond compassion, Africa matters to the United States because there are deep historical and cultural ties to the continent. With nearly 15% of Americans of African descent, as a nation we have a special interest in Africa's development.

> *"We cannot and we will not walk away from Africa."*
>
> -- Former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher

USAID's assistance program to Africa mirrors U.S. foreign policy objectives.
The Administration retains five foreign policy goals in Africa:
- supporting long lasting improvements in the lives of average Africans
- alleviating suffering and hunger
- fostering democracy and respect for human rights
- promoting peace by preventing and resolving conflict, and
- increasing American private sector involvement in Africa, as the United States seeks to help integrate Africa into the global economy.

USAID manages the foreign assistance program in Africa to achieve these post-Cold War foreign policy objectives. USAID has taken a long-term perspective on Africa's development objectives, to systematically address the root causes of its poverty and to lay the foundation for long-lasting improvements in average lives. The Agency uses investments in economic growth and social equity to achieve these long-lasting improvements, by:
- promoting broad-based economic growth with equity, through investments in small-holder agriculture and small enterprises and complementary investments in people through basic education;
- stabilizing population growth and improving health conditions;

- protecting the environment;
- fosTering democracy and participation in social and economic decision-making; and
- providing emergency relief to help nations make the transitions from crisis to long-lasting development.

Achieving Results -- USAID has Changed, is Making a Difference, and there is Hope

USAID has changed and continues to learn ...

USAID programs in Africa continue to emphasize results, teamwork, and partnerships with Africans in the execution of U.S. development programs.
To improve the impact of the funds USAID manages, missions reorganized to focus more financial and human resources on the strategic objectives of USAID country programs. Program design and implementation more clearly emphasize results, and engage more and earlier participation of counterparts in defining and assessing results. Finally, program funds and staff are formally and increasingly being allocated on the basis of demonstrated results.

Reorganization, reductions in force, and reduced staff movement within the Africa region have all been dictated by tight operating budgets. This has placed increased urgency on USAID's efforts and technological capacity to work in teams within the Agency and with development partners -- utilizing technologies such as e-mail and video-conferencing to supplement USAID field presence with additional Washington-based expertise.

USAID has achieved this by making more and better use of regional offices and missions to provide leadership and an increasing array of technical and administrative support to bilateral USAID missions. At the same time, these regional resources have increased USAID's flexibility in the field by providing administrative coverage which has facilitated opening new USAID missions, such as Angola, closing out other USAID missions, and by assuming management of regional initiatives such as the Initiative for Southern Africa and the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.

Teams have reached across and outside USAID to strengthen relationships with African partners. USAID looks to Africans to drive the decision-making process on how to best achieve joint objectives in Africa. The Greater Horn Initiative is the hallmark of a partnership effort, with President Isaias of Eritrea the most outspoken advocate for this approach and the success of USAID as its pioneer. Similarly, USAID's New Partnerships Initiative (NPI) has set new standards for collaboration with indigenous community organizations in Guinea and Kenya, and USAID and the U.S. PVO community continue working to improve collaboration and cooperation between institutions.
Together, these changes increase USAID's capacity to achieve results in Africa.

Changing Resources in Africa

	1993	1996	1998
Core Missions	23	13	12
US Direct Hire Employees	382	250	228
Development Assistance Funds	$822 million	$675 million	$700 million

... USAID programs are making a difference in ...

Encouraging Broad-Based Economic Growth ...

> *"'Aid then Trade' is how it works in the real world . And why is this important to the United States? Foreign assistance creates trade opportunities and jobs and protects the public well-being here in the United States. One could conservatively estimate that our investment in foreign aid brings a return of at least $2 for every dollar of assistance."*

-- J. Brian Atwood, Administrator, USAID, January 15, 1997

Investments in the productive capacity of African nations increase their ability to become self-sufficient in food grains, to market crops, to begin and grow small businesses, and to generate the incomes which lead to increased imports from the rest of the world. As incomes grow, nations and people begin to buy U.S. grains and tractors, U.S. pharmaceuticals and airplanes, U.S. cars and computers. Without production and productivity gains, incomes cannot grow and the capacity to import stagnates and declines. Thus, USAID begins with aid productively and equitably invested.

... in agriculture ...

> By helping US universities and the International Rice Research Institute develop new varieties of grains, and by helping African countries adopt those technologies within an environment that encourages private trading, **Mali's** grain production increased by 44% and **Senegal's** rice yields increased by 20% without fertilizers -- important steps toward food self-sufficiency.

> In **Malawi**, agricultural marketing reforms continue to have significant impact on a growing number of rural Malawian families. The number of farm families actively participating in the program expanded to over 90,000 by last year, producing a variety of export and non-maize domestic crops for sale. Administrative controls on agricultural trade have been eliminated, and the Government has given up its previous monopoly trade position on smallholder crops. Incomes have increased, and families are sending their children to school, buying bicycles and radios, and fertility and infant deaths have declined.

> Throughout the region, USAID's regional programs are working to improve the efficiency of African National Agricultural Research Systems to conduct research in staple crops and improve food security -- in one example, support to the potato

network in **East Africa** since the 1980s made important contributions to the 40% increase in potato yield.

The Government of **Mali** privatized its four largest rice mills and allowed a private Malian to develop 7500 hectares of irrigated rice land -- thus opening the rice sector to competitive forces and large-scale private initiative for the first time. In addition, the value of non-traditional agricultural exports, including vegetable and flower exports to Europe, increased by 61% last year.

Trade in livestock, and important agricultural commodity in the Sahel, was increased, and profitability to producers and traders rose by as much as $10 million in 1995. This came about through agreements among several states in **West Africa** to eliminate trade barriers such as export taxes. USAID brought together representatives of the three countries' private sectors and policy decision-makers to define and implement the steps necessary to eliminate these barriers.

... in business ...

USAID's private sector activities encourage private sector investment and growth in the economy to generate jobs and income for Africans. Depending on local needs and opportunities, activities supported by USAID funding include economic or financial sector reforms, credit and business advisory services, or training of local entrepreneurs.

USAID/ Mozambique noted that "the *sine qua non* for both rapid economic growth and democratization is focussed development assistance interventions that are supported by policy reform." The U.S. business community engaged in active investment in Africa has told us exactly the same thing -- that reforms which control inflation and stabilize monetary variables are among the most important to U.S. firms doing business in Africa. Thus, it is significant that inflation has been reduced from 45% in 1995 to 20% in 1996, that commercial banks have been privatized, that over 700 state-owned firms have been sold to the private sector, and that the customs and tax sectors are undergoing reform with U.S. assistance. Such reforms set the stage businesses need to create Mozambican jobs.

The micro-enterprise program in **Guinea** has delivered nearly 33,000 loans of an average $240 to rural entrepreneurs, two-thirds of whom are women. With an overall repayment rate of over 98%, these funds primarily have been used to increase rural agricultural trade. Borrowers under this program have seen the value of their assets double.

Through the Leland Initiative, USAID is supporting the linking of researchers and other policy-makers across Africa through the Internet and other electronic communications systems. In nine African countries, including **Ghana**, **Mali**, **Madagascar**, **Mozambique**, and **Guinea**, the regional program is supporting the restructuring of telecommunications policy to promote sustainable, low-cost internet availability.

In **Uganda**, USAID has made crucial contributions to improving the agriculture and business environment and farmers and entrepreneurs are responding. Over 100,000 new small and micro-businesses began business in the past five years. In addition, over 6500 kms of rural feeder roads were rehabilitated with proceeds from P.L. 480 resources, helping expand internal and regional grain markets.

The **Southern Africa Enterprise Development Fund** is poised to begin disbursements to support indigenous small and medium scale business development, and has received support from participating countries through the recent signing of a Trade Protocol to establish a free trade area among 11 of the 12 countries in the region. The first six loans for small business development in the region -- accounting for over $1 million and including Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola -- are scheduled for presentation to the Board of Directors in February 1997.

The **West Africa Enterprise Network (WAEN)**, an organization of second-generation African entrepreneurs, was created with USAID technical and financial support. In 1995, the WAEN began a service of monthly flash bulletins to its members in 11 West African countries to circulate information on trade flows, supplies, prices, volumes and transport costs. It also held a regional meeting in Ghana where it directly engaged with several banks on cross-currency transactions, signed an agreement with the French Development Bank for access to business loans, agreed on the analysis of transportation regulation to present to the heads of state of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and scheduled a meeting with Air Afrique on dismantling the airline's virtual monopoly on freight transport in the region.

... in infrastructure ...

Transportation is critical to agricultural marketing and access to quality social services. Through USAID support in **Mozambique**, over 1200 miles of rural access roads, as well as a strategic bridge, have been demined and repaired, linking the north and south of this vast country and allowing local capacity to move surplus food stocks to food-deficit areas.

In **Guinea**, the rehabilitation of nearly 600 miles of critical rural roads has resulted in a one-third reduction in the cost of transporting agricultural commodities, including basic foodstuffs, within the country, has nearly cut in half transportation times, and increased trade in more valuable crops, such as tomatoes, by almost 40%.

Recent efforts, including donor coordination, policy reform, and grass-roots community development, all supported by USAID, are reaping dramatic gains in basic education -- gains which help remove impediments to foreign and domestic investment and continued economic growth on the continent: for the first time **Malawi's** drop-out rate for girls is lower than that for boys, the number of years it takes to complete primary school has declined in **Benin**, the Government of **Guinea** doubled its financial commitment to primary education, and the number of girls attending school continues to increase in **Guinea** (by over 60%).

In **Ethiopia**, USAID is helping rebuild the devastated basic education system. USAID contributed to improved quality and equity of primary education by providing support to the teacher training facilities and supporting increased numbers of women trainees.

In **Uganda**, four years of support to Government-led efforts to reform primary education have yielded significant results: 8,000 principals, teachers, and tutors -- representing 11% of the primary teaching force -- enrolled in USAID-sponsored in-service training programs; policy dialogue with the Government tripled its support to primary education; primary school teachers now earn a wage they can live on ($72 per month); and, the Government monopoly on text book production and acquisition has been dissolved, resulting in a vibrant local industry and individual schools having control over their choice of instructional materials.

In **Mali,** USAID has supported efforts to promote community-managed and community-financed schools which contributed to increasing primary school enrollment rates from 22% in 1989 to 42% in 1995 and by another 9% last year, including increases in girls' enrollment from 16 to 34% over this same time period.

USAID regional programs highlighted the basic education problem in Africa, and now, through research and information-sharing, enhance the effectiveness of programming by supporting USAID efforts to build more effective and financially sustainable education systems, and to leverage an increasing level of country financing for primary schooling.

In **Malawi**, USAID encouragement and support has increased primary school enrollment by more than 50%, and its particular and insistent focus on girls' education has increased the numbers and proportions of girls in primary, secondary, and tertiary school levels.

Africa's population growth rate today is the highest of any region in the world at any time in history. Unless slowed, sub-Saharan Africa's population of 600 million will reach one billion by 2015 and 1.2 billion by 2020. Neither the land nor the governments nor the economies of the continent will be capable of supporting this level of growth or the resulting population level.

But there is cause to hope. Almost all African nations now have policies and programs supporting family planning. As a result of persistent effort coupled with broad donor support and coordination, growth rates have declined in **Kenya**, **Zimbabwe**, **Botswana**, and **South Africa**. **Ghana**, **Tanzania**, and parts of **Nigeria**, Africa's most populous nation, are showing promise of fertility declines.

USAID has provided the intellectual and financial leadership on these issues for over twenty years, and has been instrumental in the successes that are turning the tide on population growth in Africa.

> In **Ghana**, the family planning program has succeeded in lowering the fertility rate by one child per woman, down from an average 6.4 to 5.5 children per woman between 1988 and 1993. This dramatic change in a remarkably short time frame is due to a doubling of the use of modern contraceptives; USAID expects HIV infection also to fall.

> In **Madagascar**, as a direct result of USAID efforts to increase the number of health centers offering quality family planning and child survival services, the use of modern contraceptives more than doubled in one year, from 5% in 1995 to 11% in 1996.

> In **Benin**, USAID has supported HIV/AIDS prevention activities primarily through the social marketing of condoms, community education campaigns, and institutional strengthening of the national AIDS Control Program. This emphasis saw condom sales expand seven-fold between 1990 to 1995, from 355,000 to 2.2 million. Child survival efforts have also increased through the social marketing of oral rehydration salts (ORS), training village health volunteers in diarrhea prevention and management, and through a grant to UNICEF to support related activities. As a result, ORS use in target regions increased three times, from 10 to 30% of the target population.

USAID remains particularly committed to reducing infant and child deaths and improving child survival. The **infant mortality rate** declined from an average of 113 deaths per 1000 live births prior to the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) in 1988, to 102 in 1993 and 100 in 1995 -- with reductions despite the negative effect of the HIV pandemic on child mortality. Seven African countries, including **Kenya and Zimbabwe** had infant mortality rates in 1993 below the international target of 75 deaths per 1000 live births.

In **five Southern African countries**, the infant mortality (IMR) and under-5 mortality rates (U5MR) have shown sustained long term declines: from an approximate regional average IMR of 135/1000 live births in 1970 to 100 in 1995 and from a regional average U5MR of 225 deaths/1000 live births to 150 in 1995, a decline of one-third. The same pattern holds for the West Africa region.

One common indicator of how well USAID is doing to improve child health is the use of oral rehydration therapy -- a sugar-salt clean water preparation designed to avert death by dehydration, particularly in young children suffering from diarrhea. In **Malawi**, the use of this therapy by families rose from 63% in 1992 to 78% in 1995.

In **Mali,** USAID support for full immunization coverage led to a dramatic rise from 5% in 1987 to 58% of all children in 1994.

... in mitigating the devastation of HIV/AIDS ...

In Africa, USAID is emphasizing a strategy of HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation. Concurrent with implementing health sector programs aimed at preventing transmission of HIV, other development sector activities (e.g., human resource development, private enterprise, education, agriculture) are attempting to mitigate the adverse consequences, on society and the economy, of the premature adult deaths due to AIDS. The framework for HIV/AIDS activities are to increase the awareness of policy-makers of the impact of HIV/AIDS on their societies, focus on prevention of the infection, create sustainable programs, and emphasize continual program monitoring and evaluation. The strategic approaches of the Agency's HIV/AIDS prevention activities focus on reducing the sexual transmission of HIV, concentrating resources in key countries, developing public-private sector partnerships, conducting community-based approaches/interventions, expanding knowledge about sexual behavior and applying that knowledge toward the design of more effective interventions.

A major constraint is that investments in HIV/AIDS control are limited by the interests and policies of African governments. Other constraints include government absorptive capacities for preventive health and competing public health priorities. USAID has tailored its response to specific country situations, emphasizing interventions ranging from heightening the awareness and commitment of governments to combat HIV/AIDS to increasing the use of condoms and changing sexual behavior. USAID has emphasized community-based education programs focused on changing attitudes and behavior. Other activities include monitoring HIV/AIDS, increasing government and public awareness, assisting African countries with the development/implementation of AIDS prevention programs, and conducting applied research to improve preventive measures.

- To ensure that HIV/AIDS and family planning programs were mutually supportive, USAID regional office mounted case studies in five Eastern and Southern African countries -- **Kenya**, **Uganda**, **Zimbabwe**, **Botswana**, and **South Africa** -- to understand the costs and potential benefits of integrating HIV/AIDS prevention with ongoing maternal-child health and family planning programs.

- In **Kenya**, a program designed to train community health workers in AIDS prevention has demonstrated the advantages to be gained from integrating intervention programs into existing institutional structures. In the program, USAID provided training in community education and counseling techniques to clinical and service staff of Kenya's Crescent Medical AID (CMA). This training provided CMA staff and a network of community health workers with the resources to build awareness of HIV/AIDS in the community, distribute condoms and diagnose STDs. Annually, the program was able to provide information and education to 26,000 people through the community health workers, and reached 54,000 high risk STD patients through CMA's eight STD clinics. Additionally, the program distributed approximately 2.4 million condoms annually.
- Another early success story was recorded in a five-country evaluation of newly developed rapid tests for HIV. These tests require no instruments or electricity, can be performed by minimally trained technicians, and are faster and much less expensive than currently used technologies. This assessment led to a major policy change by the Government of Kenya to purchase rapid HIV tests for use in emergency situations such as emergency blood transfusion services and for routine use in district and rural hospitals. Other African countries are considering similar policy changes.
- In **Uganda**, outreach efforts including information, testing, and counseling may have helped see a leveling or falling of sero-prevalence among women visiting ante-natal clinics in Kampala.

Preventing Crises and Building Peace and Democracy ...

"[The] hopeful trend toward freedom and democracy is neither inevitable, nor irreversible, nor has it extended to the real lives of hundreds of millions of people across the globe ... we must continue to stand up for the proposition that all people ... should have a chance to live up to their potential."

-- President Bill Clinton, December, 1996

GHAI works closely with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Greater **Horn of Africa,** supporting their leadership in addressing pressing regional problems such as food insecurity, crisis prevention, post-crisis rehabilitation, and development. With GHAI support, IGAD has revitalized itself to take on a broader role in regional consensus building and cooperation regarding these issues. The IGAD charter has been expanded to include conflict, and the governing structure and secretariat have been reorganized to create greater efficiency in operations and increasing responsiveness to regional crises.

In **Angola**, U.S. national interest and natural compassion combine. Currently, seven percent of U.S. petroleum imports come from this troubled country where U.S. firms have investments worth some $3 billion. U.S. interests are growing, with petroleum imports scheduled to increase to 15% of the total within five years. Yet the country has been savaged by civil war. U.S. efforts to establish a

lasting peace between factions has been supported by an emergency food aid and medical interventions program estimated to have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. In addition, USAID has helped resettle 215,000 internally displaced Angolans with food, seeds, tools, resettlement kits, and some agricultural training. Nearly 1,000 Kms have been demined along with thousands of acres of agricultural lands. USAID's support to Angola evolved considerably in 1996 with the opening of a resident mission and through the expansion of the program to strengthen civil society -- with a focus on human rights and civic education.

Last year, **South Africa** solidified its transition to a pluralistic democracy: a new constitution and bill of rights were drafted, local elections were successfully held with local and provincial governments becoming more organized, non-governmental organizations are remaining active in political debate, the judiciary is being reformed, human rights are being promoted, and freedom of expression is a reality.

In **Rwanda**, the achievements of the post-1995 crisis period have been remarkable. The USAID/Rwanda has defined the principal challenges facing a transition from crisis to development; they are promoting social stability, gaining increased confidence in judicial processes and democratic governance, promoting resettlement and reintegration into the economy of all Rwandans, and seeking and supporting African-led efforts to extend stability and return to development. When recent conflict in Zaire precipitated the return of nearly one million refugees to Rwanda, the strength and resilience of the Government of Rwanda was tested; the world prepared for disaster. Rather than nightly broadcasts of resumed fighting, however, the world saw cautious but continuous streams of refugees returning to Rwanda. That nearly one million returned is testimony to Rwandan willingness to trust the newly strengthened judicial and democratic systems -- systems strengthened under the guidance of African partners with USAID assistance. USAID assistance also helped reunite over 5,500 children with their families, and increase agricultural production to nearly 4/5 of its pre-war level. But the peace remains fragile and susceptible to unrest in Zaire.

Ghana saw successful general elections, which strengthened the country's efforts to consolidate democracy and increase participatory development. Non-governmental institutions, including public policy and research institutions, are numerous and actively engaged in raising awareness and encouraging public debate on all aspects of economic, political, and social issues facing Ghanaian society. The private media, particularly print media and radio, have expanded significantly over the past few years, offering alternative views, including criticism of government, on a wide range of policy issues.

In **Ethiopia**, USAID-supported legislative and executive elections at the regional and federal level were lauded as effective by the international community. The newly elected Parliament will help resolve inter-regional disputes and facilitate efficient and effective appropriation of funds to regional and federal activities. In addition, the last year has seen increased resources flow to strengthen the

institutional capacities of local NGOs and to improve their legislative and regulatory rules.

Protecting the Environment ...

The international community identified **Madagascar** as "the single highest biodiversity priority in the world" due to the combination of the great variety of species found nowhere beyond this island and the tremendous threat to the existence of plants and animals posed by human poverty and public mismanagement. To protect these resources, USAID has supported activities to increase the stake local community residents have in the maintenance of their natural resources -- local community groups now retain half of park-entry fees and a share of rising forest-cutting fees. Land protected has increased, tourism has increased 108%, and local revenues increased 44%. Developed with assistance from USAID, this last year saw the first environmental impact law adopted.

Community-based management of the environment and natural resources has been the hallmark of USAID's program in **Zimbabwe**. As USAID country program heads toward graduation, increasing attention has been paid to ensuring that a durable policy and operational framework is in place for the long-term protection of these resources. Thus, it is especially encouraging that Zimbabwe's widely regarded and community-based CAMPFIRE program has more than doubled the number of districts in which it works -- now covering some 57 districts representing most of the country. The CAMPFIRE program gives local community residents a financial stake in maintaining the long-term usefulness -- while improving the actual management -- of its natural resources. At current levels, CAMPFIRE is now shifting more than $1 million per year to local groups while at the same time reducing poaching in Zimbabwe's parks.

The Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) is an example from the environment sector of USAID working successfully with other donors to achieve significant results. Together with the EC and the World Bank, USAID is creating an international awareness and developing a strategy to address the issues of deforestation and loss of biodiversity in the second largest rainforest in the world located in the **Congo Basin**, thus ensuring that this valuable resource is managed in a more sustainable manner.

and Providing Humanitarian and Emergency Assistance ...

For 1996, USAID provided some $436,000 in humanitarian and emergency assistance -- Title II and Title III Food Aid plus OFDA and OTI resources -- to 13 countries in Africa. The major recipients of these resources were Rwanda, Ethiopia, Liberia, Angola, and Sudan. With the world's highest numbers of

refugees, funds were provided primarily to assist in refugee camps and with resettlement efforts.

Building Peace and Making Peace Work -- the Uganda Transition Story

Too often, development seems a series of discrete actions and abstract numbers -- a growing proportion of the population using oral rehydration therapy, greater non-traditional agricultural exports, or more girls in school. It can be difficult to see in the accumulation of these actions and numbers a success that fundamentally transforms a society, moving it from decades of domestic turmoil to a land of hope and promise for its people and the people of its region. The Uganda example helps tell that story.

Just 11 years ago, Yoweri Museveni became Uganda's President, presaging a period of peace and prosperity for this small nation. After the new government's troops swept through Kampala and its agricultural lands, families returned to their fertile farms in Luwero. Pyramids of bones and skulls stood in mute testimony to the suffering of family members; yet people returned -- the land was fertile, the future held a tangible hope of growth through rehabilitation.

The North was different -- as lands of former oppressors Amin, Obote, and Okello, retreating armies were pursued aggressively; as productive cotton and sesame farms supporting state-owned processing facilities, productive capacity was decimated by neglect; and as the region closest to Sudan, a thriving regional trade was disrupted and replaced by a staging ground for mountains of relief supplies en route to southern Sudan. Empty fields and dilapidated processing plants stood their own testimony to neglect. People did not return -- they had never left their impoverished lands. The future shouted its challenge of basic and broad-based economic development to give the North an equal stake in a prosperous and stable Uganda.

Museveni inherited little beyond the determination of the Ugandan people: a nation needed to be rebuilt, the infrastructure developed over half a century, and destroyed during decades of war and neglect, needed to be recreated, and a people ravaged by war had found a new scourge -- AIDS. One of only a few bilateral donors present at the end of hostilities and active when the World Bank was just moving in, USAID began to work in close partnership with Ugandans to build their peace and make it work. Early efforts facilitated return of displaced Ugandans, seeds and tools were provided to returning soldiers and credit to returning farmers. USAID worked with the IMF, World Bank, and other donors to stabilize the economy and rehabilitate financial institutions as well as key economic infrastructure such as roads and bridges. USAID worked with the people to help heal the wounds of AIDS and war.

As the peace became established, USAID's program shifted to help Ugandans make the peace work by increasing access to and investment in a thriving economy and prosperous future. Over the last five years, USAID has made crucial contributions to improving the agriculture and business climate in the country, and farmers and entrepreneurs are responding. More than 100,000 new small and micro-businesses have been established in

the last five years, and agricultural sector growth has exceeded 5% a year since 1991. Coffee exports, principally produced by smallholders, grew by 16% last year, with high value non-traditional crops, such as flowers and vanilla (grown by women), showing 26% growth per year. Total annual agricultural exports -- to the region and beyond -- grew four-fold between 1990 and 1995, with maize and bean exports enhancing regional food security. Infrastructure remains critical, and P.L. 480 Title III resources financed the rehabilitation of over 6,500 kilometers of rural feeder roads.

At the same time, USAID investments have emphasized social equity. Thus, investments in primary education have achieved significant results for ensuring future participation in economic growth by all: 11% of the primary school labor force -- teachers, principals, and tutors -- have been trained with USAID support; Government of Uganda resources for primary education tripled, and primary school teachers are now paid a living wage -- up from $8 per month to $72 per month. Books and materials are now competitively purchased at a lower cost, and can be selected directly by schools to meet their needs. After years of few students or teachers, fewer schools, and no materials, Uganda has created a professional cadre of primary school teachers committed to students and equipped with 1.5 million text books purchased last year alone. Gross enrollment of the school-aged population increased from 55% to 73% by last year. USAID is continuing to work with Ugandans to expand this ratio to 85% by 2002, and to make this investment level financially sustainable.

USAID has also worked closely with Ugandans on issues of maternal and reproductive health, HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted disease, and fertility. Important gains have been made, though much remains to be done. USAID has worked with Ugandans in developing major and continuing initiatives to upgrade the skills of health care providers in family planning and maternal health, mass-media communications, community education, contraceptive social marketing, and HIV testing and counseling. Although cause and effect are difficult to establish, it appears that USAID's efforts have had an impact on reducing fertility by nearly 10%, infant and child mortality by 20 and 17% respectively, and stabilized or reduced sero-positive cases among women visiting ante-natal clinics in Kampala -- and it appears that this may be the result of reducing high-risk sexual behavior.

Reflecting on the schism between north and south 11 years ago, it is the gains in the political arena that speak most strongly to national reconciliation. From dictatorship and coup, the country moved to establish democratic principles and test them over the last two years. In 1995, a new constitution establishing Uganda as a representative democracy was adopted. In 1996, successful democratic elections were held at the presidential and parliamentary levels.

Thus, a democratic transition coupled with pro-business monetary and economic policies and pro-equity social investments have led to increased security, renewed investor confidence, and supported robust economic growth (nearly nine percent last year). But much remains to be done, and a durable peace is still in the making:

- households remain poor -- average annual expenditures range from only $43 to $52 per family, barely enough for food or school fees or needed drugs -- so income growth is vital to improving lives and increasing the financial sustain ability of social programs;
- fertility remains high at 6.8 children per woman, HIV infection rates remain high, as do infant and child mortality;
- natural resources of global significance, such as the mountain gorilla and its forest habitat, are in danger of extinction -- while this is exacerbated by regional instability, hope for protection in a stable Uganda is real;
- regional disparities need to be overcome to ensure political stability; and
- nascent democratic institutions need to be strengthened and tested, as well as public fora enhanced to encourage broad domestic debate without tension, and the role of Uganda as a regional model and leader for democratic opportunity and economic growth firmly established.

Continued investments in the democratic sector, in economic growth and the social sectors, and in the environment are required to make the peace hold and give everyone a stake in a stable future.

... Thus, though the progress is fragile, there is reason to Hope -- not only in Uganda, but throughout the Greater Horn of Africa and beyond.

The FY 1998 Budget Proposal
Progress in Africa, and performance of USAID programs in Africa, is real and encouraging. But challenges remain, and investments in economic growth combined with increased social equity and improved democratic participation are required to ensure that the gains remain real and sustained. Such investments will serve to help people help themselves and prosper over the long-term and avoid costly relief efforts in the short-term.

Encouraging Broad-Based Economic Growth Request $ 335,900,000
Promoting broad-based economic growth is fundamental to the success of USAID's sustainable development strategy in Africa. American assistance must stimulate growth to move beyond dependency of individuals upon the state and of states upon donors. Thus, it is critical that USAID continue support for those sectors that promote the health and independence of African economies: smallholder agriculture and small and medium enterprises.

Agriculture remains the backbone of most African economies, affecting the well being of virtually all Africans in terms of household income and food security and the national economy. Small and medium scale enterprises are also vital to the health of African economies because this is the source of job growth and diversification of production. Thus, USAID will support the expansion of non-traditional export and market liberalization and small and medium enterprise development.

For FY1998 USAID requests Development Funds for Africa and Economic Support Funds to support agricultural and small and medium scale enterprise development in Angola, Benin, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, and through regional programs in the Greater Horn of Africa (GHAI), the Initiative for Southern Africa (ISA), and the regional support program. In addition, USAID expects to provide an additional $19,900,000 in P.L. 480 Title III assistance to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.

Food Security Initiative: ($25,000,000)
Not requested as a separate account, but significant in its intent and potential impact, USAID is proposing a new Food Security Initiative in Africa. Recognizing the increasing threat to food security in the region posed by trends in agricultural production and population growth, the new initiative will underscore policy, technology, and infrastructure constraints to enhancing food production and marketing. In this pilot year of a ten-year effort, USAID will highlight programs in Ethiopia, Uganda, Malawi, Mozambique, and Mali to increase attention and resources on these constraints. At the same time, these resources and programs will be supplemented by activities proven to enhance child survival. USAID's goal for this program over the ten-year period is to increase child survival by increasing access to food and other services so as to reduce child survival rates in a sustainable manner.

Stabilizing World Population Growth and Protecting Human Health $241,300,000
Stemming Africa's high population growth rate is a typical strategic objective in USAID's full sustainable development country programs, because there id great synergy with other USAID objectives: unchecked population growth erodes economic growth, undermines the ability to reach food security, exacerbates environmental degradation, and fuels political instability. Thus, it is critical both to sustainable development and crisis prevention.

Infant and Child mortality rates in Africa remain the highest in the world, and USAID will continue its significant assistance to strengthening health delivery systems and expanding immunization and oral rehydration therapy coverage. Of increasing importance, however, is the positive relationship between food security and child survival. Therefore, those countries selected to participate in the new Food Security Initiative are those where need and opportunity combine to suggest that important gains in child survival can be gained -- USAID will be watching performance in these countries closely. Since child survival is so important, USAID programs in this area are extensive.

Finally, HIV/AIDS is and will remain a major health and economic problem in Africa for the foreseeable future. USAID will continue its efforts to increase public awareness of its causes and of the behavioral changes needed to prevent transmission of this disease.

In population, child health, and AIDS/HIV area programming, USAID's FY1998 request will support activities in Angola, Benin, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and through regional support programs

for Africa and West Africa. Of the total funding requested, $86.6 million is planned for population activities and $154.7 million is planned for health activities.

Protecting the Environment Request: $100,500,000
Africa's lands are fragile and subject to uncertain rains and drought, yet it remains a continent of vast but still-untold natural resource wealth. Thus, managing the natural resources (NRM) of this immense continent is vital to sustainable agricultural production and far beyond. USAID programs that have agricultural development as an objective are also commonly supporting development of sound NRM policies and host country capacity to monitor environmental changes and early warning systems. Such programs also develop and demonstrate environmentally sound production and processing techniques. For FY1998, USAID proposes funding major NRM programs in Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and in regional programs such as the GHAI and ISA.

Building Democracy Request: $67,200,000
Africa is changing. No longer a continent of dictatorship and authoritarian regime, Africa's people are demanding increased transparency, accountability, participation in national economies and government and governments are becoming increasingly free and democratic. USAID support for democratization and civil society includes electoral support, strengthening democratic institutions such as free press and independent legislatures and judiciary branches, developing NGOs, as well as promoting conflict resolution and demobilization of troops. For FY1998, USAID proposes funding for important democratic governance efforts in Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and through regional programs such as the GHAI and ISA.

Humanitarian Assistance: $262,147,000
USAID plans to provide $262,147,000 in P.L. 480 Title II assistance to Angola, Benin, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, and Uganda. The emergency component of these resources cannot be predicted at this time.